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China’s economic growth has come with the cost of environmental deteriora-
tion. The economy has faced with many problems in land resource depletion and
industrial pollution. I examine two policies that tackle three major environmental
aspects on land, water, and air in China. All three chapters share the theme that
devolution without enough oversights in environmental policies has lead to unin-
tended consequences in practice, as local officials have their trade-offs to promote
local economy and protect environment.
The first chapter explores the local government’s behavior in a land conser-
vation program, which intends to reduce soil erosion by subsidizing afforestation
of low productive farmland on steep slopes. Theoretically, the incentives created
by the program combined with insufficient oversight have led to afforestation of
highly productive farmland on level ground. With a unique land transition dataset,
I show that this unintended land use effect has been substantial. This unexpected
displacement of highly productive farmland represents a form of leakage that has
not been fully explored in the literature. And it is problematic to a country with
limited arable land relative to population size as it can negatively impact national
food production targets and self-sufficiency goals.
The second chapter investigates water pollution activities under China’s Pol-
lution Reduction Mandates. In response to the substantial environmental dete-
rioration, the central government taxes firm emissions and subsidizes abatement
technology installation. In theory, devolution to local governments to lower pollu-
tion and promote economic growth can create local incentives to allocate subsidies
to effectively export pollution. I provide the first evidence of the magnitude of these
distortions with unique firm-level pollution panel data and find evidence of water
pollution exported to downstream and further away from local residences. A sim-
ulation indicates that the distortions created by local jurisdictional control harm
the environment substantially: centralized allocation of subsidies could reduce total
emissions by 20-30%.
The third chapter keeps investigating the inter-jurisdictional pollution exter-
nalities on air pollution under the same mandates. It provides a complimentary ev-
idence to show that local governments have incentives to promote spatial spillovers
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Chapter 1: General Introduction
1.1 Overview
China’s economic growth has come with the cost of the rapid deterioration
of environmental quality and the depletion of natural resources. The economy has
faced with many problems in land use, ecological conservation, and industrial pol-
lution to water and air (Deng et al., 2012; Kan et al., 2012; Zhang and Wen, 2008).
Although air pollution due to rapid industrialization in China has attracted the
world’s attention (Chen et al., 2012; Matus et al., 2012; Vennemo et al., 2009), the
corresponding industrial activities and waste disposals are the major sources of water
pollution and soil contamination as well. Beneficial nutrients and toxic heavy metals
in rivers have caused significant impacts to residents’ health and local agricultural
production (Chen et al., 2005; Singh et al., 2004). China is experiencing land degra-
dation, which is a long-term loss in ecosystem. With 22% of the world’s population
but 7.2% of the world’s arable land, China suffers the most from the impact of land
degradation. The estimated loss from land degradation was $38.7 billion in 1999
alone (Bai and Dent, 2009; Zhang et al., 2007). China’s major freshwater lakes are
also extremely polluted, with the water in half of China’s twenty-seven major lakes
unsuitable for any use (Vennemo et al., 2009). As noted in Economy (2007), land,
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water, and air are three major environmental issues in China: “China’s environ-
mental problems are mounting. Water pollution and water scarcity are burdening
the economy, rising levels of air pollution are endangering the health of millions of
Chinese, and much of the country’s land is rapidly turning into desert”.
My dissertation is comprised of three essays on two environmental policies
that tackle these three aspects in China. The first essay focuses on a land conser-
vation program, the latter two essays examine the water and air aspects of a pollu-
tion reduction policy, respectively. Because of the political management system in
china, all three essays share the same core: devolution without enough oversights
in environmental policies in China has lead to unintended consequences in prac-
tice. Although the existence of environmental externalities in both agricultural and
industrial sectors provide a rationale for governmental intervention, the attempts
to correct these market failures may not be efficient or cause additional problems
during the implementation process.
I explore the performance of these environmental policies in China with an
emphasis on the incentives of local governments, which have their own incentives to
promote local economy for their careers, and are pressurized from the central govern-
ment to protect environment. As noticed by Schofer and Granados (2006), decen-
tralization has empowered local officials to link their self-interest to local economic
performance, which is often not completely in lines with the central government’s
interests. From local authorities’ perspectives, industrialization and economic devel-
opment provide more direct fiscal return, and can further strengthen their legitimacy
of political positions.
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The three papers are organized as follows. The first paper explores the local
government’s behavior in a land conservation program, Grain for Green Program,
which intends to reduce soil erosion by subsidizing reforestation of farmland located
on steep slopes with low crop productivity. I show theoretically that the incentives
created by the program combined with insufficient oversight have led to afforestation
of non-sloped highly productive farmland. With a unique land transition dataset, I
show that this unintended land use effect has been substantial, amounting to nearly
one-fifth of the total amount of cropland converted to forest. This unexpected
displacement of highly productive farmland represents a form of slippage/leakage
that has not been fully explored in the literature on payment for ecosystem services
programs. This form of land displacement is significant in the context of China as
well as other countries with limited arable land relative to population size as it can
negatively impact national food production targets and self-sufficiency goals. This
paper points out some weaknesses in China’s governance system, which delegates a
great deal of authority to local officials with potentially insufficient checks on the
part of the central government. The full version of the paper is in Chapter 2.
The second paper provides an investigation of water pollution activities under
China’s Pollution Reduction Mandates, in which water pollutants are strategically
exported across jurisdictional boundaries. In response to the substantial environ-
mental deterioration, the central government taxes firm emissions and recycles the
revenue to subsidize installation of abatement technology. In theory, the central gov-
ernment mandates local governments to lower pollution while promoting economic
growth, which creates local incentives to allocate pollution control subsidies in ways
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to effectively export pollution. I provide the first evidence of the magnitude of these
distortions in this paper. An econometric investigation using unique firm-level pol-
lution panel data finds evidence of water pollution exported to downstream and
further away from local residences. A simulation using the estimated parameters
indicates that the distortions created by local jurisdictional control harm the envi-
ronment substantially: centralized allocation of those subsidies could reduce total
emissions by 20-30%. This paper underscores the importance of a certain degree
of centralization in environmental policies due to the conflicting incentives between
environmental protection and economic growth at the local level. The full version
of this paper is in Chapter 3.
The third paper keeps investigating the inter-jurisdictional pollution external-
ities on air polluting activities under the same Pollution Reduction Mandates. I use
the same conceptual framework in Chapter III to explain the observed geograph-
ical distortion, i.e., local governments can strategically allocate pollution control
subsidies in ways to effectively export discharged air pollution away from their
jurisdictions that optimally balance the tradeoff between pollution reduction and
promoting local economic growth. The paper provides a complimentary evidence
in air pollution to further show that local governments have strong incentives to
promote spatial spillovers and free-ride on the downwind neighbors. Specifically, it
empirically shows that a firm has a higher pollution incentive if it locates closer to
a provincial leeward border or in an area with a higher wind speed on average. The
full version of this paper is in Chapter 4.
The following section provides a detailed review of China’s political back-
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ground, which sheds some light on the implementation challenges of environmental
policies in China. In summary, the central government has recognized the negative
environmental impacts on its economy, and responded with several ambitious en-
vironmental goals in the recent two decades. However, China’s hierarchic political
system with authority devolution can lead to inefficiency in the implementation.
Using a cadre responsibility and evaluation system to examine local performance
may force local officials to focus on myopic achievements and ignore unrewarding
responsibilities. Other countries fell into similar circumstances may draw a lesson
from China’s inefficient environmental policy implementation process.
1.2 Background on China’s Environmental Policies
1.2.1 Evolution of China’s Environmental Concerns
While China still gives GDP growth the highest priority, attentions to environ-
mental quality concerns are growing. The boosting economy is accompanied with
endangered resource depletion and serious pollution. The conflict between environ-
ment and development is prominent. China’s leaders have started to worry about
the environment’s impact on the economy. Several studies estimate that environ-
mental degradation and pollution have costed the Chinese economy between 8 to
12 percent of GDP annually (Economy, 2007). The Chinese central government has
correspondingly changed its focus from pure GDP growth to objectives that include
environmental protection (Bo, 1996; Chen et al., 2005; Wang, 2013). After the dev-
astating floods in the summer of 1998, the central government has recognized the
5
importance of soil erosion prevention and the urgency of ecological conservation.
China started to ban natural forest logging and subsidize steep arable land con-
version to forests and grassland with its “Grain for Green” (GfG) Program, which
is “a historic shift of focus” in China’s environmental protection (Zhang and Wen,
2008). The central government has issued several important ecological conservation
decisions since then, including the Law on Prevention and Control of Desertification
(2001), the National Zoning of Ecological Function (2004), the Law on Natural Re-
serves, and the 11th Five-Year Plan for ecological conservation (2005). The number
and area of nature reserves increased from approximately 5% to 15% of the country’s
territory from 1995 to 2005 as a direct result of the change in ecological conservation
focus (Zhang and Wen, 2008).
Despite some early successes in soil-erosion reduction and ecological rehabil-
itation, China is still facing many natural resource problems and significant envi-
ronmental degradation caused by industrialization. China initiated a program for
acid rain control in the SO2 Control Region in 1998. The Law on the Prevention
and Control of Air Pollution was revised in 2000. More laws related to air pol-
lution control has been issued since then. In addition to serious air pollution in
major cities, China faces deteriorating water quality as well. It amended the Law
on Marine Environment in 1999, and has been implementing the Green Engineer-
ing Program since 2001 to promote the treatment of pollution in key catchment
(OECD, 2006). Starting in 2005 (the beginning of the 10th Five-Year Plan), the
central government began to increase investment in environmental protection, set
ambitious targets for the reduction of pollution and energy intensity (the amount of
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energy used to produce a unit of GDP), and introduce new environmentally friendly
technologies (Economy, 2007).
In general, China has gradually shifted its focus from pure economic growth to
plans emphasizing environmental protection and other public goals like health care
and education. Over the last decade, reduction of environmental pollution loads
and better management of natural resources have become priorities of state policies
(Yuan et al., 2006). Its 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) sets several environmental
achievements under China’s Pollution Reduction Mandates as important targets.
The country has become more sustainable from the policy’s point of view. This
shift also relies largely on the change in cadre promotion incentives and assigned
responsibilities (Wu et al., 2013).
1.2.2 China’s Cadre Responsibility and Evaluation System
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manages the country with a credit-
based promotion for its Party and government officials (also known as cadres). The
CCP politburo and central committee is at the apex of this political hierarchy,
which has five layers of administration (center, provinces, prefecture, counties, and
townships).1 Each level of administration (including a village) has a communist
party branch ruled by a party secretary and an administrative office ruled by a
jurisdictional leader (governor, mayor, or even a village head). Although this dual
presence of the communist party and government executive officials at each level
1A village is the lowest level in this government system, although it has no formal governmental
level.
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seems like a balanced coordination of authority, a party secretary usually has greater
control over the nominal jurisdictional leader at the same level of governance (Eaton
and Kostka, 2014; Li and Zhou, 2005; Zhang et al., 2004).
Due to the great heterogeneity in China, local governments have plenty of dis-
cretion powers to direct local economic development and provide pollution reduction
services (Wang and Di, 2002). The central government relies heavily on local officials
to execute its plans, while the establishment and management of the practices are
quantity-, rather than quality-based. Inherited from the previous planned economy,
China’s environmental governance is largely based on the command-and-control reg-
ulation (Liu et al., 2012). Although China has a nominally top-down authoritarian
control, its fiscal authority has been greatly decentralized since the start of the
economic reform in 1978. Because of the fiscal decentralization, the central govern-
ment rewards or punish local officials on the basis of their political performance.
The central government, or CCP, strengthens the political control among their lo-
cal governmental cadres based on two means: performance evaluation and rotating
positions.
As noticed in a group of studies, a cadre’s past performance, evidenced by
economic development outcomes, is mainly affecting this person’s odds of promo-
tion, conditional on the political conformity. (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Chen
et al., 2005; Edin, 2003; Li and Zhou, 2005; Maskin et al., 2000; Whiting, 2017; Wu
et al., 2013). The standard yardstick competition among local officials under the
reward and punishment mechanism in China forces cadres to concentrate on eco-
nomic ranking or GDP growth rates (Li and Zhou, 2005; Maskin et al., 2000; Qian
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and Xu, 1993). Local officials are enthusiastic to collect taxes and levies, implement
local plans, and fulfill assigned quotas, while reluctant to provide local public goods
and services (Zhang et al., 2004). Similarly, Wu et al. (2013) has shown that CCP
cadres intend to fulfill responsibilities that can boost local economy and increase the
odds of their promotion, while ignoring the unrewarding responsibilities like certain
environmental investment, even when the central government started to emphasize
the importance of environmental quality. The next subsection provides more details
in the change of this evaluation.
Each level of cadres will be evaluated by the upper level governments, and
they will be promoted, demoted, or moved laterally every three to four years. Cen-
tral government use this periodic turnover as a tool to enhance the control and
monitoring of local officials. It is also important to maintain a certainly level of
cadre circulation as it helps to bridge departments and jurisdictions vertically and
horizontally (Edin, 2003; Huang, 1999; Wright, 2008). However, this short-term
rotation could jeopardize the implementation of environmental policies. Local offi-
cials are likely to choose a quick and low-quality approach to fulfill the mission, as
relatively costly and long-term initiatives are likely to yield outcomes outside their
tenure (Eaton and Kostka, 2014).
1.2.3 Authority Devolution in Environmental Governance
Evaluation of local governments’ performance is a way to decentralize author-
ities from the central government. Instead of planning and coordinating from the
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ministries at the center, higher-level officials can simply assess lower-level officials
based on a series of criteria for promotion. Because of the economic reforms in
1978, each local jurisdictional leaders are empowered with the ultimate authority
to allocate economic resources within their jurisdictions (Huang, 1999; Qian and
Xu, 1993). Since then, local officials have started to be obsessed with the relative
economic ranking (along with other competence-related indicators gradually added
over the years) among peers.
Other policies are also following the same hierarchical governing process. For
instance, when the decentralized pollution reduction mechanism is introduced in
China, the environmental protection pressure has passed to local officials due to
the new environmental demand. The central government’s evaluation adds the cri-
teria on environmental quality, while the evaluation of local economic-growth still
remains. Each local government is responsible for the environmental quality un-
der their jurisdiction and shall take measures to improve the environment quality
without threatening the local GDP growth.
Although the central government has established this decentralized system to
control and prevent pollution in 1980s. Evaluation of environmental performance has
not been emphasized and actively enforced until the most recent years. Therefore,
local cadres chose to ignore the environmental targets before 2007, as the odds of
promotion hinged on economic performance only (Chen et al., 2018; Jia, 2017; Jiang
et al., 2014). During the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), the central government
revised the evaluation criteria and assigned pollution reduction targets to each local
officials, and has included pollution reduction performance into local governments’
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promotion evaluation since 2007.
The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in China (the counterpart
of the Environmental Protection Agency in the US), is responsible to set general
but vague guidance of environmental policies and regulations (Yang, 2017). Local
environmental protection bureaus (EPBs), which are controlled by the corresponding
level of local governments, are responsible to set and enforce detailed rules in their
own jurisdictions (Rooij and Lo, 2010; Zheng and Kahn, 2013). Conflicts of interests
between different layers of governments can emerge due to the substantial discretion
at local (Golding, 2011; Lo et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2003).2 As explained above,
the central government adopts the new promotion criteria in hope of emphasizing
the environmental concerns at local.
The change in the criteria of the cadre performance evaluation can be viewed as
a shift in the goals of the central government. Unfortunately, the central government
has relatively “loosely-worded environmental directives”, which rely mainly on the
improvisation of local leaders (Eaton and Kostka, 2014; Heilmann, 2008). The local
governments are required to undertake the major responsibilities of environmental
protection, and integrate the tasks into the target responsibility system, a key insti-
tutional arrangement for environmental performance evaluation that provides local
officials with political incentives to promote pollution control policies (Lo, 2014).
However, the flexibility to interpret the policies provide the opportunities for cadres
to select the favorable directives strategically. When local economic growth, social
2However, conflicts of interests at the same layer of governments will be coordinated by the
central government, which believes that lower-level regional negotiation could weaken the power
of the center (Tyler, 2005).
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planning, and environmental targets are incorporated into one cadre responsibility
and evaluation system, local officials have to allocate limited local resources to the
projects that are likely to boost the career prospects in the short-run (O’Brien and
Li, 2017).
Local governments have strong incentive to boost the local economy for their
promotion during the GDP-based competition period, and have to take the respon-
sibilities of both promoting local development and protecting environment under
the revised cadre evaluation system. They need to carry out the assigned tasks
by the central government, but have their own interests in local economic growth.
When the two incentives do not match, the trade-off decisions made by the lo-
cal governments may increase the conflicts between natural resources and the local
communities.
Comparing to local governments’ strong favor of economic development, lo-
cal environmental institutions (EPBs) have very little experience or institutional
capacity to conduct local environmental regulations (Jahiel, 1998; Shi and Zhang,
2006). China did not have a strong environmental state with effective monitoring
and enforcement capacity to oversee the regime of pollution control (Wang et al.,
2004). On the other hand, it has been noticed that local regulators are self-interested
utility maximizers, and may favor environmental benefits only because they have
some rents to seek. Under the guidelines of concentrating on economic development,
industrialization is universally considered by local government officials as the only
path leading to modernization. The local officials have a notion called “first pollution
and then remediation”, which suggests an obsession with the economic development
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while overlooking other important social aspects and the unintended consequences
(Li, 2013). Local economic situations are the key role in determining career ad-
vancement of local officials, and the local institutions and government bureaucrats
are more inclined to boost economic growth than concerned about environmental
pollution control (Guo, 2007; Li and Zhou, 2005).
In general, the hierarchic political system in China has the following three key
features that may influence environmental policy implementation: authority devo-
lution with performance evaluation, relatively vague environmental directives, and
short-term rotation. Because of this political background, local governments exe-
cute environmental policies in a relatively irresponsible way. They tend to prioritize
local economic growth over environmental quality, modify the environmental rules
locally, and may adopt cheap and quick approaches to fulfill the mission.
If the central government wish to improve environmental quality by relying on
local officials’ activities, it should (1) go in tandem with checks and balances with
an independent monitoring group; (2) use detailed and measurable responsibilities
on low-level cadres; and (3) evaluate cadres’ performance based on the activities
(such as the investment in abatement technologies) rather than the outcomes (such
as the level of average BOD in the jurisdiction) during their tenure periods.
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Chapter 2: Unintended Land Use Effects of Afforestation in China’s
Grain for Green Program
2.1 Introduction
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs are increasingly seen as an
attractive means for combatting environmental degradation. They have been shown
to provide regional public goods such as hydrological services and erosion control
(Alix-Garcia and Wolff, 2014). At the same time, they can alleviate poverty by
making provision of environmental services economically desirable for low income
land users (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010; Wunder, 2005). Unfortunately, PES
programs are prone to implementation problems, especially in developing countries
where governmental oversight tends to be deficient (Alix-Garcia and Wolff, 2014;
Pattanayak et al., 2010). This lack of oversight in PES programs can lead to un-
intended effects. This article investigates a PES program in China to illustrate an
unexplored form of land displacement. Specifically, it shows that China’s PES pro-
gram, which aims to reforest sloped farmland with high risk of erosion, inadvertently
This essay is published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics (https://doi.org/
10.1093/ajae/aay107). The format has been changed to be consistent in this thesis. I would like
to thank Erik Lichtenberg for the guidance and comments that greatly improved the manuscript.
My grateful thanks also extended to Stephen Salant, Robert Chambers, David Newburn, Lori
Lynch, the editor and four anonymous reviewers for their helpful advice and comments.
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converts flat productive farmland into forest.
Deforestation has been an important contributor to numerous environmental
problems in China, most notably soil erosion, which results in land degradation,
sedimentation of rivers, downstream flooding, and other problems (Cao et al., 2011;
Deng et al., 2012; Feng et al., 2010; Long et al., 2006). A significant share of that de-
forestation was driven by the national government’s goal of increasing domestic food
production during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962). More recently, the Chinese
government engaged in a massive effort to reconvert much of that deforested land
to forest. In 2000, the Chinese government launched the “Sloped Land Conversion
Program” or “Grain for Green” (GfG), which paid farmers to convert cropland on
hillsides with high risk of erosion into forest. GfG aimed to reforest nearly 15 million
hectares of high-risk cropland by 2010 (Uchida et al., 2005). As one of the largest
PES programs in the world, GfG has been successful in reforesting large amounts of
land, with forested land area increasing by almost 18%, 1.2% annually (FAO, 2015).
However, the program had the unintended effect of creating incentives to con-
vert highly productive cropland with low risk of erosion to forest, which significantly
reduced the cost effectiveness of GfG. This excess land conversion is particularly
problematic for China’s food production goals. As a result, the costs in terms of
foregone output could outweigh any environmental benefits achieved.
This article makes three contributions to the PES literature. First, it stud-
ies a new type of leakage in the form of a perverse land use outcome caused by a
PES program; namely, enrollment of un-targeted flat farmland with high crop yield
potential, while targeted farmland with lower crop yield potential remains in culti-
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vation. Second, it shows that the cost-effectiveness of the program is significantly
reduced by this unintended conversion. The subsidies to convert low-erosion-risk
farmland, which yields little environmental benefit, account for nearly five-sixths of
the total loss under the program. Third, the article explores this unintended effect
theoretically and empirically with a unique dataset that specifies transitions of land
use in China. This detailed nationwide dataset allows me to conduct a pre/post
policy analysis and provide regional comparisons.
I develop a conceptual framework explaining the conditions under which it is
optimal for village leaders to use GfG to subsidize afforestation of highly productive
flat farmland, contrary to the intended purpose of the program. I use a model of
local heads’ (village-level administrators) land use decisions to derive the conditions
under which GfG subsidies make it optimal for them to convert highly productive
farmland into forest. This land allocation is not cost-effective from the central
government’s perspective, because of the high value it puts on un-targeted land
(productive farmland with low erosion risk) and the low social benefit from paying for
this type of conversion. The analysis indicates that such unintended land conversion
is more likely to occur in (a) areas where the productivity of high quality cropland
is low relative to GfG subsidy levels, (b) areas where the value of forested land
is relatively high, and (c) in areas where there is an abundance of high quality
cropland.
I investigate the extent to which this unintended land conversion occurs us-
ing a unique panel dataset containing confidential annual county records of land
transitions combined with socioeconomic data from county statistical yearbooks.
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The dataset spans the years 1996-2004, covering a period prior to the program, ex-
tending through the gradual rollout of the program, and continuing into the years
after implementation. I use a difference-in-difference (DID) strategy, with county
and year fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Two falsification
tests (estimating differences in time trends in treated versus un-treated provinces
in the pre-treatment period and a placebo test re-estimating the DID model over
the pre-treatment period) indicate the common trend assumption is valid. Two
major robustness checks using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model and
DID-Matching are conducted.
The results indicate that unintended conversion of highly productive/low-
erosion-risk cropland was substantial, amounting to nearly one-fifth of the total
amount of cropland converted to forest. A share-change model suggests that unin-
tended conversion of high productivity and low-erosion-risk cropland amounted to
about 8% of the pre-program stock. As predicted by the theoretical model, con-
version of low-erosion-risk cropland was greater in areas where crop productivity
was low relative to reforestation subsidies. The estimated highest level of cropland
productivity for reforestation is higher for high productive flat cropland than for
highly-erosion-risk cropland, indicating that some highly productive, flat cropland
was converted to forest while less productive sloped cropland remained in cultiva-
tion.
This article is the first to document a form of unintended land use effects
that has not been fully explored in the literature on PES programs to date. Dis-
placement of deforestation and unintended cultivation due to enrollment in PES
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program (leakage/slippage) has been documented in the US (Fraser and Waschik,
2005; Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramı́rez, 2011; Lubowski et al., 2006; Roberts and
Bucholtz, 2005; Wu, 2000; Wu et al., 2001) and in the context of land threatened
by deforestation in developing countries (Alix-Garcia et al., 2012; Arriagada et al.,
2012). These studies have been concerned with the possibility that PES programs
displace deforestation to unenrolled lands, essentially offsetting the environmental
benefits achieved by the program. In this article, I show the opposite — that PES
programs can enroll land whose benefits in alternative uses outweigh the environ-
mental benefits achieved from conversion. This finding underscores the importance
of independent monitoring for verifying compliance with PES restrictions and goals.
2.2 Motivation and Policy Background
PES projects can have both negative and positive unintended consequences.
The failures of PES programs include encouraging unintended conservation, as well
as deforestation of lands not enrolled in the program (Sills et al., 2008). Both
types of these unintended consequences are caused by the displacement of forest
exploitation known as leakage or slippage (Wu, 2000). Although slippage leads to
production displacement (substitution slippage; see, for instance, Alix-Garcia et al.,
2012; Arriagada et al., 2012; Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramı́rez, 2011) or changing
production incentives on un-enrolled land (price slippage; see, for instance, Murray
et al., 2004; Robalino, 2007), it may generate some positive land use effects.
Positive land use effects can help discourage additional deforestation or en-
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courage afforestation (Pfaff and Robalino, 2012), yet to date, there is little empir-
ical evidence on such positive effects. Some exceptions include studies of slippage
related to the US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) suggesting that it may in-
crease production on neighboring lands (Fleming, 2010), increase farmland values
(Wu and Lin, 2010), and delay non-conservation uses to later periods (Jacobson,
2014). Positive effects are usually considered as a mitigation of slippage and are
assumed to be caused by greater enforcement of PES regulations (Pattanayak et al.,
2010).
Whether the positive land use effects caused by slippage provide additional
conservation benefits or induce problems that mitigate PES program benefits may
vary by context. Some have argued that the additional forested areas, such as those
on flat farmland, may not yield additional environmental services such as prevention
of soil erosion and flood mitigation, as soil erosion mainly occurs on sloped farmland
(Ziadat and Taimeh, 2013). Additional land use change will only deliver services
when the changes are of appropriate quality and location (Pattanayak and Butry,
2005; Sills et al., 2006). More importantly, the unintended conversion of productive
farmland to conservation uses could result in food scarcity in countries with smaller
amounts of arable land relative to their population sizes.
This article helps to broaden the literature by showing that land use changes
viewed as “positive land use effects from land displacement” in developed countries
like the United States may have negative consequences in other contexts. Coun-
tries with scarce arable land often have legitimate concerns about food security.
In those contexts, additional conservation that jeopardizes quality farmland is no
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longer a “positive” effect. More importantly, excess spending on subsidies to con-
vert low-erosion-risk farmland to forest significantly reduces a PES program’s cost-
effectiveness.
Because government and market institutions in developing countries are often
relatively weak, the cost-effectiveness of governmental PES programs is often dif-
ficult to achieve (Landell-Mills et al., 2002; Lipper et al., 2009; Pattanayak et al.,
2010; Wunder et al., 2008). The extent of misallocation documented in this article
emphasizes the importance of monitoring and enforcement in incentive-based poli-
cies for correcting environmental externalities (Coggan et al., 2010; Stavins, 2007).
This article demonstrates that PES programs are likely to be less cost-effective
with problematic unintended effects unless there is sufficient monitoring to ensure
compliance with PES policies and goals.
2.2.1 Background of the Grain for Green Program
Forest policies in China from 1949 to 1998 demonstrate aggressive deforesta-
tion targets. Timber was viewed as a cheap raw material to be used for industrial
production and forests were seen as potential farmlands (Delang and Yuan, 2015).
To feed the burgeoning population and industrialize the nation, China’s central gov-
ernment undertook a massive deforestation campaign beginning in the Great Leap
Forward period (1958-1962). By 1979, 38 million hectares of forestland and wetland
had been transformed into farmland (Feng et al., 2005). With only 0.08 hectares
of arable land per person (in comparison to the world average of 0.20 hectares; see
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World Bank, 2012), a central goal of the national government has always been to
have domestic crop production meet the needs of the population.1
There were no laws governing forests in China until 1978, when the realization
began to take hold that China had a “supply and demand crisis due to insufficient
reforestation” (Richardson, 1990).2 Although some traditional forest land was not
very fertile and prone to erosion when used for crop production, farmers and lo-
cal officials had insufficient incentives to reforest since they could not capture for
themselves most of the benefits of reduced erosion (e.g. protection of watersheds, re-
duction of desertification, and restoration of ecosystems). Rapid exploitation, little
concern for regeneration, and ineffective afforestation after 1962 resulted in devas-
tating floods of the Yangtze River in the summer of 1998 (Robbins and Harrell,
2014). Environmental and ecological problems of the late 1990s forced the govern-
ment to change course and institute an extensive reforestation program, the GfG
program.
This program is one of the world’s largest PES programs, enrolling 40 million
hectares at a cost of $100 billion funded entirely by the central government (Cao
et al., 2011). The GfG program compensates farmers for enrolling farmland by offer-
ing them a combination of cash, grain, and free saplings. Payments vary regionally.
In the middle and upper reaches of the Yellow River and its northern region, the com-
pensation package has a monetized value of 3,150 Yuan/ha (equivalent to $380.51/ha
1Preserving farmland is one of the seven basic national policies in China, which is regulated in
the Land Administration Law.
2The Forest Law was officially promulgated in 1984 to formalize the ownership of trees and
promote forest investments for the first time. It helped to set the groundwork and the legal
framework to implement and operate the Grain for Green program.
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in 1999) for the first year, and 2,400 Yuan/ha (equivalent to $289.91/ha in 1999)
from the second year on. The corresponding values in the middle and upper reaches
of the Yangtze River and its southern region are 4,200 Yuan/ha ($507.35/ha) and
3,450 Yuan/ha ($416.75/ha)(Uchida et al., 2005).3 Subsidies are paid over 8, 5, or
2 years for cropland conversion to timber-producing forest, orchards, or pasture, re-
spectively. The subsidy can be either viewed as a compensation for the farmland’s
opportunity cost, or the governmental price to purchase the positive externality
from soil erosion reduction. Timber-producing forests serve mainly an ecological
function initially, as farmers cannot harvest forest products from them during the
period in which subsidies are paid. In contrast, farmers are allowed to harvest non-
timber products from orchards. Timber-producing forest and orchards increased
substantially when the GfG program started.
The GfG program was primarily designed to reduce the amount of erosion-
prone hillside land for ecological benefits (Xu et al., 2006). Afforestation on these
lands helps to reduce soil erosion and protect watersheds, as well as restoring ecosys-
tems and preventing desertification. The program was initiated to return farmland
with slopes of 25 degrees or more to forests in the upper Yangtze River and Yellow
River Basins as a pilot in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu provinces. It expanded
nationwide beginning in 2000 to cover almost all of China. After a rapid roll-out,
1,897 counties from 25 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities had en-
rolled into the program by 2002 (Deng et al., 2012). In 2004, the central government
3Unused land (like abandoned grassland and swamps that may be suitable to afforest) conversion
has less compensation than farmland conversion, it includes free seed and seedling compensation
and the cash subsidy of 50 Yuan/ha/year (the Regulations, Article 36).
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decided to modify the GfG program’s afforestation policy from mainly converting
farmland to converting unused mountainous land, due to the decrease in grain pro-
duction starting in 2000 (China News, 2013; Xu et al., 2006). Although there is
no assessment on the direct effect of the GfG program on county and national-level
grain production (Gutiérrez Rodŕıguez et al., 2016), there is evidence that the GfG
program has reduced food production in some locales (Bullock and King, 2011;
Zhen et al., 2014). The country suspended the original program in 2007 due to the
concern that it was jeopardizing national farmland production goals set to ensure
self-sufficiency in food production. The program was then transformed into a rural
land maintenance and rural economic development program. At the same time, the
State Council decided to extend the subsidies for enrolled farmland in the first phase
for another 2 to 8 years (Bennett et al., 2014; Gutiérrez Rodŕıguez et al., 2016; State
Forestry and Grassland Administration, 2007). Although the land maintenance in-
volved in the transformed GfG program still has land use impacts, the scale of these
impacts is much smaller. Starting in 2013, when the original subsidies period was
ending, several provinces in western China submitted their GfG program reports
to the State Council to request a program “reboot” (China News, 2013; Li et al.,
2014). Currently, only Sichuan Province has land enrolled in the GfG program due
to the severe land damage and soil erosion caused by the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake
(China News, 2013).
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2.2.2 Program Administration in China
Although the central government set a target for converting farmland (14.67
million ha to forest by 2010), it has been up to the local governments and village
heads to determine how much farmland to convert (State Forestry and Grassland
Administration, 2003; Xu et al., 2010). Village heads administer rural land in China
(Lichtenberg and Ding, 2009), and county-level Forestry Bureaus have been respon-
sible for the overall management of the GfG program, including identifying farmland
eligibility, delivering subsidies and saplings, and maintaining newly afforested area.
Program participants were subsidized conditionally on their ability to convert eli-
gible farmland and maintain a tree survival rate of at least 70-85%. However, the
local land verification and maintenance conducted by the county governments has
resulted in high quality farmland enrollment and low survival rates of planted trees
(Gutiérrez Rodŕıguez et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2010). Furthermore, the central govern-
ment provided subsidies to these county-level authorities based on their reporting
of converted land. These subsidy payments were then supposed to be delivered to
each village, but issues like insufficient subsidy delivery to farmers and involuntary
enrollment were common (Xu and Cao, 2001; Xu et al., 2010). These local officials
delayed or withheld subsidy deliveries because they view the program “as an oppor-
tunity to bring in much-needed government funding” to local government agencies
(Xu et al., 2010).
The objectives of some local officials did not align with those of the central
government (Xu et al., 2004), and county-level authorities adjusted the GfG program
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to fit their local needs and conditions (Delang and Yuan, 2015). In particular,
reforestation subsidies made it attractive to village heads (under the instruction of
local officials) to convert productive flat farmland to forests regardless of formal
restrictions on farmland conversion (Long et al., 2006; Uchida et al., 2005; Xu et al.,
2010).
The regulations governing the GfG program, the Regulations on Conversion
of Farmland to Forests (hereinafter the Regulations), prohibited unauthorized tree
harvesting or damage to ecological functions even after expiration of subsidies (the
Regulations, Article 50).4 The Regulations also emphasized the preservation of
farmland that has relatively good productive conditions or no potential risk of soil
erosion, especially “basic farmland” (the Regulations, Article 4 and 16).5 Con-
version of basic farmland is illegal and subject to penalties if detected (the Land
Administration Law, Article 34 and 36). The program targeted hillside farmland
and unused land prone to erosion. The slope of the land is thus the top criterion for
farmland enrollment (conversion priority is given to higher slope, which is known
as the “slope rule”) because hillside land was highly vulnerable to erosion, caused
nonpoint source pollution, and could contribute to flooding (Feng et al. 2005; Long
et al. 2006; Xu et al. 2004; the Regulations, Article 15).
4Rehabilitation and damaging surface vegetation are considered as criminal activities prohib-
ited by the Forest Law, the Grassland Law, and the Law of Water and Soil Conservation (the
Regulations, Article 62).
5Basic farmland is a type of land under the protection of the Land Administration Law in
China. It is relatively flat and has irrigation and drainage facilities. It includes farmland with
good irrigation and water conservation facilities even the current yield is low. It is forbidden for
tree planting or fish nurturing, but only limited to agricultural uses (the Land Administration




This section contains a theoretical model deriving the conditions under which
it is optimal for village leaders to use the GfG program to subsidize afforestation
of potentially highly productive farmland on level ground, contrary to the intended
purpose of the program. Converting highly erodible farmland to forests has positive
externalities with ecological benefits that affect the whole country, such as preventing
soil erosion and reducing sedimentation, flooding, and nonpoint source pollution.
There is little or no excess of social benefit over private benefit from afforestation on
level farmland. Although the stated policy goal is to subsidize afforestation of only
highly erodible hillside land, early survey results in some counties suggest that the
program unintentionally paid for converting level farmland as well (Uchida et al.,
2005; Xu et al., 2010). As mentioned, a potential cause is weak monitoring by the
central government, which delegates both monitoring and vegetation management
to officials at the county level (the Regulations, Article 31). Under some conditions,
local heads may have incentives to expand afforestation beyond hillside and unused
land, and may thus ignore the “slope rule”.
The following conceptual model of farmland conversion is developed to explore
conditions where unintended conversion is likely to happen. It assumes that the
central government has difficulty enforcing the farmland preservation requirement
because it relies on county-level governments to both implement the program and
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monitor compliance. In China, rural land is administered by village collectives
(Deininger and Jin, 2003; Jacoby et al., 2002; Lichtenberg and Ding, 2009). However,
county-level governments implement and exercise oversight of the GfG program. The
corresponding level of Forestry Bureaus are responsible for the overall management
of the program, including identifying farmland eligibility. Because local officials
may not identify the land carefully before enrollment, which results in some highly
productive farmland being converted, the following theoretical model does not have
the farmland eligibility constraint. Subsidy payments have value to the local heads
either because they appropriate the money themselves or deliver them to farmers
(as intended) for rural activities and local economic growth.
To simplify the exposition, possible land uses are restricted to farmland and
forest land (F ). Farmland is separated into two types: high productivity farmland
on level ground (Al) and highly erodible farmland on hillsides (Ae), only the latter
of which is targeted by the program. F > 0, Al > 0, and Ae > 0 denote the initial
stocks. Let al and ae denote the levels of level and erodible farmland converted to
forest, respectively, in a village. Positive (negative) al or ae means an increase in
forest (farmland) cover.6 To account for the differential quality of land, define the
relative forest productivity with converted land from erodible farmland to the one
from level farmland as 0 < ε ≤ 1.7 Let B(F + al + εae) and πj(Aj − aj) represent
the annualized revenues the village gets from forestry and agricultural sectors, with
6I assume al < Al and ae < Ae in order to concentrate on the interesting case where an
unintended conversion might occur. The assumption reduces only two corner solutions that are
less likely to happen and are not the focus of the article.
7For simplicity, assume the relative forest productivity of converted land from level farmland
to forest land as 1. Adding another quality adjust factor will yield similar results but complicate
the model.
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j = {l, e} representing the land types of level and erodible farmland, respectively.
They are functions of land alone under the assumption that labor and capital used
in production are not constrained, i.e., they adjust instantaneously with the land.8
The costs of conversion include both labor costs and seedling purchases. Be-
cause the seeds are produced locally and redistributed to adjacent areas in this
program (the Regulations, Article 26), transportation costs and profit seeking from
seedling purchases can be ignored. Let Cl(al) and Ce(ae) represent the total cost of
converting level and erodible farmland, respectively. Assume diminishing marginal
returns of the benefit and revenue functions, B′(·), π′j(·) > 0 and B′′(·), π′′j (·) ≤ 0,
and convex cost functions C ′j(aj) > 0, C
′′
j (aj) ≥ 0 when aj > 0 and C ′j(aj) < 0,
C ′′j (aj) ≥ 0 when aj < 0. The costs of converting farmland to forest and forest to
farmland are expected to be different.9 I assume tree logging and land rehabilita-
tion requires higher effort than reforestation on farmland: −C ′j(âj) > C ′j(ãj) when
âj < 0 < ãj and âj, ãj ∈ aj. The cost functions are thus kinked at the origin and
C ′j(0) is undefined. The subsidy for converting a unit of farmland of either type
is fixed. Let S be the total monetized subsidy payment per unit of farmland con-
version, and S · [max(al, 0) + max(ae, 0)] be the total compensation the local area
received because of the unintended payment to convert level farmland. Assume S
is converted to the present value in the first year’s implementation.10
8A social planner from the central government’s perspective may have a higher weight on the
benefits of level farmland.
9The assumption of convex conversion cost is because in a village, increasing area of conversion
involves more households and more local negotiation, as well as additional costs of sapling delivery
paid at the local, which may increase the marginal cost of conversion.
10Conversion constraints under the program are not included because local officials have the
bargaining power to undershoot or overshoot land conversion quotas.
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The village head chooses the area of level and erodible farmland to enroll in
the GfG program to maximize net benefits of land to the village:
maxW (al, ae) = V (al, ae) + S · [max(al, 0) + max(ae, 0)]
s.t. al < Al and ae < As








The individual rationality condition should also be satisfied: prior to the subsidy
(when S = 0), no additional conversion is needed because land must have been
distributed across the three types of land in an optimal way for the local area, i.e.,
(0, 0) solves maxV (al, ae). Because Cj(x) is kinked at the origin, so is V (al, ae),
and the conditions V +j (0, 0) ≤ 0 and V −j (0, 0) > 0 are assumed to be satisfied to
guarantee this optimum.11 The superscripts + and − denote right and left partial
derivatives. The subscript j under V or W represents partial derivatives with respect
to aj.
An implicit requirement to the local condition is also needed(V +l (0, 0) <
V +e (0, 0)(≤ 0)), in order to guarantee that a certain subsidy level is able to induce
afforestation of only the erodible farmland in that region. The condition means
that even if forest output on the level farmland would be weakly more valuable,
afforesting on one unit of level farmland results in a higher loss than afforesting on
one unit of erodible farmland.
11The conditions can be interpreted as converting one additional unit of farmland(forest) to
forest(farmland) costs more effort than the received land values.
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2.3.2 Conditions of Unintended Level Farmland Conversion
The primary interest is to find out when converting level farmland is more
likely to occur, which is equivalent to deriving the conditions under which village
heads convert only erodible farmland. All cases violating these conditions may lead
to unintended phenomenon. Because the first order condition of (2.1) suggests that
aj > 0 if W
+
j (0, 0) = S+V
+
j (0, 0) > 0. To follow the Regulations without converting
level farmland, S + V +l (0, 0) ≤ 0 < S + V +e (0, 0) is required, which is equivalent to
the following conditions that the subsidy level must satisfy:
S +B′(F )− π′l(Al)− C ′l(0+) ≤ 0 (2.2)
S + εB′(F )− π′e(Ae)− C ′e(0+) > 0 (2.3)
Violating these conditions may lead to not only cases of positive conversion in
both types of farmland (when both (2.2) and (2.3) are positive) or no participation
in the program (when both (2.2) and (2.3) are nonpositive), but also the possibility
of afforestation only on level farmland (when (2.2) is positive and (2.3) is nonpos-
itive).12 The condition is more likely to be violated when one or more situations
described in the following two paragraphs happen.
Condition (2.2) is more likely to be violated in areas that have (a) higher
marginal value of forest, (b) lower marginal value of level farmland, (c) relatively
lower marginal cost of converting level farmland, (d) lower stock of forest, or (e)
12Because S is set exogenously by the central government before the program started, it may or
may not reflect the true external benefits that a PES program intends to capture.
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higher stock of level farmland. The first three conditions are most likely to be found
in western China, where crop profitability is low relative to forest profitability, and
where level farmland conversion is relatively easier due to low rural population
density. Western China also has a relatively low stock of forested land due in part
to deforestation during the Great Leap Forward period. Some conditions are also
satisfied in eastern China, where there is high stock of level farmland, and where
forest profitability is relatively high.
Condition (2.3) is more likely to be violated in areas that have (a) lower
marginal value of forest, (b) higher marginal value of erodible farmland, (c) relatively
higher marginal cost to convert erodible farmland, (d) higher stock of forest, (e)
lower stock of erodible farmland, or (f) subsidy levels are relatively low to local
conditions. These conditions are most likely to be found in southern China, which
has a low stock of erodible farmland, low forestry productivity, and an average
output of farmland 1.5 times as much as that in northern China. These conditions
give local authorities in southern China less incentive to participate.
2.3.3 Factors Affecting the Amount of Level Farmland Conversion
This subsection explores the conditions under which excess conversion of level
farmland is likely to be more extensive. In the case of converting both types of
farmland, there are a pair of interior solutions for the maximization problem, a∗l >
0 and a∗e > 0, with detailed comparative statics included in the supplementary
appendix online.
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It is straightforward to show:
1. A higher unit subsidy leads to a higher converted amount of both types of
farmland.
2. A smaller amount of forested land or a higher value of forest production leads
to a higher converted amount of both types of farmland.
3. A larger amount of level (erodible) farmland, or a lower value of its farmland
value, leads to a higher converted amount of level (erodible) farmland, and a
lower converted amount of erodible (level) farmland.
4. Larger conversion costs of erodible farmland relative to those of level farmland
lead to a larger (smaller) amount of level (erodible) farmland conversion.
These results suggest different land use impacts driven by local conditions. Local
heads in western China may be more likely to convert both types of farmland due
to their low forest stock, and to convert more level farmland because converting
erodible land on hillsides is relatively costly. The latter may cause serious unintended
conversion of highly productive farmland because labor could be scarce and costly
for sloped land conversion. Local heads in eastern China have a high stock of level
farmland and a low stock of forest, both of which could induce them to convert
more level farmland to forest. Participation and conversion of farmland to forest
are likely to be low in southern China, where agricultural profitability is high, both
absolutely and relatively, compared to returns to forestry.
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2.4 Data
To test the hypotheses derived in the preceding section, I create a unique panel
by combining detailed transition data from the Ministry of Land and Resources
(MLR) of China with socioeconomic data from statistical yearbooks. The annually
land transition and land stock data come from confidential records maintained by
MLR from 1996 to 2004 at the county level. This dataset thus spans the period
during which the program was being implemented. Land use reports from MLR
personnel are compared to China’s Land Survey of 1996 and satellite imagery, as
well as being subject to periodic inspection by central government MLR officials
(Feng et al., 2005; Lin and Ho, 2003).13
The MLR dataset (1996 to 2004) documents the yearly land transition with
47 classes of land cover (8 major categories) in every county and includes stocks
and transitions for all types of land that measured to the nearest 0.1 mu (1 mu
is equivalent to 1/15 hectare) and converted to hectares. There are several major
advantages of the dataset: (1) the dataset documents the uses land came from and
went to as a land transition matrix; (2) the dataset allows me to examine afforesta-
tion of unused land, which has largely been ignored in the previous literature; and
(3) with the nationwide data, I am able to evaluate the land use and land cover
impacts of the GfG program on a yearly basis for the whole country and to examine
regional heterogeneity.
13I have checked the reliability of the MLR land use dataset with data from satellite imagery
available from the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Differences between land uses at the county level
were small in magnitude and not statistically significant. The interested reader can find the details
in a supplementary appendix online.
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Level and erodible farmland are differentiated according to two criteria, the
land gradient and the presence of irrigation facilities. As well, these criteria are used
to define “basic farmland” (the Land Administration Law, Article 34). Irrigated
paddy and irrigated cropland are characterized as level farmland, and rain-fed paddy
and dry land as erodible farmland. Both irrigated paddy and irrigated cropland have
flat topography and relatively high-level productivity. These types of arable land fit
the classification of basic farmland, and have sufficient water and irrigation/drainage
facilities.14 In general, they are not the target of the GfG program. Rain-fed paddy
and dry land, on the other hand, are located near or at the middle and upper parts
of mountains and hills. Hilly land is more prone to soil erosion and has less organic
matter content and is thus less fertile (see Feng et al., 2005). Grain yield from these
types of land depends mainly on natural precipitation. These two types of land fit
the target of the GfG program described in the Regulations.
County-level socioeconomic data from 1996 to 2004 are collected from the sta-
tistical yearbooks published from 1997 to 2005. The dataset includes GDP by sector
(primary, secondary, and tertiary), the value of grain and forestry output, rural la-
bor population, and local government’s revenue and expenditure, all measured at
the county level.15 All the monetary variables in Chinese Yuan are normalized to
14From the definition of basic farmland, even low-yield fields can be classified as basic farmland
as long as they are equipped with good irrigation practices and water conservation facilities (the
Land Administration Law, Article 34). The presence of these fixed infrastructure investments are
a defining feature indicates that their category does not include hillside land in close proximity to
level farmland.
15Two types of statistical yearbooks are used: annual Provincial Statistical Yearbooks and
Chinese Counties (Cities) Socioeconomic Statistical Yearbooks. The first one contains data at
the provincial and prefectural level, with partial county-level data provided, and the second one
provides more observations for certain variables.
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real 2005 terms, and converted to US dollars using the 2005 average annual exchange
rate. GDP deflators for each sector are used to deflate the local GDP from respec-
tive sectors. Both GDP deflators and exchange rates are provided by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
The GfG program was phased in gradually, with the process determined by
the central government. The program was implemented in: Gansu, Sichuan, and
Shaanxi provinces in 1999; Yunnan, Guizhou, Chongqing, Hubei, Qinghai, Ningxia,
Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, and Xinjiang in 2000; Hebei, Heilongjiang, Jilin,
Liaoning, Hunan, Guangxi, and Jiangxi in 2001; and Beijing, Tianjin, Anhui, Henan,
and Tibet in 2002 (Administration, 2002; Deng et al., 2012; the GfG Office of Na-
tional Forestry Administration, 2000). By 2002, the phase-in process was complete
and the GfG program covered 25 out of 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and
provincial level municipalities. The indicator for whether the policy was in effect
thus varies by year as well as province. Table 2.1 includes the descriptive statistics
of the data I use. Table 3.2 includes the selected descriptive statistics of the data
for different cohorts of counties before and after the implementation of the GfG
program.
2.5 Empirical Model
I use the panel of county land transition data to test the hypotheses derived in
the theoretical section. I examine the subset of conversions between forested land,
level farmland, and erodible farmland. The equations below represent the aggre-
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gated decision-making process from each village at the county level. County-level
officials exhibit oversight in the program and may have some influence to local land
use decisions as well. The hypotheses remain relatively the same. Measurement
errors at the village-level should not be correlated to the GfG indicator. The theo-
retical analysis indicates that the amount of land converted from use j to use k in
county i at time t, ajkit, is a function of the GfG subsidy (specifically, whether the
GfG program was in effect), the amount of land of each type at the beginning of
the period Ait−1, and other factors influencing land conversion, Xit−1:
ajkit = β
jk
0 GfGit + β
jk
A Ait−1 + β
jk
XXit−1 + ei + et + eit (2.4)
Other factors, Xit−1, include crop profitability and forestry profitability (proxied
by the value of farmland and forested land in county i at the previous period t− 1),
the relative conversion cost (proxied by the rural labor density in county i at the
previous period t− 1), and local government’s financial status (annual revenue and
expenditure). The last are included to absorb certain land conversion incentives
made by county governments. The value of land is measured by GDP or output
divided by the corresponding land area. Specifically, the average values of farmland,
timber-producing forest, orchards, and urban land are calculated or proxied as grain
output per unit of farmland, output of forestry per timber-producing forest, output
of fruits per unit of orchard, and secondary and tertiary industrial GDP per unit
of urban land, respectively. The value of urban land, as well as other urban related
variables (urban average GDP, average wage in urban and rural areas, and the
36
number of workers in urban and rural areas) are added. Rapid urbanization has
been shown to lead to the conversion of farmland into urban uses (Lichtenberg and
Ding, 2009). Road expansion may have impacts on forests (Uchida et al., 2009),
so incentives for urban expansion may indirectly influence farmland transitions to
other uses.
To accommodate the potential regional heterogeneity suggested in the theo-




(βjk0r (GfGit · regioni)) + β
jk
A Ait−1 + β
jk
XXit−1 + ei + et + eit (2.5)
where r is the region type, regioni = south or north to distinguish the effect
of subsidies and production conditions. I also estimate a model to identify the
program’s regional impacts by further breaking down the equation by allowing
regioni = southwest, southcentral, northwest, northcentral, and northeast.
The theoretical model suggests there may be a critical value of farmland at
which unintended conversion effect occurs: lower (higher) value of level (erodible)
farmland is more likely to be converted (maintained). Because only the average
farmland value in each county is observable, I create two variables, farmland valueli,t−1
and farmland valueei,t−1, using the farmland shares in each county and the average
farmland yield ratio to represent the average level farmland value and the average
erodible farmland value, respectively. In order to test this hypothesis and estimate
the critical value for each type of farmland in different regions, two other variables,
GfGit · farmland valueji,t−1 (or GfGit · regioni · farmland valuejit in a regional
37












Equations (2.4) to (2.6) use county and time fixed effects models to control
for unobserved heterogeneity. I use cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the
provincial level to cope with possible serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The
effects of the program are estimated by βjk0 s (and β
jk
1 s in equation (2.6)) from the
land use outcomes of the two groups: the observations affected by the GfG program,
and the non-participated observations, after controlling for observed influences and
unobserved factors in each county in a given year. The expected signs for βjk0 s
are positively significant for all land transitions. The expected signs for βjk1 s are
negatively significant when j is level or erodible farmland.
To adjust for the level of land stock and explore the relative sizes of unin-
tended conversion effect in different regions, I estimate another model with shares
ajkit/Aji,t−1 as the dependent variable in equation (2.4) and (2.6). The coefficients
βjk0 and β
jk
1 in the share model show the effects of the GfG program on a certain type
of land relative to its total stock. The expected signs are the same as in equation
(2.4) and (2.6). On the other hand, given the stock effect observed in the theoretical












The main focus of the empirical analysis is to investigate whether GfG causes
unintended conversion of level farmland to forest and, additionally, the extent to
which this unintended conversion depends on the value of farmland. To put the un-
intended conversion in context, I examine six types of transitions from three sources
(level farmland, erodible farmland, and unused land) to two end uses (timber-
producing forest and orchards). Although two types of afforestation are subsidized,
only significant conversion to timber-producing forest is expected due to the conver-
sion restriction on orchards. Descriptive statistics of the data used in the regression
for regions are given separately in table 2.1.
To examine the validity of the parallel trend assumption, I conduct two tests:
(1) estimating differences in time trends in treated versus un-treated provinces in
the pre-treatment period and (2) a placebo test re-estimating the DID model over
the pre-treatment period. To examine if the land-use effect varies under different
model and data specifications, I also conduct a series of robustness checks. I inter-
act provincial/prefectural-level and year indicators to control for the corresponding
level of time-variant unobservables. I estimate the group of equations for each land
transition simultaneously to account for cross-equation errors. I also use propensity
score matching and DID-matching methods to account for observable differences in
characteristics between enrolled and un-enrolled counties. The interested reader can
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find both the test results and robustness checks in a supplementary appendix online.
2.6 Estimation Results and Implications
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 report the estimated coefficients of the GfG indicator for the
pooled and regionally disaggregated models. Table 2.3 provides the land transitions
from farmland or unused land to timber-producing forest and orchards under the
GfG program from 1996 to 2004. Table 2.4 provides the corresponding estimates in
the share model. Table 2.6 shows the farmland value effect estimated in equation
(2.6).16 In general, the estimated coefficients have signs consistent with expectations.
The first panel of each table reports the coefficient of the GfG program indicator in
equation (2.4). The second and the third panels show the coefficients of the GfG
indicator interacted with regional dummies. All models include a complete set of
covariates along with county and year fixed effects. The robustness checks with
different functional forms also provide the estimated coefficients showing the same
land transition pattern. The assumption of the parallel trend is valid. Because
unused land is not significantly converted (possibly due to the low subsidy rate)
and the Regulations require that newly afforested area be composed of at most 20%
orchards, the following subsections focus mainly on timber-producing forest based
on the estimation in table 2.3 (with a certain percentage reference drawn from table
2.4).
16Land stock effects estimated in equation (2.7) are shown at the end of Appendix III.
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2.6.1 Effects of the GfG program on Erodible Farmland
The stated goal of the GfG program is to convert highly erodible farmland
to timber-producing forest to prevent soil degradation and water erosion. The esti-
mated coefficients of the GfG indicator suggest that the program was quite success-
ful in meeting that goal, with an estimated 7.6% (1.52% per year from table 2.4) of
erodible farmland converted to timber-producing forest in the five years from initial
program implementation to the end of the study period. At the average timber-
producing forest value in each region, the estimates indicate that the cumulative
effect of the GfG program over the whole study period (1999-2004) was an increase
in timber-producing forest with a value of nearly $21.84 million.17
There was significant geographical heterogeneity in the effects of the program.
Consistent with the theoretical analysis, erodible farmland conversion was higher
in northern China, which has a large stock of erodible farmland, a low stock of
forested land, and relatively low farmland productivity. The difference between
northern and southern China was statistically significant (F (1, 6008) = 54.18 and
p − value = 0.000) and large in magnitude. Because the program was designed
to use a uniform subsidy rate (for a large region), the program indicators in the
regional regression model capture the impacts of subsidy. Specifically, each dollar of
subsidy was associated with 0.073-0.300 hectare of conversion of erodible farmland
in northern China, compared to 0.028-0.054 hectare in southern China.
17To calculate this, I multiply the average value of forest in each subregion (northwestern, north-
central, northeastern, southwestern, and south-central China) with the number of counties that
participated in the program in each subregion and year, then add up all the regions.
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The regionally disaggregated coefficients indicate that the program was most
successful in northwestern, northeastern, and south-central China. This finding is
consistent with the prediction in theory, because these regions have larger stocks of
erodible farmland and higher forestry value. Northern China also has a large stock of
erodible farmland and relatively low farmland productivity. With the highest stock
of erodible farmland and forestry productivity, northeastern China had the highest
conversion, which is almost twice as much as the second highest (in northwestern
China) with a statistically significant difference (F (1, 6004) = 10.52, and p−value =
0.001). These two regions converted 10.0% and 6.3% of erodible farmland to forest
after four years of implementation, respectively. In contrast, central China is less
likely to participate in the program due to higher farmland productivity, lower
hillside farmland stock, and a lower return in forestry. In south-central China,
conversion is relatively similar to that of north-central China (F (1, 6004) = 0.01
and p − value = 0.9144), even though it has a relatively low stock of erodible
farmland. Thus, its conversion share is sizable, amounting to 12.5% of erodible
farmland conversion after four years of implementation.
The impacts of erodible farmland stock on the GfG program’s erodible farm-
land conversion decision is high in northwestern and northeastern China, which
follows the expectation from the theoretical analysis. Higher stock of erodible farm-
land would further stimulate the conversion of the corresponding farmland, while
higher stock of level farmland would reduce this incentive. This finding suggests that
the GfG program worked as intended, because more erodible farmland conversion
would occur in a relatively erosion-prone region.
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The GfG program was designed to incentivize conversion of farmland to timber-
producing forest rather than orchards. Consistent with that program design, the
GfG program had a smaller effect on conversion of farmland to orchards. Two fea-
tures of the program’s design are likely responsible: (1) the low monetary value
of subsidy packages for orchard and (2) the requirement that orchards account for
no more than 20% of total afforestation, which the central government was able to
realize by rationing seedlings of orchard trees. Only in northeastern China, where
orchards are relatively profitable, was a substantial amount of erodible farmland
converted to orchards.
2.6.2 Unintended Land Use Effects of the GfG program
The GfG program targeted hillside land but specifically exempted productive
farmland with little risk of soil erosion. Unintended conversion of flat productive
farmland to forest yields little environmental benefit but is costly in terms of excess
spending on subsidies and risks to food security. Table 2.3 suggests this type of
unintended conversion was substantial, amounting to nearly one-fifth of the total
amount of cropland converted to timber-producing forest.
Consistent with the theoretical analysis, the estimated coefficients in table 2.3
indicate that unintended level farmland conversion was greatest in northern China,
where this type of unintended conversion was nearly three times greater than in
southern China. (The difference is statistically significant with F (1, 5560) = 18.66
and p − value = 0.000.) This leakage caused a cumulative 2.5% loss in total stock
43
of level farmland during the study period in northern China.
The theoretical model also predicts that the unintended conversion of level
farmland could be considerable in both eastern and western China, because the
former has relatively high returns in forestry and a high stock of level farmland
and the latter has a relatively low stock in forestry, low returns on level farmland,
and relatively low-cost conversion of level farmland. Western China has a low stock
of productive level farmland, so that a 0.2% - 0.45% annual rate of loss of level
farmland per county due to program subsidies represents a sizable relative loss of
productive capacity. Unintended conversion of high quality farmland is also sub-
stantial in the southern part of central China, where forested area is relatively small
but value of forest production is relatively high. In this region, unintended conver-
sion amounted to nearly one-fourth of the total amount of cropland converted to
timber-producing forest. Higher subsidy payment would also stimulate additional
level farmland conversion. On average, each dollar of subsidy was associated with an
increase of 0.009-0.035, and 0-0.016 hectares of level farmland conversion in northern
China and southern China, respectively.
Similar to the conversion of erodible farmland, local land stock effects are
sizable in the conversion of level farmland. Regions with limited area of highly
productive farmland may choose to enroll more erodible farmland into the program,
while regions with a high stock of productive farmland have incentives to violate the
program’s regulations. Unintended land use conversion is more likely to be observed
in south-central China, because this region has a relatively abundant stock of level
farmland. This is also consistent with the coefficient in the land transition model
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reported in table 2.3.
2.6.3 Impacts on Farmland Productivity
Land quality is likely an important factor that affected local officials’ decisions
when applying the rules of the GfG program. Level farmlands may have had low
yields due to drought or pest problems. Relatively poor households may have been
selected to enroll low productive flat farmland into the program due to local equity
concerns (Uchida et al., 2005). My theoretical analysis of the Chinese situation
indicates that unintended conversion of level farmland is more likely to occur in
areas where the value of that farmland is relatively low. I investigate this possibility
by calculating maximum levels of county-average cropland productivity at which




Under the program, farmland is converted to forest only if its productivity is
below the maximum value. I estimate these values using the delta method condi-
tional on local land stocks, land values, local characteristics, and unobserved time-
invariant characteristics. These estimated maximum productivity levels are shown
in table 2.5. They imply that in some parts of China, high-quality level farmland
was enrolled in program while low-quality, high degradation risk farmland remained
in production, consistent with the findings of earlier descriptive studies in the pilot
regions (Uchida et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2004).
At the national level, the maximum grain yield for level farmland conversion is
45
1.25 times higher than corresponding values for erodible farmland. The difference in
maximum yields implies that some level farmland was converted to forest, while some
lower yielding, erodible farmland remained in crop production. In northern China
specifically, where unintended land conversion is high, the difference in maximum
yields indicates that erodible farmland with nearly 36.4% lower yields remained in
production while some level farmland was converted to forest. The maximum yield
differential discrepancy was the greatest in north-central China.
One possible explanation for the difference in maximum yields at which con-
version is desirable between level farmland and erodible farmland is the relative cost
of land conversion. As indicated in theory, higher amounts of this unintended con-
version can occur in areas where it is considerably more costly to convert erodible
farmland to forest than it is to convert level farmland. In relatively poor areas,
such as the western and central parts of northern China, land conversion depends
mainly on rural labor. Rural labor density is low in northern China, making labor
more scarce and costly. Since converting erodible farmland to forest requires more
labor than does converting level farmland, the relative conversion cost differential
tends to be high, making it attractive to convert high quality farmland while leaving
erodible farmland in production.
2.6.4 Policy Implications
At the national level, the Ministry of Forestry (MOF) is responsible for af-
forestation and forest management. The MOF has its own hierarchical structure at
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provincial, prefecture, and county levels. Forestry Bureaus at the county level are
charged with both implementing and monitoring GfG and other programs. How-
ever, environmental administration at the local level is generally controlled by village
leaders (OECD., 2005; Wu, 2005). In the case of the GfG program, village leaders
are given incentives to allow high productive level farmland to be converted to for-
est, while simultaneously, these same officials are meant to ensure compliance with
restrictions on farmland conversion.
If lack of independent compliance monitoring is the cause of unintended land
displacement, then it could be reduced or even eliminated by the central government
establishing its own independent monitoring system as a check on local authorities’
behavior. As a rough estimate of the potential avoided loss from establishing an
independent compliance monitoring system, I calculate the sum of (1) subsidies
paid to cropland subject to the unintended conversion and (2) the value of the lost
grain production net of the increased forest production value. Because the land
displacement is substantial in certain regions of China, amounting to one-fifth of
total forest conversion annually, excess subsidy payments for this unintended land
conversion amount to $572.1 million.18
Valued at the central government’s average grain price (1.4 yuan per kilogram
of grain), the potential loss in grain production is roughly $107.9 million in total.19
18I calculate the average payment to level farmland conversion per county per year by multiplying
the regionally differentiated subsidy level to the estimated annual leakage. Multiplying the average
payment by the number of counties that receive the subsidy in each region (northwestern, north-
central, northeastern, southwestern, and south-central China) and each year yields the regional
potential avoided payments. Then I add up all the regions to receive the total potential reduction.
Note that the number of participated counties varies from region-to-region and year-to-year. The
total number of county-year observations with the GfG program in effect is 4819 from 1996 to
2004.
19I first find the estimated annual loss of grain in value by multiplying the grain price to the
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The estimated corresponding value of forest products is $2.92 million. Thus, poten-
tial avoidable net losses are around $677.06 million from 1996 to 2004, or $140,498
per participating county per year. In the northwestern and northeastern regions
of China, which have relatively sizable unintended conversion, the total avoidable
losses reached $ 257,726 per county per year, suggesting the compliance monitoring
system could double the budget if it focuses on these two regions alone. Whether
an independent central government compliance monitoring system would be eco-
nomical depends on the cost and effectiveness of that system. Nevertheless, the
preceding calculations suggest that independent compliance monitoring could be
well worthwhile.
2.7 Conclusion
Starting in 1999, the Chinese government implemented an extremely ambi-
tious afforestation program, Grain-for-Green (GfG), with the aim of preventing
soil erosion by converting farmland with high risk of erosion into forests and pas-
ture. The GfG program has gained public interest in recent years because the
central government intends to reboot the program in the near future. GfG is widely
considered a great success in terms of soil erosion reduction and flood prevention
(Gutiérrez Rodŕıguez et al., 2016). Because of the central government’s concern for
food production, high quality flat farmland was never meant to be enrolled in the
average yield in each county per year. Multiplying the average value of yield lost by the estimated
annual leakage and the number of counties that receiving the subsidy in each region and year yields
the regional loss in grain production. Then I add up all the regions to receive the potential savings
in grain production.
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program. Yet, authority for compliance with program regulations was delegated
to local officials whose incentives did not fully align with the central government’s.
This article provides a systematic nationwide land use analysis focusing on the first
phase of the program. It studies the potential unintended land use effect of convert-
ing productive farmland into forest for conservation uses, which reduces program
efficiency and undermines the country’s goal of protecting productive farmland.
This article suggests that PES programs can err by enrolling too much land,
a form of leakage that has not been recognized in the literature to date. In the
context of China as well as other countries, with limited arable land relative to
population size, this type of land displacement can negatively impact national food
self-sufficiency goals.
I derive theoretical conditions under which this form of land use effect is likely
to occur, then estimate the magnitude of excess conversion of productive farmland
in China using a unique land transition/use dataset from 1996 to 2004. I find
substantial unintended conversion in western and coastal China, especially in the
northern portions of those regions, consistent with predictions derived from the
theoretical model. Also as predicted, slippage is more prevalent on lower-value
land. The results of the empirical analyses suggest that it might be worthwhile for
the central government to establish a compliance monitoring system to avoid losses
in both crop production and undesirable subsidy payments.
The extent to which this unintended conversion occurs suggests that local of-
ficials exercise a significant amount of discretion in implementing national policies.
The central government relies largely on reports from local officials to monitor how
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its policies are being carried out. In the GfG program, bolstering local government
finances with reforestation subsidies appears to have taken precedence over the cen-
tral government directives to preserve level farmland in order to meet the country’s
stated food production goals.
This article provides elements of a more nuanced evaluation of China’s GfG
program. These findings in this article suggest that substantial leakage may occur in
some regions due to insufficient oversight by the central government, which may also
lead to other local maintenance issues like low survival rates of trees or incomplete
payment delivery. Conducting field surveys to gain a clear picture of the effects
of GfG in those regions seems important. A closer examination of conversion in
southern China also seems of potential interest. To fully understand how land value
would influence farmland conversion in this region may rely on analysis of other
local land use programs. Finally, the misallocation observed in the GfG program
suggest the desirability of considering how the central government might implement
compliance monitoring. Further examination of these issues are beyond the scope
of this article and are left for future research.
50
Subregions by Geography Subregions by Subsidy Level
Eastern Central Western Northern Southern
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Transition (ha) from
level farmland to timber forest 1.47 38.86 4.30 50.28 1.91 122.52 1.30 114.38 3.40 40.77
erodible farmland to timber forest 73.16 531.32 54.02 281.11 242.05 1015.03 181.20 913.58 93.94 505.81
unused land to timber forest 23.24 284.79 5.19 194.38 44.37 585.72 29.82 380.65 24.58 453.37
level farmland to orchards -3.54 111.06 8.33 313.31 14.62 114.64 12.94 254.74 1.07 78.33
erodible farmland to orchards 0.83 167.70 20.23 439.95 25.83 186.72 14.66 333.72 17.11 193.75
unused land to orchards 2.37 58.13 0.49 62.45 9.61 99.13 3.47 37.64 6.08 103.00
Stock (1k ha) at year t of
level farmland 26.26 21.72 24.84 23.47 16.86 22.13 23.28 25.03 20.98 20.32
erodible farmland 38.82 60.34 27.76 27.15 37.35 42.89 46.77 58.79 24.56 27.21
orchards 5.30 7.10 3.31 4.22 2.24 3.15 2.88 5.24 4.18 5.15
timber forest 7.64 14.83 4.99 6.97 6.54 12.99 4.23 9.62 8.68 14.39
Output level at year t of
grain per farmland (ton/ha) 5.05 5.54 5.22 2.44 2.66 2.56 3.34 4.68 4.87 3.06
fruits per orchard land (ton/ha) 3.29 29.89 3.42 9.62 2.83 13.52 3.92 25.96 2.39 11.81
forestry per forestland ($1k/ha) 0.13 0.76 0.05 0.30 0.06 0.92 0.11 0.66 0.05 0.83
Socio-econ. data at year t:
urban land value ($1k/ha) 29.38 29.11 18.06 16.84 12.08 15.57 14.63 17.44 24.09 25.87
rural labor density (person/ha) 2.54 2.16 2.43 1.94 1.26 4.24 2.00 1.91 1.98 4.04
county gov. revenue($1m) 18.15 19.88 14.54 12.39 8.00 14.99 10.94 15.95 14.42 17.35
county gov. expenditure($1m) 27.99 23.28 24.12 17.87 18.75 17.22 19.82 19.68 25.59 19.83
Number of observations 3352 2545 4114 5018 5193
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Data Used in Analysis in Eastern, Central, and Western China (1996-2004)
51
1999 2000 2001 2002
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Transition (ha) from
level farmland to timber forest -1.24 25.90 -5.52 111.22 -3.83 170.81 19.76 250.63
4.34 53.55 18.51 273.74 45.62 180.09 351.16 491.15
erodible farmland to timber forest 56.44 446.71 93.38 887.68 10.13 527.97 24.998 166.62
591.50 1499.31 535.25 1403.38 462.88 1087.63 1391.62 1114.67
level farmland to orchards 10.42 126.47 15.38 250.50 4.06 71.72 9.72 132.86
10.55 92.08 31.60 265.81 14.79 74.89 114.17 383.35
erodible farmland to orchards 34.83 284.26 32.63 352.69 20.90 139.60 2.68 87.474
173.53 1649.01 43.17 221.11 36.98 197.47 75.90 166.47
Stock (1k ha) at year t of
level farmland 12.38 16.14 20.58 26.42 20.96 16.62 19.01 26.19
12.31 16.04 20.62 26.60 21.02 16.72 18.80 26.28
erodible farmland 36.89 34.78 35.82 40.17 43.99 63.04 18.16 33.59
35.23 33.88 34.55 38.47 43.78 62.99 18.00 33.64
orchards 3.41 4.13 2.17 3.22 3.81 5.81 2.65 5.48
3.76 5.04 2.31 3.39 3.93 5.88 2.73 5.61
timber forest 2.72 4.29 4.59 10.32 7.85 11.14 1.69 3.14
3.82 5.29 5.30 11.42 8.07 11.25 1.93 3.30
Output level at year t of
grain per farmland (ton/ha) 3.59 3.13 2.77 2.88 5.46 9.32 3.71 3.83
3.54 3.02 2.71 2.80 4.89 7.41 3.52 1.41
fruits per orchard land (ton/ha) 0.00 0.00 3.26 16.41 3.07 33.13 0.00 0.00
1.72 9.00 3.63 12.19 3.05 30.96 0.00 0.00
forestry per forestland ($1k/ha) 0.06 0.41 0.04 0.19 0.14 0.78 0.13 1.62
0.08 0.60 0.06 0.38 0.04 0.24 0.67 5.83
Socio-econ. data at year t:
county gov. revenue($1m) 9.95 35.91 12.63 35.68 21.82 63.72 15.13 7.26
12.03 44.10 17.65 57.39 23.93 52.21 15.31 6.65
county gov. expenditure($1m) 16.42 39.00 20.23 41.16 32.59 80.49 23.99 9.86
27.08 51.27 36.93 78.59 46.01 69.35 36.25 11.47
Number of Observations 2744 6589 4704 1435
The two rows of data for each variable represent the descriptive statistics summarized before and after the GfG program’s
implementation, respectively.
Table 2.2: Selected Pre/Post Descriptive Statistics of Data Used in Analysis by Program’s Implementation
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Land Transition
level erodible unused level erodible unused
farmland farmland land farmland farmland land
Model Variable to timber-producing forest to orchards
Pooled GfG 74.13∗∗∗ 272.8∗∗∗ 28.82 -15.78∗ 16.43∗ 8.866∗
(14.79) (31.64) (20.75) (7.476) (7.197) (3.793)
Regional GfG·N 42.29∗∗∗ 464.9∗∗∗ 40.98 -15.79 25.78∗∗ 9.312∗
(5.664) (40.93) (26.04) (9.105) (9.319) (4.738)
GfG·S 13.50∗ 119.3∗∗ 18.54 -15.77 8.769 8.470
(5.811) (37.79) (24.65) (9.489) (8.677) (4.555)
Subregional GfG·NW 84.08∗∗∗ 447.9∗∗∗ 30.88 -20.19 18.61 10.00
(9.115) (53.63) (34.48) (11.79) (12.22) (6.396)
GfG·NC 20.99 176.6∗ 49.90 2.092 8.934 10.98
(13.35) (79.30) (47.59) (17.25) (17.95) (8.664)
GfG·NE 35.13∗∗ 723.9∗∗∗ 48.36 -23.18 54.81∗∗∗ 7.002
(12.15) (71.75) (41.99) (15.73) (16.42) (7.593)
GfG·SW -2.101 94.57∗ -3.501 0.630 23.70∗ 4.390
(8.818) (44.25) (29.96) (11.38) (10.26) (5.608)
GfG·SC 53.14∗∗∗ 186.1∗∗∗ 17.30 -43.54∗∗ -10.35 10.61
(10.74) (50.42) (32.92) (13.93) (11.63) (6.097)
Number of Observations 8566 9003 10012 8564 8949 9838
Clustered standard errors (at province level) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
County and time fixed effects are included. The table reports the coefficients of βjk0r
in the following equation. Pooled, regional, and subregional models are separate regressions.




0r (GfGit · regioni) + β
jk
A Ait−1 + β
jk
XXit−1 + ei + et + eit
Table 2.3: Land Transition to Forests in China from 1996 to 2004 (in Hectare)
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Land Transition
level erodible unused level erodible unused
farmland farmland land farmland farmland land
Model Variable to timber-producing forest to orchards
Pooled GfG 0.00233∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0195 -0.000241 0.00328∗ 0.000837
(0.000652) (0.00133) (0.0109) (0.000284) (0.00152) (0.00463)
Regional GfG·N 0.00483∗ 0.0203∗∗∗ 0.0170 -0.000472 0.00462∗ 0.0000415
(0.00216) (0.00271) (0.0139) (0.000348) (0.00203) (0.00585)
GfG·S -0.000875 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0215 0.00000758 0.00235 0.00150
(0.00150) (0.00156) (0.0128) (0.000358) (0.00179) (0.00549)
Subregional GfG·NW 0.00199∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0154 -0.000525 0.00781∗∗ 0.00146
(0.000544) (0.00246) (0.0189) (0.000460) (0.00286) (0.00812)
GfG·NC 0.000452 0.00630∗ 0.00129 -0.000368 0.000180 -0.00101
(0.000769) (0.00321) (0.0252) (0.000649) (0.00370) (0.0106)
GfG·NE 0.00450∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0302 -0.000507 0.00373 -0.00113
(0.000701) (0.00293) (0.0219) (0.000593) (0.00341) (0.00915)
GfG·SW 0.0000402 0.00152 0.0131 0.000620 0.00269 -0.000469
(0.000508) (0.00179) (0.0156) (0.000428) (0.00212) (0.00675)
GfG·SC 0.00273∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0308 -0.000993 0.00177 0.00358
(0.000619) (0.00204) (0.0171) (0.000524) (0.00240) (0.00734)
Number of Observations 8363 8685 9566 8361 8631 9392
Clustered standard errors (at province level) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
County and time fixed effects are included. The table reports the coefficients of βjk0r in the following
equation. Pooled, regional, and subregional models are separate regressions.




0r (GfGit · regioni) + β
jk
A Ait−1 + β
jk
XXit−1 + ei + et + eit
Table 2.4: Land Transition to Forests in China from 1996 to 2004 (in Share)
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Model Land Type
Level Farmland Erodible Farmland
Pooled 10.262*** 6.178***
[5.58,14.94] [4.82,7.54]














Note: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
The Delta Method is used to calculate the 95% Confidence Intervals.
Pooled, regional, and subregional models are separate regressions.
Table 2.5: Estimated Maximum Farmland Values (ton/ha) for Unintended Conver-
sion to Timber-producing Forest
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Model Land Type
Level Farmland Erodible Farmland
Pooled GfG 113.2∗∗∗ 514.6∗∗∗
(18.69) (78.56)
GfG·farmland value -11.03∗∗∗ -83.30∗∗∗
(3.241) (19.40)
Regional GfG·N 67.46∗∗∗ 949.6∗∗∗
(8.546) (174.3)




GfG·S·farmland value 1.096 -39.99∗∗
(1.412) (14.03)
Subregional GfG·NW 130.7∗∗∗ 622.9∗∗∗
(13.77) (79.42)
















GfG·SC·farmland value 7.698 -109.8∗∗∗
(7.140) (30.61)
Number of Observations 8363 8685
Clustered standard errors (at province level) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
County and time fixed effects are included. The table reports the coefficients of βjk0 and β
jk
1 below.
Pooled, regional, and subregional models are separate fixed effects regression models:
ajkit = β
jk
0 GfGit + β
jk
1 (GfGit · farmland valueji,t−1) + β
jk
A Ait−1 + β
jk
XXit−1 + ei + et + eit.
Table 2.6: Land Transition to Forests in China (1996-2004) with Interaction
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Chapter 3: Political Pressure under Pollution Reduction Mandates:
Downstream Spillovers in China
3.1 Introduction
China’s rapid industrialization has been the heart of its equally rapid economic
growth but has also created serious problems of air and water pollution (Buckley
and Piao, 2016; Deng, 2017; Webber, 2017). The central government has responded
by levying fines on emissions and using the revenue from those fines to subsidize
installation of abatement technology. Enforcement of China’s environmental policies
is decentralized, as it is in many countries (see Millimet (2013) for a review). The
central government sets the basic policy structure, delegates enforcement to local
governments, and monitors implementation (in terms of fines levied and distribution
of revenue for pollution control subsidies), with an emphasis on the heaviest polluting
firms.
China’s combination of a highly centralized political system with the decen-
tralized fiscal system put in place in the 1990s has created a number of distortions of
economic activity, including excessive land development, overemphasis on industrial
For this chapter, I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments from participants at the
Camp Resources Workshop (Wrightsville Beach NC, 2016), the SEA Meeting (Washington D.C.,
2016), the AERE Conference (Pittsburgh PA, 2017), and the AAEA Meeting (Chicago IL, 2017).
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activity relative to domestic consumption, exacerbation of regional inequality, etc.
(Jin et al., 2005; Knight and Shi, 1999; Lin and Liu, 2000; Park et al., 1996; West
and Wong, 1995; Zhang, 1999; Zhang and Zou, 1998). How that combination of
centralized political authority and decentralized fiscal responsibilities affects envi-
ronmental policies has received relatively little attention. This paper examines how
pollution control regulations are implemented in China, with a focus on the export
of water pollutants to downstream jurisdictions (the “downstream effect”).
China provides a good context to study the downstream effect because of the
incentives created by its top-down political structure. Governance in China is highly
centralized, with the Communist Party controlling government at all levels, from the
central government down through hundreds of prefectural bodies and thousands of
county bodies. The process through which the central government promotes officials
at these lower levels of government to higher level positions creates a tournament-
style competition among those lower level officials (Knight, 2014; Li-an, 2007; Lü and
Landry, 2014; Yang and Muyang, 2013). That competition affects implementation
of policy at each level of government (Oates, 1999). While performance in terms of
economic growth and fiscal management were the predominant metrics in the past,
environmental quality has now been added to the mix (Guo, 2007; Li and Zhou,
2005; Lo, 2014).
This paper investigates theoretically and empirically how local governments’
efforts to meet the central government’s pollution reduction mandates while main-
taining high levels of economic growth and demonstrating responsible fiscal man-
agement affect environmental quality outcomes. It makes three contributions to the
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literature in doing so. First, it advances the theoretical literature on environmen-
tal federalism by combining the strategic pollution incentives of local governments
and firms into a single analytical framework. Second, it uses a unique dataset of
firm-level data to study the spatial allocation of emissions and installation of abate-
ment equipment within counties, providing direct quantitative evidence about the
magnitude of the downstream effect in water quality. Third, it uses a simulation
model to quantify the magnitude of the distortions created by local governments’
implementation of water pollution control policy by comparing observed emissions
with optimal emissions under centralized national control. The paper is organized
as follows.
First, I develop a theoretical model to study local governments’ strategies for
allocating subsidies to local firms for abatement technology investments in order
to influence pollution-related adverse effects. It combines both perspectives from a
local government and from a firm to fully examine the incentives of excessive pol-
lution in less environmentally sensitive areas. I show that local governments act as
self-interested utility maximizers to balance both performance in terms of promot-
ing their jurisdictions’ economic growth and protecting their jurisdictions’ environ-
mental quality across all the heterogeneous firms within their jurisdictions. Firms
located in less environmentally sensitive areas (that is, areas with fewer jurisdic-
tional residents, and areas close to downstream jurisdictional borders) will produce
less health damage per unit of pollution to residents living within the jurisdiction.
These “border firms” are less likely to be funded for abatement technologies and will
pollute more. If the pollutants generated by local industries are carried outside the
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province by rivers, so that serious environmental or health impacts are likely to hap-
pen elsewhere, local officials might reduce the enforcement of pollution abatement
while still enjoying the economic benefits brought by these industries.
The theory of the paper is based on the anecdotal evidence and previous
literature of transboundary pollution. Some studies argue from a firm’s perspec-
tive to show that facilities near jurisdictional borders often fail to consider inter-
jurisdictional externalities (for instance, see Cai et al., 2015; Helland and Whitford,
2003a). Others argue from a jurisdiction’s view to show that local governments en-
force less near borders (Dijkstra and Fredriksson, 2010; Hall, 2008; Sigman, 2002).
Combining both perspectives into a sequential game model supports the role of po-
litical pressure in environmental policy (Hird, 1990; Magat et al., 1986; Oates, 2001).
It also helps to explain the incentive to increase pollution or decrease abatement for
border firms, and provide channels (levies and subsidies) for local governments to
govern local pollution reduction. The theoretical model assuming that each firm
has its unique pollution level and locational information in each jurisdiction is also
close to reality.
Second, I quantify the pollution and abatement incentives based on firms’ ge-
ographic information using a unique panel dataset. Specifically, the paper tests if
polluting firms located closer to the downstream border of a jurisdiction or further
away from a residential area within the jurisdiction will have a higher pollution
output and a lower scale of installed abatement technology. The empirical analysis
builds on the literature of the geographical impacts of pollution spillover effects.
With decentralized policy structure, free-riding behavior in pollution may occur all
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over the world (Banzhaf and Chupp, 2012; Kahn, 1999; Kahn et al., 2013; Konisky
and Woods, 2010; Lipscomb and Mobarak, 2017; Murdoch et al., 1997; Sigman, 2005,
2007). However, adopting county-level data, or assigning a border-or-not indicator
to a firm’s location, is a method commonly used to investigate the rough pollution
spillover effects of jurisdictional governments’ pollution response (Cai et al., 2015;
Helland and Whitford, 2003a; Novel, 1992; Rauscher, 1995; Santore et al., 2001;
Sigman, 2002, 2005). The sole study examining pollution spillovers along 24 ma-
jor rivers in China, that of Cai et al. (2015), uses indicators of economic activity
(industrial value added and the number of firms) as indirect measures of pollu-
tant emissions to investigate this downstream effect in China with county-level data
(1998-2008). My study closely relates to these studies, yet expands the empirical
work to a more nuanced evaluation.
The paper uses quarterly pollution tax data from firms subject to intensive
monitoring by the central government from 2011 to 2015, which is a direct mea-
sure of pollution since the tax rate is uniform for all water-polluting firms. It also
uses an abatement technology adoption dataset for those firms to further examine
the abatement incentives. Firms’ coordinates are extracted from Google API to
calculate distances in ArcGIS from each firm to the provincial downstream border
along the river network and to the closest residential area within the jurisdiction.
These distances are more accurate proxies of a firm’s pollution impact to a local
jurisdiction than a dummy variable. They also create variations across firms that
allow quantifying the pollution and abatement distortion within a jurisdiction.
I adopt a within-between random effects model (Chamberlain, 1982; Mundlak,
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1978; Wooldridge, 2009) to estimate the firm’s time-invariant locational impacts. A
fixed effects model interacting the distance variables with the quarter dummies shows
that the geographical impacts on pollution are similar over time. I also examine the
heterogeneous locational impacts based on region and jurisdictional river lengths.
Possible endogeneity of a firm’s location (Carlton, 1983; De Beule and Duanmu,
2012; Kahn, 2003; Piga and Poyago-Theotoky, 2005; Wagner and Timmins, 2009)
is tested based on the assumption that functional land use planning is determined
beforehand. I do not find any evidence of endogeneity. The corresponding test,
along with other robustness checks, are reported in the Supplementary Figures. The
econometric analysis indicates that a water-polluting firm emits more pollutants if
it is closer to the jurisdictional downstream border or if it is further away from
a jurisdictional residential area. These firms are less likely to adopt abatement
equipment with high capacities. Sector-wise analysis suggests that heavy polluters
- including the fuel processing, metal, and cement industries - exhibit a stronger
downstream effect.
Third, with detailed locational information, the paper also provides a simula-
tion built upon the empirical analysis to show the advantage of centralized mandates.
With certain inter-jurisdictional negotiation, both total pollution level and involved
costs in the mandates are significantly reduced by 20-30%. The simulation result
extends the debate over environmental federalism1 to the Chinese semi-centralized
system of governance. Under a decentralized policy structure, although efficiency
1The literature of environmental federalism debates the appropriate role of the various levels of
government in environmental regulations. Whether decentralized environmental policy performs
better than centralized policy in an inter-jurisdictional competition framework varies by countries
(Levinson, 1999; Oates, 2008; Oates and Portney, 2003)
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can be achieved with a Pigovian remedy (Oates and Schwab, 1988; Wellisch, 1995),
local governments may “race to the bottom”, i.e., over-compete for industry and
under-provide localized public goods (Kunce and Shogren, 2005; Oates, 1999, 2008;
Shobe and Burtraw, 2012). In China, even the central government monitors firms
and local officials’ behaviors, yet large pollution and abatement distortions still ex-
ist due to jurisdictional competitions. Also, in contrast to the literature on the
advantage of China’s fiscal decentralization, this paper argues that unleashing fiscal
controls over the environmental protection sector may cause a striking pollution dis-
tortion. The conflicting incentives between environmental protection and economic
growth at the local level underscore the importance of regional cooperation and a
certain degree of centralization in general environmental policies worldwide.
3.2 Institutional Background
Environmental deterioration, as the byproduct of China’s industrial growth
during the period of economic reform, has resulted in the death of nearly a million
people every year (World Bank, 2007). With industrial expansion, China’s SO2
emissions are almost as high as those of Europe and the United States combined
(Vennemo et al., 2009). The welfare deduction from particulate matter concentra-
tions has increased from an estimated $22 billion in 1975 to an estimated $112 billion
in 2005 (Chen et al., 2012; Matus et al., 2012). Pollutants like nitrogen, phosphorus
and toxic heavy metals in rivers have caused significant impacts to residents’ health
and local agricultural production (Chen et al., 2005; Singh et al., 2004). China’s
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major freshwater lakes are extremely polluted, with the water in half of China’s
twenty-seven major lakes unsuitable for human use (Vennemo et al., 2009).
While China still gives GDP growth the highest priority, attention to envi-
ronmental quality is growing. China’s leaders have started to worry about the
environmental impacts on the economy. Several studies estimate that environmen-
tal degradation and pollution cost the Chinese economy between 8 to 12 percent
of its GDP annually (Economy, 2007). China has responded to the problem with
pollution reduction mandates including a new pollution levy system throughout the
whole country. The system is different from those in the U.S. and Canada, because
plants are allowed to pollute above pollution standards as long as they pay the cor-
responding levies (Hering and Poncet, 2014; Lin, 2013; Ma and Zhao, 2015; Wang
et al., 2003; Wang and Wheeler, 2005). Starting in 2005, the central government
began to increase investment in environmental protection, setting ambitious targets
for the reduction of pollution and energy intensity (the amount of energy used to
produce a unit of GDP), and introducing new environmentally friendly technologies
(Economy, 2007).
The major focus of the pollution reduction mandates for monitoring and levy
collection is on chemical oxygen demand (COD) and SO2. Pollution tax charges are
levied for 61 water pollutants and 44 air pollutants. All the other pollutants are
converted to COD-equivalent or SO2-equivalent units when calculating the pollution
tax. Since July 1, 2004, the pollution tax is calculated as 0.7 Chinese Yuan (CNY)
times the sum of the top three COD-equivalent pollutants for water-pollution. The
charge rate and conversion rate for each pollutant were set by the central govern-
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ment in the Regulations on the Administration of the Charging and Use of Pollutant
Discharge Fees (hereinafter, the Regulations) issued on February 28, 2003. China’s
pollution reduction mandates also include the installation of pollution abatement
technology, as well as shutting down small-scale coal-fired plants, which are gen-
erally inefficient in the use of natural resources and highly polluting (Cao et al.,
2009; Jin and Lin, 2014; Ma and Zhao, 2015). Plant shutdowns or the installation
of abatement technology are mainly enacted by local governments, while the levy
system is based on universal self-reporting by firms (Wang and Wheeler, 2005).
While municipal and county authorities have been known to manipulate re-
porting of environmental activities (Cai et al., 2015; Lin, 2013), the most heavily
polluting firms are monitored directly by the central Ministry of Environmental Pro-
tection (MEP), which reduces the chance of data manipulation and misreporting
from local officials. In an effort to establish and improve the information disclo-
sure systems in China, the MEP, since 2010, has released a list of firms subject to
intensive monitoring and control, as well as their corresponding quarterly charged
pollution taxes (the Regulations, Article 1). The central government updates the
selection of the firms every year and most of the heavily polluting firms remain on
the list year after year.2 Local officials are required to provide pollution reduction
plans for the polluting firms that demonstrate the proposed use of levies. These
plans include details about the investment required for firms’ abatement technology
2The selection criteria is the following: For water polluters: sort the firms based on the emission
(production) level of COD or NH3, select the top of those that account for 65% (50%) of the total
emission (production), then merge the four groups of firms to the final selected water-polluter
monitoring list. The MEP also monitors large-scale sewage treatment plants with capacity ≥
5,000 ton/day.
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adoptions, or constructions of new sewage treatment plants.
Contrary to studies in the United States and Canada (Laplante and Rilstone,
1996; Magat and Viscusi, 1990), Lin (2013) argues that China’s pollution regulation
does not help reduce pollution but only improves plants’ self-reporting accuracy.
With strong incentives to pursue economic growth and tax revenue, local govern-
ments in China often turn a blind eye to extensive pollution in their jurisdiction
(Cai et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2013). Jia (2012) and Zheng et al. (2014a) also show
that Chinese politicians are strongly motivated by promotion incentives regardless
of their social costs. Wang (2013) argues that the central government’s motivation
for emphasizing pollution reduction is to seek legitimacy with Chinese people and
to signal that the Communist Party leadership cares about its own people. Targets
related to energy efficiency and pollution reduction are now linked to local officials’
performance and evaluation. Local officials are incentivized to invest in pollution
abatement technology and environmental infrastructure because credit (recognition)
for pollution reduction may be granted (Qi, 2013). Seemingly, local officials become
more concerned about local environmental quality and local residents’ lives because
actions to reduce pollution may also help their political careers. With sustainabil-
ity and social stability included in political promotion criteria, local GDP growth
remains the main criterion for promotion. Because local government officials have
their own incentives to promote the local economy for their careers while receiving
pressure from the central government to protect the environment, it is important to
understand local government trade-off behaviors in environmental regulations.
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3.3 Conceptual Model
To motivate the empirical work, a theoretical model is developed highlighting
the downstream effect of a firm’s pollution. The Chinese tournament-style competi-
tion to promote local officials has a significant influence on local pollution reduction
and environmental protection (Wu et al., 2013). In order to retain their political
power, local government officials must boost their local economy by attracting dirty
industries, and reduce pollution to improve local residents’ quality of life (Wang,
2013; Zheng et al., 2014a). Given the externalities inherent in downstream pollution,
local governments benefit most from pollution reduction higher upstream in their
jurisdiction, and thereby exert the least enforcement effort near the downstream
boundary of their administrative regions (Cai et al., 2015). This paper elaborates
on this downstream effect. It assumes that per unit of pollutants emitted from firms
located at less environmentally sensitive areas have less health impacts to local res-
idents. Specifically, for water-polluting firms, identical emissions from firms located
closer to the jurisdictional downstream border or further away from a residential
area have less of an overall impact on jurisdictional residents’ well-being. Those
firms can easily export pollutants outside the jurisdiction and are therefore assigned
with a lower health-risk index inside the jurisdiction based on their locations. This
paper hypothesizes that local governments care less about pollution from firms with
relatively low health-risk indices.
The central government has stipulated that pollution levies can only be spent
on funding abatement controls. Because there are no specific requirements beyond
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that, it is assumed that the local government decides the portion of abatement
technology investment si to subsidize for each firm i as the policy instrument. The
share of the investment reflects the level of pollution reduction enforcement from
the local government, and could potentially be based on the firms’ health-risk index
θi, i.e., the relative pollution damage from each unit of pollutants based on the
firm’s location in a jurisdiction. Because locations of firms do not change over
the study period, I assume that θis are determined prior to environmental quality
being a concern. The firms understand their geographical influence on jurisdictional
residents’ well-being, and plan their intended output level yi, unintended output
(emission) level ei, and abated amount ai to maximize its profit:
π(yi, ei, ai; si) = max
yi,ei,ai
{pyi − C(yi, ei;w)− (1− si)A(ei, ai; q)− τ(ei − ai)} (3.1)
where p, τ , w, q, are the exogenous prices of the intended output, the unintended
output (levy rate of emission), the production inputs, and the abatement inputs,
respectively. C(yi, ei;w) and A(ei, ai; q) are the production costs and abatement
costs, respectively. The model implicitly includes two types of technologies, yi and
ei are the outputs with a non-negative “trade-off” under the production technology,
then ei becomes the input under the abatement technology, with ai as the output.
It is assumed that Cy > 0, Ce > 0, Ae < 0, Aa > 0, Cye ≤ 0, and Aea ≥ 0,
where the subscripts under A or C represent partial derivatives with respect to
the corresponding variables. Again, si represents the share of A(ei, ai; q) that is
subsidized by the local government.
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To solve (3.1), notice that:
∂π(yi, ei, ai; si)
∂(−yi)
= Cy − p
∂π(yi, ei, ai; si)
∂(−ei)
= Ce + (1− si)Ae + τ
∂π(yi, ei, ai; si)
∂ai
= −(1− si)Aa + τ
∂π(yi, ei, ai; si)
∂si
= A(ei, ai; q)
(3.2)
Because all the 6 pairs of cross partial derivatives are nonnegative,3 π(yi, ei, ai; si)
exhibits increasing differences for all pairs of its arguments and is supermodular in
(−yi,−ei, ai, si). This provides the following results: ∂yi/∂si ≤ 0, ∂ei/∂si ≤ 0, and
∂ai/∂si ≥ 0, i.e., both intended and unintended outputs are decreasing if the local
government provides a higher share of investment on the abatement technology for
the corresponding firm, and the abatement level is increasing.
The local government knows the impact of their investment on the local econ-
omy, and decides si in a strategic way. It has its own tradeoffs between promoting
the local economy and preventing environmental damage, which are two key factors
evaluated by the central government. Because the local government’s choices will
indirectly influence the firm’s actions, firm i’s optimized production and abatement
in equation (3.1) are functions of si (yi(si), ei(si), ai(si)) from the local government’s
perspective. The local government chooses s1, ...sn for each firm i to maximize its






∂(−ei)∂ai = (1− si)Aea ≥ 0,
∂π
∂(−ei)∂si = −Ae > 0,
∂π
∂ai∂si
= Aa > 0.
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utility from aggregate impacts in its jurisdiction:


















where t is the exogenous tax rate of output, which is assumed as another source of
governmental revenue aside from pollution levies. D(zi(si), θi) = D(ei(si)−ai(si), θi)
is the pollution damage caused by firm i inside the jurisdiction. I assume that
Dzθ ≥ 0, i.e., marginal pollution damage is nondecreasing as a firm locates in more
environmentally sensitive areas.
To solve (3.3), notice that:
∂U(s1, ...sn, θ1, ...θn)
∂si
= tys + τ(es − as)− A− si(Aees − Aaas)−Dz(es − as)




Because ∂U(s1, ...sn, θ1, ...θn)/(∂si∂θi) = −Dzθ(es − as) ≥ 0 and the other cross
partial derivatives are zero, U(s1, ...sn, θ1, ...θn) has increasing differences for all pairs
of their arguments and is supermodular in (s1, ...sn, θ1, ...θn). Thus, ∂si/∂θi ≥ 0,
i.e., the local government subsidizes a higher share of a firm’s abatement investment
if the firm locates in a more environmentally sensitive area, such as places closer to
an upstream border or a residential area within the local government’s jurisdiction.
An interesting testable result can be derived from the equations above. Each
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firm’s emission level is increasing as it locates in a less environmentally sensitive














The model provides a detailed explanation of a possible cause for the down-
stream effect. Water-polluting firms closer to the downstream border of a juris-
diction or further away from a jurisdictional residential area yield less damage to
jurisdictional residents, which leads to less environmental-related complaints that
may jeopardize a local government official’s promotion. At the same time, local
officials can still enjoy the economic growth brought from such a firm’s production.
Local officials may be more likely to ignore pollution from these firms because in-
creased production is more likely to offset the corresponding pollution damage at
less environmentally sensitive areas. For firms that may cause health damage to
local residents, the local government has the ability either to shutdown the firm,
or to require the installation of pollution abatement technology to part or all of its
units (Chang and Wang, 2010).
Moreover, because the subsidized portion of abatement investment is higher
for firms located in more environmentally sensitive areas (∂si/∂θi ≥ 0), those firms















This shows why local officials may respond to the pollution reduction mandates
by shifting enforcement efforts away from the least geographically significant firms,
essentially allowing those firms to continue polluting because their emissions flow
outside the jurisdiction where it is less harmful to jurisdictional residents’ health.
In summary, this section provides two testable hypotheses about relationships
between firm emission levels, investment in abatement technology, and firms’ ge-
ographical information. The following sections provide detailed empirical tests of
these hypotheses. Specifically, they test that for water-polluting firms, those that
are closer to the downstream border of a jurisdiction, or those that are further away
from a jurisdictional residential area, will have higher emission levels and lower
abatement technology investment.
3.4 Data
To test the hypotheses of the inter-jurisdictional spillovers explored in the pre-
ceding section, I create a unique panel of firm and socioeconomic data. The firm
data is collected from a number of governmental documents recently released by the
MEP. In particular, these are the lists of enterprises subject to Intensive Monitoring
and Control of the State (2011-2015), and the latest lists of Running Desulfuriza-
tion and Denitrification Facilities. The first list contains the quarterly pollution
levies charged to each firm subject to intensive monitoring and control by the state,
with the corresponding firm’s names at plant-level. According to the central MEP,
these high production firms account for nearly 65% of total emissions. The last
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two lists provide the end-of-the-pipe desulfurization and denitrification technology
installation information before 2015 for all installed firms, including firm’s name,
firm’s sector, installation date, capacity, and types of technology. To ensure the
reliability of the monitoring information, local Environmental Protection Bureaus
(EPBs) must conduct monitoring activities and unannounced field inspections be-
fore reporting to superior level EPBs and the MEP (Wu et al., 2016).
Firms’ locations were obtained from Google Maps API, which provides each
firm’s longitude and latitude information. This coordinate layer was projected and
merged to other layers of administrative, hydrological, transportation, and residen-
tial maps that are collected from the National Fundamental Geographic Informa-
tion System (NFGIS) to generate distance variables. The ArcGIS Proximity toolset
(Near) was used to calculate the distances from a firm to its closest residential area,
industrial park, and transportation infrastructure, and the ArcGIS Network Ana-
lyst extension was used to find the distance to downstream estuaries along river
networks. All distances were then converted from Decimal Degrees to Meters using
the Gauss Kruger-Beijing 1954 projection, the most commonly used projected coor-
dinate system in China. The detailed firm-level locational information was merged
with county, prefectural, and provincial-level socioeconomic data.
There are six major water-polluting sectors from the intensive monitoring lists:
power; cement; steel; paper; food and beverage; and the clothing/dyeing sectors.
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics by sector to compare water-polluting firm’s
relative locations. The power sector has the highest average COD−equivalent pol-
lution level, the cement and steel sectors are heavy polluters as well. While heavy
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polluting sectors in the US tend to be located together (Monogan III et al., 2013),
that is not the case in China. The ranges of all the distance variables are wide in
each sector, and there are no significant differences across sectors. This is important
for my analysis, because firms clustered together with similar geographical patterns
(i.e., all located near the border) would not provide enough “between variation”
in each sector, and cross-sector comparison as in Monogan III et al. (2013) is not
the major interest of this paper. No significant geographical variations by sector
may suggest that heavy polluters are not strategically placed before or at the mo-
ment they enter the market, pollution level variations, if any, are more likely to be
generated after the placement.
The socioeconomic data for the corresponding study time period comes from
the published statistical yearbooks from 2011 to 2015 and the monthly data re-
leased on the website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, including: local
aggregate production in each industry and sector; administrative information; popu-
lation; income; GDP or value added by sector; education; welfare; local government
budgets; as well as aggregate industrial solid waste information. All the monetary
variables in Chinese Yuan (CNY) are normalized to their 2015 values. GDP deflators
for each sector are used to deflate the local GDP from respective sectors. Both de-
flators and normalized rates are provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
their sources being the Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development
(OECD).
Other sources include county, prefectural, and provincial-level statistical year-
books compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, and monthly provin-
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cial sectorial data published on its website. Weather data is included for better
control under the consideration that certain production activities may be influenced
by local precipitation and temperature. It is collected from the hourly weather sta-
tion reports of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
The standard inverse distance weighting (IDW) tool in ArcGIS Spatial Analyst is
used to find the estimated weather information for each firm and aggregate the
weather data to quarterly level. Information about local terrain types and whether
the firm is located in a designated historical industrial city is also extracted from
maps in ArcGIS.
Because these socioeconomic variables are included only for control purposes
I report descriptive statistics in Table 3.2 for some selected variables to show that
control variables are relatively similar for firms from sector to sector. In general,
there are no significant differences across sectors. Firms from the power and cement
sectors are located in counties with higher governmental revenues on average, as well
as higher governmental expenditures. Areas with more paved roads also suggests
these counties have better public goods provisions. Relatively similar population
densities and shares of firms in designated historical industrial cities suggests that
firms in different sectors have similar socioeconomic backgrounds as well. Similar
average precipitation and local terrain types also suggest that these firms have no
significant geographical variations, confirming the information from Table 3.1.
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3.5 Empirical Model
This section illustrates the empirical methods to test the hypotheses derived
above. I first examine the existence and the magnitude of the downstream effect
among the monitored water-polluting firms. The theoretical model suggests that
a firm’s pollution level and the scale of installed abatement technology are both
functions of its location in a jurisdiction. The scale of installed abatement technol-
ogy may also influence firm’s pollution level. Let pollutionit represent the quarterly
pollution of firm i at the quarter t, which is converted from the charged quar-
terly pollution tax to COD-equivalent pollution in kilograms. Let Techit represent
the aggregated desulfurization or denitrification capacity of the installed abatement
technology in firm i at the beginning of quarter t. The main empirical model is
given by:
pollutionit = α + β1downstreami + β2residentiali + δTechit + γXit + ei + et + eit
Techit = a+ b1downstreami + b2residentiali + gXit + εi + εt + εit
(3.7)
where downstreami and residentiali represent the distances from the firm i to its
downstream estuary along the river network and to its nearest residential area within
the jurisdiction in kilometers, respectively, and Xit includes weather data and all
the county, prefectural, and provincial-level controls mentioned in the preceding sec-
tion, such as local demographic information, administrative size, education facilities,
76
hospital facilities, social service facilities, and aggregate gross/per capita industrial
values. Including Xit also helps to reduce possible biases caused by other local
impacts that are time-varying, because previous studies suggest variation in local
enforcement may depend on local incomes, accessibility to information, and average
education level. (Cai et al., 2015; Helland and Whitford, 2003a; Wang and Wheeler,
2005).
Because the key variables downstreami and residentiali are time-invariant, I
adopt two different estimation methods. As noted before, the pollution reduction
mandates started before the study period. There is no policy change that creates
significant impacts on regulatory stringency. I use a within-between random effects
(WBRE) model to estimate the impacts of a firm’s location on pollution levels and
installation levels of abatement technology in different sectors. To do so, I adopt
the Mundlak-Chamberlain Approach (Allison, 2009; Chamberlain, 1982; Mundlak,
1978; Schunck and others, 2013; Wooldridge, 2009) by including the time averages
of the time-variant variables:
pollutionit = α + β1downstreami + β2residentiali + δ1Techit + δ2Techi
+ γ1Xit + γ2Xi + uit + ei + eit
Techit = a+ b1downstreami + b2residentiali + g1Xit + g2Xi + εi + εt + εit
(3.8)
I estimate both the reduced form equations (in which the abatement technology
variable is not included in the pollution estimation), and the 2SLS equations (in
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which the abatement technology variable is included in the pollution estimation and
is instrumented by local governmental revenue and expenditure). I choose county-
level governmental revenue and governmental expenditure as instruments, because
as explained earlier, abatement technology installation is mainly enacted by local
governments. Firms’ financial situations are very likely to be linked to the scale of
their abatement technology, but unlikely to have direct impacts on their pollution
levels.
The WBRE model estimates the time-invariant locational impacts on a firm’s
pollution level directly. The model decomposes between and within variation and
estimates the respective effects in a single equation. However, for the estimates
of β1, β2, b1, and b2 to be unbiased, E(ei|Xit, ui) = 0 and ei|Xit, ui N(0, σ2e) have
to hold. I include additional time-invariant variables that potentially influence a
firm’s pollution levels, ui, to further reduce the possible bias, where ui includes local
terrain types, provincial-wide total water volume on average, and whether firm i is
located in the historical industrial base.4 The estimated coefficients are reported in
Table 3.3, which includes both the reduced form estimation and the 2SLS-WBRE
estimation.
To examine if the Mundlak-Chamberlain Approach provides non-biased co-
efficients, I conduct a series of robustness checks in the Conceptual Framework. I
include detailed plant-level control variables for a representative subgroup of data to
reduce possible bias from the plant’s time variant variables. I use a two-stage least
4There are 120 cities in 27 provinces designated as the historical industrial base, where heavy
industries were concentrated during China’s early industrial development period (1953-1970).
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square fixed-effects (2SLS-FE) model to examine possible regime or policy change
during the study period by interacting time-invariant locational variables with quar-
ter indicators. I examine the heterogenous locational impacts by separating the
dataset based on region and jurisdictional river lengths. I also treat locational vari-
ables, residentiali and downstreami, as endogenous in equation (3.7) with a control
function approach. The estimated coefficients have the same magnitudes and follow
the expectations.
3.6 Estimation Results and Implications
This section reports the estimated coefficients for water-polluting firms. Sec-
tions 3.6.1.1 to 3.6.1.3 under the subsection 3.6.1 provide extensive interpretation
of the downstream effect in water pollution. And subsection 3.6.2 provides pol-
icy implications and one policy simulation that allows jurisdictional negotiation in
the water pollution case. It can be considered as a general economic method to
potentially reduce transboundary pollution.
Table 3.3 and Table B.1 (& B.2) report key estimated coefficients for water-
polluting firms using the within-between random effects model and the two stage
least square fixed effects model, respectively. In general, the estimated coefficients
have signs consistent with expectations. The second panels of Table 3.3 and Ta-
ble B.2 also report the 2SLS estimated impacts of the scales of installed abate-
ment technology on water-polluting firm emission levels, and the coefficients have
the same magnitudes across different sectors. Two instrumental variables for the
79
abatement technology installation, local governmental expenditure and revenue, are
significantly different from zero in both models, and have signs following the expec-
tation. Over-identification tests and the weak instrument tests indicate that these
instruments are strong and valid.
The coefficients reported in Table 3.3 from the reduced form model (panel
1) and the model that includes the abatement technology variable (panel 2) have
signs and magnitudes that are consistent with each other. In general, the reduced
form estimation of distance variables have higher magnitudes, because the locational
impacts on pollution and abatement technology capacities have opposite signs, and
higher abatement technology capacities reduce total pollution levels. Moreover, the
standard errors in panel 2 are generally larger compared to those in the first panel,
because using instruments brings more variation to the model.
3.6.1 Strategic Polluting Behavior in Water Pollution
This paper broadens the concept of the “downstream effect” in water pollu-
tion by separating this strategic pollution behavior into the spillovers inherent in
river network and related those to residential locations. Although firms closer to a
downstream border or further away from a residential area have incentives to reduce
local pollution based on the same theoretical grounds, the political implications may
be different. I will illustrate these separately in the following subsections.
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3.6.1.1 Spillovers Inherent in River Pollution
China’s Pollution Reduction Mandates charge each unit of pollutant at the
same price and return the levy as abatement subsidies to each firm in order to
reduce pollution in the whole country. However, the theoretical section suggests
that a firm locating closer to the downstream border along the river network within
each jurisdiction will have higher pollution levels. The estimated coefficients in
Table 3.3 follow the expectation of this hypothesis for all the six industrial sectors.
On average, firms will pay an extra pollution tax of 25.68 to 50.43 Yuan
($3.98 to $7.81 in 2011 exchange rate), and emit 0.009% to 0.118% of additional
COD-equivalent pollutants if it locates one kilometer closer to a provincial down-
stream estuary. Firms further downstream along the river network, where emitted
pollutants to rivers are less likely to generate health impacts to the whole juris-
diction, have less incentive to reduce emission. Sector-wise analysis suggests that
firms in heavy polluting sectors, such as the power sector, steel sector, and cement
sector are more sensitive to locational changes along the river network. These firms’
incentives to emit additional pollution emissions into rivers increases as they lo-
cate further downstream. However, these sectors have a lower percentage change
of pollution based on locational variation. Firms in the clothing/dyeing sector and
food/beverage sector increase their percentage of pollution almost 12 times faster as
they locate further downstream, although increases in their pollution emission levels
over distance amount to only half of those firms in the power sector. With the av-
erage distances to the downstream border, the average pollution in COD-equivalent
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would increase by 5.48-13.92 tons in different sectors if the firms were locating near
the border, which are 1.3% to 20.6% of the current average, suggesting the down-
stream spillovers would be significant.
The regionally disaggregated coefficients are similar to the main regression
results. Figure B.1 plots the coefficients using the WBRE model and the 2SLS-FE
model for eastern China and western China. The dashed lines represent the WBRE
model’s coefficients and the dots (with the corresponding standard errors) represent
the 2SLS-FE model’s coefficients over 20 quarters. In general, the coefficients remain
almost identical over time, and the magnitudes are higher for the power and the steel-
manufacturing sectors, and lower for the clothing/dyeing and the food/beverage
sectors, corresponding with the results in Tables 3.3 and B.1.
Eastern China in general exhibits a stronger downstream effect compared to
western China. Firms in the eastern region, which are relatively further downstream
of the whole country, are more likely to have increased incentives to pollute. These
firms can export pollution outside the entire country along the river network. This
is consistent with the literature showing that international rivers and seas are more
polluted than rivers within a country. Shallow waters along China’s vast coast have
failed to meet national quality standards for clean oceanic water, with 29,000 square
kilometers of seriously polluted seawater (Liu and Diamond, 2005; Pan and Wang,
2012). The level of major pollutants, such as inorganic nitrogen and phosphate,
remain high in contaminated seawater. My estimation suggests that local officials
have more motivation to free-ride on water pollution in the eastern coastal area of
China. They have less of an incentive to promote pollution reduction among heavy
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industrial facilities compared to those in western regions in general, because emitted
pollutants are more likely to be exported outside the country.
3.6.1.2 Trade-off Effect for Local Support
The theoretical analysis suggests that firms located further away from resi-
dential areas may increase pollution emissions, because local officials have less of an
incentive to subsidize abatement for those firms. This is similar to the downstream
effect observed above, which is that each jurisdiction shifts pollution downstream,
and focuses on reducing pollution impacts to its own residents. The corresponding
coefficients in Table 3.3 suggest that these types of pollution incentives, which po-
tentially allow local authorities to acquire more local support, are substantial and
have a similar magnitude to the spillover effect along a river network. This may
indicate that shifting pollution to the downstream or further away from residential
areas are similar decision-making processes for balancing the local economy and
local environment, which is consistent with the theoretical model.
To retain its local public support and avoid pollution complaints, the local
government has more of an incentive to strengthen the abatement enforcement near
jurisdictional residential areas and meet the demand for environmental quality under
its jurisdiction with the least effort. On average, a firm will emit 0.009% to 0.093%
of additional COD-equivalent pollutants if it locates one kilometer away from a
residential area. Given the average distances to the closest residential area, a firm
would have incentives to decrease 0.12 to 0.86 tons of COD-equivalent pollutants if
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it locates next to it.
Similar to the spillover effects inherent in river pollution, local officials have
the highest incentives to reduce pollution for firms in the power sector and the steel-
manufacturing sector as the firm is located closer to a jurisdictional residential area.
While the percentage reductions of pollution from these sectors are lower than for
firms in industries such as the clothing/dyeing sector and the food/beverage sector.
Region-wide comparisons are shown in Figure B.2, which plots the coefficients
using both a WBRE model and a 2SLS-FE model (with the corresponding standard
errors) of the distances to the closest jurisdictional residential area over the study
period. These figures suggest similar incentive patterns as with distances to down-
stream estuaries, with higher magnitudes in eastern China. This is possibly due to
the difference in population density. Western China has lower population density,
and the pollution level of a firm in western China is less sensitive to a firm’s distance
to a residential area.
3.6.1.3 Downstream effect and the Installation of Abatement Tech-
nology
Based on my theoretical model, firms with less per unit local environmental
damage will receive a smaller subsidy share of abatement technology investments
from the local government, and their total level of abatement technology installation
will be lower, compared to firms located in more environmentally sensitive areas.
Table 3.3 shows the estimated coefficients for the impact of firms’ location on in-
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stalled abatement technology level from both the direct estimation (panel 1) and
the first stage estimation (panel 2). In general, the estimated coefficients follow the
expectation of the theoretical hypothesis and have the same magnitudes between
different estimation methods, although the magnitudes of the coefficients are gener-
ally higher in the first stage estimation. I illustrate the following implications based
on the coefficients reported in the first panel in Table 3.3.
On average, the scale of installed abatement technology will increase from
0.004% to 0.080% if a firm locates one kilometer upstream from the downstream
estuary, or from 0.008% to 0.133% if it locates one kilometer closer to a residential
residential area, depending on the sector that it is in. Local officials’ incentives to
abate pollution may vary by sectors: variation of abatement technology installation
is more sensitive to a firm’s relative location on a river network for firms in the paper
and power sectors, and more sensitive to a firm’s relative location with regard to
residential areas for firms in the steel manufacturing sector. Given the descriptive
statistics in Table 3.2, these sectors are generally located in counties with relatively
high expenditures compared to the governmental revenues, and where the impacts
of local governments’ financial situations are relatively high. It is possible that a
certain share of governmental expenditure is allocated to investing in abatement
technology installation for firms in these sectors inside the jurisdiction. Higher
revenue (lower expenditure) from the previous year stimulates significantly more
installation of abatement technology for these heavily polluting firms, suggesting
local governmental financial status plays an important role when it strategically
allocates pollution and abatement resources inside each jurisdiction.
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With the average locational information from the descriptive statistics in Table
3.1, the average abatement capacities would decrease from 0.78% to 11.44% or from
0.04% to 0.93% if firms from different sectors are gathering at the downstream border
or next to the closest jurisdictional residential area, respectively. Firms in the power
and the paper sectors have higher decreases for the former situation, and firms in the
clothing/dyeing and the steel-manufacturing sectors have higher decreases for the
latter situation. These estimated results suggest that geographical variation impacts
local officials’ incentives to promote additional abatement technology installation.
The total savings from the pollution levies for all the firms in this dataset would be
$57.84 million (in 2011 exchange rate) if all of them increased the scale of abatement
technology by one additional ton (approximately a 10% to 132% increase based on
the current installation scales, depending on the sector), and the total emission
reduction would be 0.62 million tons of COD-equivalent pollutants.
3.6.2 Policy Implication and Pollution Reduction
In this subsection, I estimate the magnitude of distortions caused by inter-
jurisdictional spillovers by comparing an optimum from a hypothesized central pol-
icy to the current decentralized optimum from the water-pollution regression, and
provide policy implications related to it. Currently, in water pollution, each juris-
diction acts like a self-interested utility maximizer and exports pollution outside
the jurisdiction through the river network or away from jurisdictional residential
areas. However, the country could internalize all the pollution spillovers across
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jurisdictions while still exporting pollution outside the country by acting like one
jurisdiction. This new policy scenario can be easily designed for water pollution,
and I will illustrate this centralized scenario using the water pollution case as an
example.
To simulate the new policy scenario, I use the estimated coefficients in the
first panel of Table 3.3, which estimates firms’ pollution levels using the following
equation:
pollutionit = α + β1downstreami + β2residentiali + γ1Xit + γ2Xi + uit + ei + eit
(3.9)
The new policy scenario will change the firm’s relative location along the river net-
work or relative to a residential area. I assume everything else remains the same. I
define the new distance to the closest residential area, new residentiali, to be the
distance from the firm i to the closest residential area within or outside the juris-
diction (while the previous distance only considers the residential area within the
jurisdiction). I define the distance to the downstream estuary, new downstreami,
to be the distance from the firm i along the river network to the most downstream
estuary in the country. I substitute new residentiali and new downstreami for
residentiali and downstreami in the above equation to estimate the new pollution
levels for each firm. For those negative pollution levels, I replace them to zero. Com-
paring the total pollution level in this new policy scenario to the current situation,
the estimated pollution reduction is reported in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4 suggests that a centralized policy will bring additional pollution re-
duction to the whole country. Specifically, the power sector and the steel-manufacturing
sector have the highest pollution reduction in absolute terms, and the cement sector
has the highest pollution reduction percentage. Given the corresponding county
population of where the firm is located, the reduced COD-equivalent pollution per
person-exposure per year is the highest from the power sector. Other sectors also
have positive reduction levels. The centralized policy can be achieved by allowing
inter-jurisdictional negotiation and financial transfers across provinces. Downstream
provinces may use charged pollution levies for abatement in upstream provinces,
which is beneficial both in financial and pollution-reduction terms. Total charged
levies from heavily polluting firms will be reduced on average, because upstream
jurisdictions’ polluting incentives are lessened further. Reduced average COD- or
BOD-equivalent pollution per person per year may also improve regional health
outcomes and thus human capital outcomes.5
In general, as mentioned before, the central MEP is responsible for managing
and monitoring firm’s polluting activities at the national level. Local officials at the
provincial level have the power to collect levies and provide pollution reduction plans
within their jurisdictions. Although the central MEP selects high production high
pollution firms into its own monitoring system, local governments still have a certain
level of freedom and can strategically pollute by allocating fewer abatement funds
in places where environmental impacts are less likely to be internalized. However,
5Note that polluting incentives may shift to the most downstream firms to pollute into inter-
national seas. International impacts have not been considered in this estimation.
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the pollution spillovers could be reduced with inter-jurisdictional financial trans-
fers. Although the centralized optimum estimated above still generates spillovers
across jurisdictions, it will increase the nationwide welfare in health compared to
the current decentralized optimum.
Additionally, to reduce pollution spillovers based on the current situation, the
central government may strengthen pollution regulation in places where local officials
tend to be more lenient toward local emissions. For instance, the central government
may have to enforce pollution abatement at facilities closer to the downstream border
in a jurisdiction where pollutants could fall into other jurisdictions. They could
require heavily polluting firms located in those regions to install pollution abatement
technology. Moreover, the MEP could provide more transparent pollution data to
the public. Thus, local residents and media members, who care about water quality
would be better equipped to put pressure on local governments to reduce pollution
across jurisdictional borders.
3.7 Conclusion
China’s rapid industrialization and the corresponding environmental deteri-
oration have led to the central government enacting stricter regulations for water
quality. Water pollutants are levied under the pollution reduction mandates. Since
2001, the central government has set pollution reduction targets for each province.
Local officials are now evaluated on their ability to reduce pollution and sustain
economic growth. More recently, the central government has stipulated that pol-
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lution levies be spent only on funding abatement controls. Although the central
government has been monitoring the most heavily polluting firms, provincial gov-
ernments may strategically allocate fewer funds or less enforcement effort in places
where environmental improvements are less likely to be internalized by their own
jurisdictional residents.
This paper explores the downstream effect theoretically and empirically. This
study uses a sequential game model to portray the interaction between the local gov-
ernment and firms under China’s pollution reduction mandates. It hypothesizes that
local officials exhibit more lenient pollution control when the pollution is less likely
to cause environmental damage inside the jurisdiction. This results in increased
pollution levels from firms located at downstream borders or away from jurisdic-
tional residential areas. The paper tests these hypotheses using quarterly pollution
data from heavily polluting firms from 2011 to 2015. The dataset is merged with
firm abatement control technology information, as well as local weather and socio-
economic data in China. I adopt both a fixed effects model and a correlated random
effects model to estimate the firm’s time-invariant locational impacts on pollution
activities and installation of abatement technologies. The estimated coefficients are
consistent with the expectations: A water-polluting firm emits more pollutants if it
is closer to a downstream border and further away from a residential area within the
jurisdiction. These types of firms will invest less in abatement technology. These
results suggest the existence of strategic polluting behavior, which is potentially
caused by local officials’ incentives from the stipulations of the pollution reduction
mandates.
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The results presented in this paper suggest that the pollution level has a sig-
nificant geographic pattern under each jurisdiction in China, consistent with the
environmental federalism literature of pollution spillovers. In particular, local offi-
cials may allow more pollution activities for water polluting firms located closer to
its downstream estuaries, where the pollutants would be more easily be exported
away from its jurisdiction. The paper argues that these effects are possibly caused
by the promotion pressure from the central government, which leads local govern-
ments to allocate most of their pollution reduction enforcement efforts to zones that
help boost the economy and residential support within their jurisdictions.
Reducing transboundary pollution will be a challenging policy problem for the
central government. In the water pollution case, specifically, decentralized decision-
making structure is not appropriate as it results in excessive level of overall pol-
lution. A centralized pollution control policy would be preferred to improve cost-
effectiveness. It seems that a centralized decision, even preserves the downstream
effect, can reduce significant pollution distortions under the decentralized settings.
The centralized decision forces officials in one jurisdiction to include the pollution
costs imposed on their downstream neighbors into their considerations. It is easier
for a central authority to recognize that $1 abatement effort is worth more up-
stream than downstream. The centralized policy may moderate differences among
jurisdictions and lower the overall pollution costs.
If the central government intends to improve environmental quality in the
whole country, it may allocate a percentage of the charged pollution levies to help
install pollution reduction technologies on border facilities and heavy-industry facil-
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ities. It could also use extra funds to encourage local officials to exert enforcement
efforts near downstream borders. It may also increase the tax rates for facilities
located in environmentally sensitive areas. Moreover, if pollution data is made
available to the public, it may help arouse citizens’ concerns and feedback. In turn,
citizen and media pressure could incentivize local officials to set pollution reduction
targets for downstream border regions and areas further away from residential cen-
ters. Regional cooperation and negotiation may also be required. Because water
polluting flows are unidirectional, the centralized policy may involve compensation
from downstream to upstream for reduced polluting activities. Provinces further
downstream may provide funding to upstream provinces for additional abatement
technology investment. The proposed method will decrease upstream pollution but
may stimulate additional pollution further downstream. However, based on the es-
timation, the total pollution in the whole country would decrease and the average
welfare would increase.
In general, this paper provides a new and important pollution spillovers eval-
uation in China that has not been adequately addressed in the existing literature.
It examines spillover effects with detailed distance measures rather than rough firm
locations and links the explanation of the downstream effect to politicians’ promo-
tion evaluations. It seems that certain modifications in the current pollution levy
design are desirable if the central government wants to properly address the strate-
gic polluting incentives that currently influence local governments. Although this
paper illustrates some economic and political means to reduce pollution spillovers,
the question of how costly these political means (better enforcement from the cen-
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tral government and providing more pollution data to the public) are compared to
the economic means (financial transfer across jurisdictions) is beyond the scope of
this paper. As well, it would be interesting to design other mechanisms to reduce
pollution from centralized or decentralized structure. I will leave these issues for
future research.
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Statistics Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Sector Power Cement
Distance to downstream boundary 140645.7 114620.6 155.64 977120.1 177129.1 140496.2 70.89 1000457
Distance to the closest residential area 10480.54 12702.46 15.49 106038.8 6619.01 9014.87 3.72 96105.41
Distance to the closest road 9542.96 26844.72 0.14 256686.5 9579.95 18421.44 0.29 253938
Distance to the closest railroad 12249.63 19580.35 0.69 212948.8 23720.35 30669.06 0.59 277080.3
Distance to the closest industrial park 25943.69 35723.27 0.11 448470.8 41724.54 44337.35 0.15 303329.8
Distance to the closest commercial center 25769.56 31266.41 14.96 297393 30163.7 32827.09 24.36 295534.1
Pollution (COD-equivalent) in ton 914.49 2163.46 0 75000 225.4 1277.27 0 61510.45
Abatement technology 4.79 45.56 0 1320 9.81 110.89 0 3280
N 75628 39860
Sector Steel Paper
Distance to downstream boundary 165665.6 113685.9 39.37 955219.3 143910.3 97809.88 155.64 651708.4
Distance to the closest residential area 7023.95 9403.82 12.46 94255 5405.13 8029.39 11.97 109398
Distance to the closest road 10878.24 23427.77 1.17 232562.1 13279.14 29916.46 0.3 253938
Distance to the closest railroad 19677.05 23711.21 6.02 179207.1 17820.05 20667.77 1.51 246856.1
Distance to the closest industrial park 30385.61 31641.41 0.15 244392.8 22864.21 25883.18 0.22 190376.5
Distance to the closest commercial center 28147.26 27245.44 23.29 323912.9 22670.44 21749.12 19.48 141642.7
Pollution (COD-equivalent) in ton 159.63 413.26 0 7826.43 59.32 304.96 0 8225.36
Abatement technology 1.42 34.02 0 1200 2.49 19.4 0 340
N 70572 21552
Sector Clothing/Dyeing Food/Bev
Distance to downstream boundary 174319.4 122552.8 358.22 1000457 128142.3 86038.18 2256.5 844230.9
Distance to the closest residential area 7761.38 10779.74 3.6 95185.8 4193.16 4887.04 17.55 48329.48
Distance to the closest road 9717.54 22418.2 0.46 256686.5 19140.51 42003.27 0.91 256579.6
Distance to the closest railroad 25709.17 40503.65 4.56 287967.3 13877.38 15076.63 11.04 90462.91
Distance to the closest industrial park 38642.61 47802.99 0.08 449460.2 19092.11 19082.37 0.11 153914.8
Distance to the closest commercial center 31764.18 32822.49 17 294949.2 18587.02 18424.84 3.65 146094.3
Pollution (COD-equivalent) in ton 38.54 249.35 0 11644.04 37.18 230.07 0 10891.12
Abatement technology (ton) 1.56 29.38 0 800 0.76 9.08 0 240
N 29444 32636
All the distance variables are measured in meters.
Abatement technology is production capacity (tons) installed with denitrification technology for Cement, Paper, and Food Sectors,
and with desulfurization technology for Power, Cement, and Clothing/Dyeing Sectors.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Data Used in Water Pollution Analysis in Various Sectors (2011-2015)
94
Statistics Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Sector Power Cement Steel
County-level governmental revenue (100 million CNY) 22.25 30.13 28.4 33.87 12.06 16.27
County-level governmental expenditure (100 million CNY) 32.29 27.53 36.14 30.57 24.8 17.04
County-level value added (100 million CNY) 191.8 228.91 253.6 262.2 109.86 125.14
County-level population (10k person) 66.99 34.38 74.48 38.54 69.36 36.54
County-level number of industrial enterprises 342.05 451.91 554.38 593.25 189.25 259.59
Prefectural-level number of employees (10k person) 89.77 117.7 94.68 92.94 82.65 139.86
Prefectural-level population density (person per sq. km) 580.46 531.05 663.31 378.21 509.9 501.27
Prefectural-level average wage (CNY) 40847.24 13504.99 39146.4 11238.39 37288.22 16469.51
Provincial-level area of paved road (10k sq. m) 2877.04 2794.81 2615.67 2456.81 2238.68 2812.95
Precipitation (mm) 72.54 66.71 101.9 80.09 91.2 73.82
Terrain (average land slope) 5.16 6.57 4.22 5.84 8.34 9.04
In a designated historical industrial city (0/1) 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45
N 75628 39860 70572
Sector Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food/Bev
County-level governmental revenue (100 million CNY) 15.14 19.51 10.61 14.61 15.29 26
County-level governmental expenditure (100 million CNY) 25.93 18.62 23.34 16.67 25.73 23.8
County-level value added (100 million CNY) 144.28 160.01 98.25 112.74 144.9 222.83
County-level population (10k person) 71.15 33.81 66.53 34.92 60.94 33.69
County-level number of industrial enterprises 287.13 354.62 175.15 243.66 201.8 343.65
Prefectural-level number of employees (10k person) 83.95 102.59 72.37 109.52 61.71 91.21
Prefectural-level population density (person per sq. km) 540.98 388.14 458.13 455.09 444.89 410.39
Prefectural-level average wage (CNY) 38375.94 14945.44 37150.31 14762.7 37144.9 13166.45
Provincial-level area of paved road (10k sq. m) 2372.28 2384.82 2179.18 2411.45 1888.18 2231.15
Precipitation (mm) 100.14 80.03 84.68 73.17 85.29 72.57
Terrain (average land slope) 6.65 7.56 7.32 8.43 11.1 12.4
In a designated historical industrial city (0/1) 0.27 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.38
N 21552 29444 32636
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Control Variables in Various Water-Polluting Sectors (2011-2015)
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Comparison between Mundlak-RE and Mundlak-RE with IV results
dep. var. Power Steel Cement Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food/Bev
Pollution (COD) Distance in km to -84.05∗∗∗ -78.60∗∗∗ -77.91∗∗∗ -53.34∗∗∗ -45.60∗∗∗ -42.82∗∗∗
(Mundlak) Downstream estuary (1.090) (1.001) (0.783) (0.748) (0.493) (0.391)
Distance in km to 82.45∗∗∗ 63.62∗∗∗ 66.31∗∗∗ 42.83∗∗∗ 35.85∗∗∗ 29.67∗∗∗
Residential area (0.793) (0.840) (0.917) (0.734) (0.284) (0.502)
Abatement Tech. Distance in km to 0.00244∗∗∗ 0.00043∗∗∗ 0.00065∗∗∗ 0.00198∗∗∗ 0.00016∗∗∗ 0.00028∗∗∗
(Mundlak) Downstream estuary (0.00018) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.0002) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Distance in km to -0.00038∗∗∗ -0.00135∗∗∗ -0.00189∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.00032∗∗∗ -0.00018∗∗∗
Residential area (0.00005) (0.00027) (0.00023) (0.00002) (0.00004) (0.00005)
Pollution (COD) Distance in km to -70.43∗∗∗ -63.25∗∗∗ -63.04∗∗∗ -40.20∗∗∗ -26.19∗∗∗ -25.98∗∗∗
(Mundlak-IV) Downstream estuary (2.628) (2.660) (4.186) (1.264) (3.022) (4.333)
Distance in km to 72.50∗∗∗ 62.47∗∗∗ 61.00∗∗ 41.10∗∗∗ 27.22∗∗∗ 25.75∗∗∗
Residential area (4.044) (1.781) (19.47) (0.834) (0.452) (5.461)
Abatement tech. -3352.6∗∗∗ -2210.6∗∗ -1803.2∗∗ -803.8∗∗ -2887.4∗∗∗ -2606.7∗∗∗
(in tons) (806.5) (858.0) (647.3) (291.2) (685.4) (300.8)
Abatement Tech. Distance in km to 0.00789∗∗∗ 0.00294∗∗∗ 0.00125∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.00064∗∗∗ 0.00057∗∗∗
(Mundlak-IV) Downstream estuary (0.00026) (0.00025) (0.00024) (0.00023) (0.00004) (0.00006)
Distance in km to -0.00655∗∗∗ -0.00172∗∗∗ -0.00485∗∗∗ -0.00082∗∗∗ -0.00971∗∗∗ -0.00073∗∗∗
Residential area (0.00021) (0.00031) (0.00025) (0.00006) (0.00025) (0.00005)
Governmental -6.3834∗∗∗ -0.1768∗∗∗ -5.0455∗∗∗ -3.5132∗∗∗ -5.1563∗∗∗ -0.1818∗∗∗
Expenditure (1.628) (0.0513) (1.2278) (1.0155) (0.9829) (0.0528)
Governmental 0.4604∗∗ 0.1812∗∗∗ 4.2733∗∗∗ 4.2332∗∗∗ 3.2729∗∗∗ 0.1847∗∗∗
Revenue (0.1502) (0.042) (1.0514) (0.854) (0.9062) (0.0433)
† Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 25.185 69.912 24.442 84.63 69.442 54.298
Sargan-Hansen Stat 1.357 0.257 0.217 0.261 2.168 0.169
p-val 0.2441 0.612 0.641 0.6096 0.1409 0.6807
N 70572 75628 21552 39860 29444 32636
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Abatement technology is production capacity (tons) installed with denitrification technology for Cement, Paper, and Food Sectors,
and with desulfurization technology for Power, Cement, and Clothing/Dyeing Sectors.
† Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values (maximal IV size): 10% 19.93, 15% 11.59, 20% 8.75, 25% 7.25. Source: Stock-Yogo (2005)
Table 3.3: Firm’s Locational Impact on Water Pollution and Installed Abatement Technology: 2011-2015
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Sector Power Cement Steel Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food/Bev Sum
Reduction Percentage 23.12% 32.68% 29.73% 21.27% 13.66% 24.64%
in Million CHYuan 9923.93 717.92 3267.3 258.17 94.24 105.86 14367.42
average BOD-equivalent
per person·year 1494.07 117.44 409.84 44.02 14.34 15.63 2095.34
Table 3.4: Water Pollution Reduction with Inter-jurisdictional Negotiation
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Figure 3.1: Summary of Distances by Industrial Sectors
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Chapter 4: Geographic Spillovers in China: Strategic Air Polluters
4.1 Introduction
Air quality in China is among the worst in the world, due to the country’s
heavy reliance on fossil fuel consumption during its rapid economic growth and in-
dustrialization in the last three decades (Ghanem and Zhang, 2014). Coal accounts
for more than 70% of the total energy consumption, which contributes the most to
air pollution due to its combustion (Chan and Yao, 2008; Fang et al., 2009). Severe
SO2, NO2, and particulate matter pollution have caused tremendous health and eco-
nomic problems (Zhang and Wang, 2011). The problems were exacerbated in China
by the large population, the lack of capital, and the poor education (Fang et al.,
2009). Although China has made considerable efforts to limit air pollution, such
as installing desulfurization and denitrification systems and strengthening vehicle-
emissions standards, these measures have not kept up with the growth of its economy
and fossil-fuel use (Zhang et al., 2012). The monetized health costs of premature
mortality and morbidity associated with air pollution was 157.3 billion Yuan in 2003
alone (Sun and Gu, 2008). Non-health-related air pollution impacts, such as crop
and fishery damage from acid rain, are substantial in economic value terms as well
(He et al., 2016; World Bank, 2007).
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All these pollution caused incidents have threatened the legitimacy of the cen-
tral government, which has created bottom-up pressures for its local governments
to reduce air pollution within the jurisdiction (Zheng et al., 2014a). To incentivize
air pollution abatement in China, the central government evaluate local officials’
performance, by including local air pollution index, the pollution reduction levels,
and installation of abatement technologies as part of the promotion criteria. Major
cities are required to disclose their classified air quality data, yet the manipula-
tion of the disclosed pollution data has been noticed (Ghanem and Zhang, 2014).
Fortunately, the central government has started to intensively monitoring the most
heavily-polluted firms directly, and released the pollution levels in terms of charged
pollution levies to establish and improve the information disclosure systems. This
step also helps to reduce the chance of interference and misreporting from local
officials. However, as noted before, jurisdictions have strong incentives to actively
promote spatial pollution externalities to capture the benefits of economic develop-
ment within their own borders.
This paper keeps investigating the inter-jurisdictional pollution externalities
under the Pollution Reduction Mandates in China, with a focus on air-polluting
firms. Under the decentralized environmental pollution control situation, it pro-
vides a complimentary evidence to show that local governments have incentives to
promote spatial pollution spillovers among air-polluting firms as well. Following
the theoretical model in Chapter 3, each firm has an assigned health-risk index
representing its heterogeneous locational information. This value is used to proxy
the relative health impact from its emitted air pollutants on residents’ well-being
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within a local jurisdiction. Firms with relatively low health-risk index receive lower
concerns from local governments, and are likely to emit higher pollution.
To adopt the theory in the air pollution circumstance, this paper hypothesizes
that a firm has a lower health-risk index if it is closer to the downwind border of a
jurisdiction or locating in an area with a higher average wind speed. Its pollution
level is higher and its abatement investment is lower, comparing to an equivalent
firm with a higher health-risk index in the same jurisdiction. To test the hypoth-
esis empirically, I quantify the pollution and abatement incentives based on firm’s
geographic information using a unique firm-level panel dataset. I have constructed
this dataset including each firm’s relative distance to the leeward provincial border
in each season, average wind speed at the firm’s coordination, its quarterly SO2-
equivalent pollution level and the scale of installed abatement technology, as well as
other socio-economic variables.
Similar to the econometric analysis adopted in the previous chapter, this chap-
ter validates the hypothesis and shows that an air-polluting firm emits more pollu-
tants if it is closer to the downwind border or in a location with higher wind speed
(so that more emissions are carried downwind); these type of firms are also less likely
to adopt abatement equipment with high capacities. Sector-wise analysis suggests
that heavy polluters including the chemical and manufacturing industries exhibit a
stronger “downwind effect”. In general, this chapter shares part of the contribution
to the literature in the previous chapter. It explores the geographical impacts of air
pollution and abatement incentives with the direct measure of the pollutant levels
and the firms locational information in China. This paper further examines the free-
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riding behavior that is possibly exhibited among local governments in environmental
pollution issues, and serves as a complementary chapter for Chapter 3.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides ad-
ditional detailed literature review of China’s pollution reduction mandates and the
role of promotion criteria in environmental regulation. This section focuses mainly
on the air pollution side. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 are the empirical portion with a
within-between random effects model and a fixed effects model to test the hypoth-
esized “downwind effect” for air pollution. The conceptual framework behind the
empirical work follows the theoretical model in the previous chapter, and is further
explained in the empirical section. Section 4.5 shows the main empirical results with
a discussion of the caveat in theory. Section 4.6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Institutional Background and Literature Review
Environmental deterioration, as the byproduct of China’s industrial growth
during the period of economic reform, has resulted in the death of nearly a million
people every year (World Bank, 2007). With its strong industrial expansion and
relatively lax environmental regulation, China’s air quality is among the worst in
the world. Its SO2 emissions are almost as high as for Europe and the United States
combined (Vennemo et al., 2009). Less than 1% of the major cities in China meet the
World Health Organization recommended air quality standards (Zhang and Crooks,
2012). Fossil fuel consumption, as a major result of rapid economic growth in China,
has led to severe pollution of SO2, NO2, and particulate matter (Zhang and Wang,
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2011).
Air pollution has substantial economic and health impacts to the society.
Based on a World Bank report, the monetized health costs of air pollution in china
are reached to 1.2% and 3.8% of GDP (World Bank, 2007). The welfare deduction
from particulate matter concentrations, which are five times higher than the safety
level, has increased from an estimated $22 billion in 1975 to an estimated $112
billion in 2005 (Chen et al., 2012; Ghanem and Zhang, 2014; Matus et al., 2012).
Air pollution is also associated with elevated rates of mortality in developing coun-
tries (Chen et al., 2013; Ebenstein et al., 2015; Greenstone and Hanna, 2014; Zhang
and Mu, 2018). The Global Burden of Disease Study shows that air pollution has
become the leading health-risk factor for Chinese residents, which causes between
350,000 and 500,000 premature deaths each year in China (Chen et al., 2013; Yang
et al., 2013).
China’s leaders have started to worry about the corresponding environmental
impacts on the economy and the society. Based on their concerns, air pollution is not
only decreasing the speed of GDP growth in China, but also jeopardizing the legit-
imacy of the Chinese Communist Party. As noticed by Ghanem and Zhang (2014),
because of the corresponding health impacts, air pollution “has stirred widespread
discontent among the emerging middle class in urban areas” to threaten the stabil-
ity of the society, which pressurizes both the central and the local governments to
systematically reduce pollution for their residents.
While China still gives GDP growth the highest priority, the central gov-
ernment responded to the pollution problem with pollution reduction mandates
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including a new pollution levy system throughout the whole country. Starting in
2005 (the beginning of the 10th Five-Year Plan), the central government began to
increase investment in environmental protection, set ambitious targets for the reduc-
tion of pollution and energy intensity, and introduce new environmentally friendly
technologies (Economy, 2007).
The major focus of the pollution reduction mandates for monitoring and levy
collection is on SO2 for air-polluting firms. Pollution tax charges are levied on 44
air pollutants. All the other pollutants are converted to SO2-equivalent units when
calculating the pollution tax. Since July 1, 2004, the pollution tax is calculated
as 0.6 Yuan (approximately $0.10) times the sum of the top three SO2-equivalent
pollutants for air-pollution. The charge rates and conversion rates for each pollutant
are set by the central government in the Regulations on the Administration of the
Charging and Use of Pollutant Discharge Fees (hereinafter, the Regulations) issued
on February 28, 2003.
Under the decentralized pollution regulation, local governments are also em-
powered the ultimate authorities to manage local polluting firms. Inefficient small-
scale coal-fired units with high polluting levels are forced to shut down (Cao et al.,
2009; Jin and Lin, 2014; Ma and Zhao, 2015), other firms are subsidized to install
pollution abatement technology under technology mandates. As explained above,
environmental performance at the local level has incorporated in the cadre promo-
tion and evaluation system to better motivate officials’ pollution abatement incen-
tives. The promotion tournament created among local officials forces them to focus
both local economic growth rate and pollution reduction performance since 2007
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(Chen et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005; Shih et al., 2012). However, economic growth
is always the top priority in China, even environmental compliance has been explic-
itly written into the cadre evaluation system (Zhang and Crooks, 2012; Zheng et al.,
2014b). Local governments might trade local environmental services for faster eco-
nomic growth, as the latter ones linkage to financial rewards and political promotion
is well-known in Chinese political system (Ghanem and Zhang, 2014).
Because of the apparent tradeoffs between economic growth and pollution re-
duction, the literature to date suggests that local jurisdictions are likely to account
for local conditions but ignore inter-jurisdictional spillovers when the decision of
providing a public good is made locally. For instance, Rauscher (1995) and San-
tore et al. (2001) show that differences in state-level policies may lead to strategic
pollution and asymmetric pollution spillovers. Novel (1992) finds that emissions of
volatile organic compounds or nitrogen oxides in downwind states have more lax
regulation. Helland and Whitford (2003b) notice that industrial toxic chemical re-
leases to the air are systematically higher in counties on the eastern edge of states,
because prevailing wind patterns could carry pollution across the border. Another
related study conducted by Ghanem and Zhang (2014) also shows that wind speed
is important for local pollution management.1 The studies evaluating environmen-
tal free riding are largely based on county-level evidences. Detailed firm location
data, on the other hand, could provide additional evidence of polluting facilities’
geographic distribution. One of the most recent studies, Monogan III et al. (2013),
1They show that pollution data manipulation is likely to happen when the wind speed is low,
as the pollutants are not “gone with the wind” under that circumstance.
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uses stationary firms’ locations in latitude and longitude to show that air polluting
facilities are more likely to be located near a state’s downwind border than other
industrial facilities.2
This paper links closely to the above series of literature. Similar to other
countries, after the economic reforms and the devolution of authorities, Chinese
local governors can influence the location and scale of dirty industries’ production
with their administrative power. Because of the flexibility at the local level in the
pollution reduction mandates, local leaders can strategically shift pollution activities
without jeopardizing the production benefits within their jurisdictions. To provide
a more nuanced empirical evidence in air pollution, I use a rich dataset to examine
the relationship between the emission/abatement level and the location of a firm in
the Chinese context.
4.3 Conceptual Framework and Data
Conceptually, a theoretical model of a firm’s pollution highlighting the “down-
stream effect” has been developed in the previous chapter. As explained above, the
Chinese “tournament competition” system to promote local officials has a signifi-
cant influence on local pollution reduction and environmental protection (Wu et al.,
2013). Local governments have incentives to both boost their local economy by at-
tracting dirty industries and reduce air pollution to improve local residents’ quality
of life in order to retain their political power (Wang, 2013; Zheng et al., 2014a).
2Although this pattern of location may be the result of government’s strategy, my study further
argues that within each industry, higher pollution facilities are more likely to be located near the
downwind border as well.
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Similar to the externalities inherent in river, natural prevailing wind direction and
average wind speed can lead to free-riding behaviors in air pollution at local level.
Presumably, local governments benefit most from pollution reduction higher upwind
in their jurisdiction, and thereby exert the least enforcement effort near the down-
wind boundary of their administrative regions. Higher wind speed could also take
pollution away without additional abatement effort. Similar to the settings in the
previous chapter, this paper assumes that per unit of pollutants from firms locating
at less environmentally sensitive area have less health impacts to local residents, or
firms locating closer to the downwind border or in an area with a higher average
wind speed for the air-pollution case. Those firms can export pollutants outside
easily and are assigned with lower health-risk index inside a jurisdiction based on
their locational information.
The paper hypothesizes that local governments care less about pollution from
firms with relatively low health-risk indices. Those firms yield less damage to local
residents, which leads to less environmental-related complaints that may jeopardize
local government’s promotion. In theory, one dollar spent upwind brings more local
health welfare than a dollar spent downwind. To enjoy the economic growth brought
from firm production, local officials may be more likely to ignore pollution from
downwind firms because increased production is likely to offset the corresponding
pollution damage at less environmentally sensitive areas.
Similar to the theoretical conclusions in the previous chapter, I derive two
testable hypotheses about the relationships between an air-polluting firm’s geo-
graphical information with its emission levels and abatement technology scales:
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firms closer to the downwind border or with higher wind speed will have higher
emission levels and lower abatement technology investment. This pollution distor-
tion or spillovers is examined using a unique panel of firm and socioeconomic data.
To construct the dataset, I use the data from the quarterly pollution tax data
of firms subject to intensive monitoring from 2010-2015, and extract coordinates
of firms in air polluting sectors using Google API. Same as the previous chapter,
the pollution and abatement data is collected from a number of governmental doc-
uments recently released by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (the lists of
Enterprises subject to Intensive Monitoring and Control of the State (2011-2015),
and the lists of Running Desulfurization and Denitrification Facilities).3 With the
coordinate information for each firm, I use the layers of map from the National
Fundamental Geographic Information System (NFGIS) to generate similar distance
variables in the previous chapter. The ArcGIS Proximity toolset (Near) was used
to calculate the distances from a firm to its closest residential area, industrial park,
and transportation infrastructure.
To measure the distance to the provincial leeward border, I find the prevailing
wind direction in each province using NOAA’s hourly weather station data in China
(346 stations with valid observations in total). I then interpolate the prevailing
wind direction at all firms with a circular kriging model. This interpolating model
3The first list contains the quarterly pollution levies charged to each firm subject to intensive
monitoring and control by the state, with the corresponding firm’s names at plant-level. According
to the central MEP, these high production firms account for nearly 65% of the total emissions. The
last two lists provide the end-of-the-pipe desulfurization and denitrification technology installation
information before 2015 for all installed firms, including firm’s name, firm’s sector, installation
date, capacity, and types of technology. To ensure the reliability of the monitoring information,
local EPBs must conduct monitoring activities and unannounced field inspections before reporting
to superior level EPBs and the MEP (Wu et al., 2016).
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accounts for the unique features of angular data, where 1◦ and 359◦ are almost the
same in terms of wind direction. Each firm’s average wind speed and wind direction
data are extracted from the generated kriging rasters in each season. Figure 4.1 and
4.2 display the examples of average prevailing wind direction in winter and summer
across China, respectively.4 The figures follow the common sense that the prevailing
winds blow across southern China from the southeast: Cold air pours down from
Siberia in the winter; Warm air comes up from Southeast Asia and the South China
Sea in the summer.
Given the wind direction information at each firm, I draw a line based on
the interpolated wind angle to find the border intersect, and calculate the distance
from the firm to this intersect in ArcGIS. All distances were then converted from
Decimal Degrees to Meters using the Gauss Kruger-Beijing 1954 projection, the
most commonly used projected coordinate system in China. The detailed firm-level
locational information was merged with county, prefectural, and provincial-level
socioeconomic data for additional controls. The corresponding data is collected
from the published statistical yearbooks and the website of the National Bureau of
Statistics.
There are five major air-polluting sectors: the power, the electronics, the
manufacturing, the chemistry, and the medical sectors. The power sector has a
high share of firms in the monitoring list, and potentially pollute both water and
air. Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics by sector to compare air-polluting firm’s
4Figure 4.3 shows an example of the interpolated wind direction for all firms in Anhui province
in winter.
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relative locations. The power and electronic sectors have relatively high average
SO2-equivalent pollution levels. Again, no significant geographical variations by
sector may suggest that heavy polluters are not strategically placed before or at the
moment they enter the market, pollution level variations (if any) are more likely to
be generated after the placement.
4.4 Empirical Model
4.4.1 Main Regression Model
For the air-polluting firms, I adopt the same empirical methods to further
explore the strategic polluting behavior, which has the same theoretical grounds as
the “downstream effect” in the water-polluting case. To quantify the impact of a
firm’s locational information to its pollution level and abatement technology instal-
lation scale, I use the within-between random effects (WBRE) model to estimate
the time-invariant variables, downwindi and windspeedi, by including the time av-
erages of the time-variant variables in the regression (Allison, 2009; Chamberlain,
1982; Mundlak, 1978).
Let pollutionit represent the quarterly pollution of firm i at the quarter t,
let Techit represent the aggregated desulfurization or denitrification capacity of the
installed abatement technology in firm i at the beginning of quarter t. The main
110
empirical model is given by:
pollutionit = α + β1downwindi + β2windspeedi + δ1Techit + δ2Techi
+ γ1Xit + γ2Xi + uit + ei + eit
Techit = a+ b1downwindi + b2windspeedi + g1Xit + g2Xi + εi + εt + εit
(4.1)
where downwindi is the distance from firm i to the downwind border along the
prevailing wind direction, and windspeedi is the average wind speed at firm i. Xit
includes weather data and all the county, prefectural, and provincial-level controls
mentioned in the previous section.5
As in the “downstream effect” situation, I estimated both the reduced form
model and the model that includes the endogenous technology capacity variable.
The instruments for the scale of installed abatement technology are local govern-
mental revenue and expenditure as before. The estimated coefficients are reported in
Table 4.3. Similar to the previous section, to examine if the Mundlak-Chamberlain
Approach provides non-biased coefficients, I conduct the following robustness checks
below.
5It includes local demographic information, aggregate production in each industry and sector,
administrative information, population, income, education facilities, hospital facilities, social ser-
vice facilities, local government budgets, and aggregate gross/per capita industrial values. It also
contains precipitation, temperature, sun radiation information obtained from NOAA.
111
4.4.2 Robustness Checks
This subsection provides models that this paper has been adopted as robust-
ness checks. I use a two-stage least square fixed-effects (2SLS-FE) model by interact-
ing each key time invariant variables with quarter dummies to examine the possible
variation of the local regimes’ regulatory stringency. I also treat locational variables,
downwindi and windspeedi, as endogenous with a control function approach.
4.4.2.1 Regime/Policy Change
I use a 2SLS-FE model to examine possible regime or policy changes during
the study period, the corresponding empirical model is the following:
pollutionit = α + β1downwindi · qt + β2windspeedi · qt
+ δTechit + γXit + ei + et + eit
Techit = a+ b1downwindi · qt + b2windspeedi · qt + gXit
+ z1Revenueit + z2Expenditureit + εi + εt + εit
(4.2)
The estimated locational impacts on a firm’s pollution level are reported in Table
4.4. First stage coefficients of locational impacts on the scale of installed abatement
technology are reported in Table 4.5.
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4.4.2.2 Endogenous Location
WBRE estimation provides an opportunity to examine a firm’s locational im-
pacts when downwindi and windspeed are endogenous without introducing too
many instruments. The difference between the results from the model below and
those in Table 4.3 is by treating the two key variables, downwindi and windspeedi, as
endogenous variables. Although the descriptive statistics have suggested that heav-
ily polluting firms may not be able to cluster at the least environmental sensitive
areas like downwind borders, it is possible that air-polluting firms’ relative location
based on prevailing wind speed and wind direction are potentially endogenous to
their emission levels. Again, I assume that functional land use planning, such as
the construction of transportation infrastructure and designation of economic de-
velopment zones, are generically determined before the environmental policy is in
effect. Firm’s locational choice is more likely to be decided according to local land
use plans, which relates to firm’s supply and procurement management, and is in-
dependent to firm’s emission level. And the corresponding system of equations for
air-polluting firms is:
pollutionit = α + β1downwindi + β2windspeedi + δ1Techit + δ2Techi
+ γ1Xit + γ2Xi + uit + ei + eit + ε̂it + ŵit + v̂it
(4.3)
Techit = a+ b1downwindi + b2windspeedi + g1Xit + g2Xi
+ z1Revenueit + z2Expenditureit + εi + εt + εit
(4.4)
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downwindi = φ1Zi + ζ1Xit + wit
windspeedi = φ2Zi + ζ2Xit + vit
(4.5)
where Zi includes the distances from firm i to the closest road, railroad, industrial
park, and commercial center.
I first estimate the reduced form equations by estimating equation 4.3 (exclud-
ing the abatement technology variable and the residual estimation: ε̂it+ŵit+v̂it) and
4.4 separately using 2SLS-WBRE model. The estimated coefficients are reported
in Table 4.6. First stage coefficients and the corresponding statistics are in Table
4.7-4.8. Including the abatement technology variable in equation 4.3 introduces
an additional endogenous variable and complicates the model, so the correspond-
ing model is estimated with a control function approach. Table 4.9 provides the
corresponding estimated coefficients for air-polluting firms.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Main Regression Results
This section reports the estimated coefficients for the pollution activity of air-
polluting firms under China’s Pollution Reduction Mandates from 2011-2015. Table
4.3 and Table 4.4 (& 4.5) report key estimated coefficients for air-polluting firms
using the within-between random effects model and the two stage least square fixed
effects model, respectively. The results derived in the theoretical section indicate
that firms located at less environmentally sensitive areas will have higher emission
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levels and lower levels of abatement technology installation. In terms of the air-
polluting firms, these areas may include places near the downwind border or with
relatively high wind speed, where pollutants can be easily exported outside the
jurisdiction and have relatively low health impacts to local residents. The estimated
coefficients in Table 4.3 follow the expectation of these hypotheses for all the five
industrial sectors.
The second panels of Table 4.3 and Table 4.5 also report the 2SLS estimated
impacts of the scales of installed abatement technology on air-polluting firm emis-
sion levels, and the coefficients have the same magnitudes across different sectors.
Two instrumental variables for the abatement technology installation, local govern-
mental expenditure and revenue, are significantly different from zero in both models,
and have signs following my expectation. Overidentification tests and the weak in-
strument tests indicate that these instruments are strong and valid. The coefficients
reported in Table 4.3 from the reduced form model (panel 1) and the model that
includes the abatement technology variable (panel 2) have signs and magnitudes
that are consistent with each other.
On average, a firm will emit 0.0005% to 0.0212% of additional SO2-equivalent
pollutants if it is located one kilometer closer to a provincial downwind border.
With the average distances to the downwind border from Table 4.1, the average
pollution in SO2-equivalent would increase from 7.83% to 418.56% for different sec-
tors if all the firms were located near the downwind border. Local officials have
more incentives to change pollution based on location for firms in the power and
the manufacturing sectors. But the manufacturing and the medical sectors have
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relatively high percentage change in pollution levels.
Theoretically, higher wind speed helps to export air pollutants, and each juris-
diction may take advantage of it to shift its local pollution away. The corresponding
coefficients in Table 4.3 suggest that these types of pollution incentives exist, but
have lower magnitudes compared to the spillover effect based on locational varia-
tion along the wind direction. On average, a firm will emit 0.0001% to 0.0005%
of additional SO2-equivalent pollutants if the wind speed increases 1mph, with the
medical and the manufacturing sectors more sensitive to wind speed in terms of the
percentage pollution changes. Given the average wind speed, a firm would have in-
centives to decrease 0.0002% to 0.0054% of SO2-equivalent pollutants if the average
wind speed at the firm drops to zero.
Based on the theory, an air-polluting firm with less per unit of local damage
(closer to the downwind border or with higher wind speed) will have lower scales of
installed abatement technology. Tables 4.3 shows the estimated coefficients of the
firms’ locational impacts on installed abatement technology from both the direct
estimation (panel 1) and the first stage estimation (panel 2). The estimated coeffi-
cients follow the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model and have the same
magnitudes, and I illustrate the implications based the coefficients in the first panel
in Table 4.3.
On average, the scale of installed abatement technology will increase from
0.020% to 0.208% if a firm is one kilometer away from the downwind border, or
from 0.00003% to 0.0026% if the average wind speed at where the firm is located
increases 1mph, depending on the sector that it is in. Local officials’ incentives
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to abate pollution may vary by sectors, and firms in the medical sector are more
sensitive to wind speed variation and relative location along the prevailing wind
direction. Same as the results among water-polluting firms, firms from this sector
are generally located in counties with relatively high expenditures comparing to the
governmental revenues, given the descriptive statistics in Table 4.2. The impacts of
local governments’ financial situation are relatively high compared to that in other
sectors as well. Geographical variation gives local officials’ certain incentives to
reduce pollution by promoting abatement technology among firms. For air-polluting
firms, one additional ton of installed technology capacity (approximately 10% to
114% increase based on the current installation scales, depending on the sector that
the firm is in) will save a firm $391.69 to $772.38 of pollution levies, with a total
saving from pollution levies around $135.95 million for all the firms studies in the
dataset. And the total reduced emission would be 1.25 million tons of SO2-equivalent
pollutants.
In terms of the estimation results in the robustness-check section, there is no
regime or policy change during the study period. Coefficients of firms’ locational
impacts on firms’ pollution levels and abatement technology installation in the 2SLS-
FE model are almost identical over the 20 quarter periods in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. And
they have similar magnitudes compared to the WBRE model using the Mundlak-
Chamberlain approach in Table 4.3. Coefficients also have the similar magnitudes
when treating the variables, downwindi and windspeedi, endogenous. The observed
pollution distortion based on a firm’s geographic information is robust in the air
pollution case as well.
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4.5.2 Caveat and Discussion
China’s Pollution Reduction Mandates charge pollution with a uniform rate
in the whole country. However, my estimation suggests that local governments have
incentives to free-ride on air pollution by taking the advantage of prevailing wind.
They tend to have less of an incentive to promote pollution reduction among air
polluters locating in a windy area or closer to the leeward border of the jurisdiction,
because emitted pollutants are likely to be gone with the wind and exported outside
the jurisdiction. Although different jurisdictions may have their own emission tar-
gets to share the abatement burden from the central government, the policy within
each jurisdiction is also not uniform.
This paper proposes one of the possible theories by following the previous
chapter, and argues that variations in the stringency of the regulations is achieved by
adjusting levy-recycled subsidies among heterogeneous firms within the jurisdiction.
This theory relies on three observed facts in China’s political hierarchy system and
the environmental policies: (1) The central government evaluates both the economic
performance and the pollution reduction performance to promote a local cadre; (2)
Other than collecting pollution levies, recycling tax as abatement subsidies for firms,
and planning/allocating subsidies within the jurisdiction, the pollution reduction
performance also includes reducing possible environmental complaints to maintain
social stability; and (3) a local cadre has more of an incentive to strengthen the
abatement enforcement to best retain its local public support and avoid pollution
complaints.
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Because of the data limitation, the allocated abatement investment from the
local government or the firm itself is unobserved. The estimated results in this paper
is at best indicating that all else equal, the level of air pollution emission is higher
(and the abatement technology scale is lower) if the location of firm has a natural
advantage to export pollution away from the jurisdiction by wind. Whether local
government has any strategic move behind this pollution distortion is still in theory.
However, the evidence provided in this paper, along with the results in the previous
chapter, has suggested that less-environmentally sensitive areas to a province are
likely to have a more lenient emission stringency.
One way to reduce the corresponding free-riding behavior would be assigning
responsibilities to lower level cadres directly from the central government. This
way may force the relatively downwind or windy towns/counties to share certain
pollution abatement burdens within a province as well. It would be very complex
to assess the efficiency between this relatively centralized case to the current de-
centralized policy.6 A more transparent data from MEP to show the abatement
subsidy allocation would also be helpful to reveal the role of local officials in the
whole pollution reduction process in China.
4.6 Conclusion
Rapid industrialization in China has caused alarming surges in air pollution.
China has responded to its severe environmental deterioration with a series of pol-
6The current environmental policy relies on the second layer of governance (the provincial level)
in China’s hierarchy political system, which is the most decentralized way to implement a policy.
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lution reduction mandates since 2001. The mandates are enacted with a series of
plans for each provincial government. This decentralized policy relies completely
on local officials, who are pressurized to enforce pollution reduction by the revised
cadre evaluation system. Although this evaluation system emphasizes on local en-
vironmental performances, local economic growth is still prioritized on a cadre’s
promotion path.
This paper adopts a conceptual framework, in which local officials are bal-
ancing their limited local resource to both reduce pollution and sustain economic
growth. This is consistent with the previous literature that local governments could
strategically allocate firms’ pollution levels and export the environmental costs. Al-
though the central government has been monitoring the most heavily polluted firms,
provincial governments may strategically allocate fewer funds or less enforcement
effort in places where environmental improvements are less likely to be internalized
by their own residents, such as downwind or windy counties. However, possibly
due to data limitation, this type of “pollution spillover effect” has not been well
studied in China until now. The disclosure of pollution information since 2010 pro-
vides a good chance to examine the geographical patterns of the pollution levels in
heavily-polluted firms among different sectors.
This paper further extends the “downstream effect” explored in the previ-
ous chapter empirically using a unique air-pollution dataset in China. It uses the
quarterly pollution data from air-polluting firms during 2011 to 2015. The data is
further merged with firm abatement control technology information, as well as local
weather and socio-economic data in China. I adopt both a within-between random
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effects model and a fixed effects model to estimate the firm’s time-invariant loca-
tional impacts on pollution activities and installation of abatement technologies.
The estimated coefficients are consistent with the expectations: An air-polluting
firm emits more pollutants if it is closer to the downwind border or locating in an
area with relatively higher average wind speed. These types of firms also have a
lower scale of the installed abatement technology.
These results point out the existence of strategic pollution behavior based on
firm geographical information, which is potentially caused by local officials’ incen-
tives from China’s revised cadre responsibility and evaluation system. In general,
the results presented in this paper provide an additional evidence of geographic-
based pollution pattern in China. To examine whether a more centralized pollu-
tion management is suitable in China, the central government could start a pilot
pollution-reduction program by bundling several provinces together with one cen-
tralized instruction. The centralized design requires a more nuanced abatement goal
in each lower level jurisdiction. The methodology adopted in this paper is transfer-
able to a design for this purpose, and I will leave this issue for future research.
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Statistics Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Sector Power Electronic
Distance to downwind border 18996.38 20622.44 1.15 182184.8 16898.71 18007.82 1.15 170246.9
Average wind speed (1000mph) 815.7 1049.78 0 7137.64 775.64 1023.28 0 7137.64
Distance to the closest road 9542.96 26844.72 0.14 256686.5 12929.23 38920.79 0.14 260709.9
Distance to the closest railroad 12249.63 19580.35 0.69 212948.8 11395.56 18093.36 0.69 189996.9
Distance to the closest industrial park 25943.69 35723.27 0.11 448470.8 22591.12 32098.44 0.11 448470.8
Distance to the closest commercial center 33765.02 33989.08 124.68 312393 31200.51 30649.82 125.09 296831.5
Pollution (SO2-equivalent) in ton 783.85 1854.4 0 64285.71 638.96 1838.24 0 56083.37
Abatement technology 4.79 45.56 0 1320 9.05 362.13 0 4309.2
N 78184 70520
Sector Chemical Manufacure
Distance to downwind border 21954.6 19275.1 1.16 182225.4 19781.06 16667.75 5.26 182225.4
Average Wind Speed (1000mph) 360.88 528.51 1 6127.586 281.16 287.26 1 5431.173
Distance to the closest road 8625.97 20487.84 0.03 248552.4 10623.11 30723.28 0.06 253938
Distance to the closest railroad 15338.05 21142.81 1.84 285919.9 15476.64 23703.25 6.06 285919.9
Distance to the closest industrial park 25831.06 31045.4 0.11 334438.2 24557.76 31136.13 0.11 334438.2
Distance to the closest commercial center 34966.73 28626.67 203.46 181636.5 31265.9 27172.89 203.46 199678
Pollution (SO2-equivalent) in ton 134.08 710.51 0 39482.34 40.18 270.85 0 17033.38
Abatement technology 9.81 45.56 0 1432.2 0.94 18.24 0 1320
N 46052 47288
Sector Medical
Distance to downwind border 21639.25 15822.49 8.47 165672.9
Average wind speed (1000mph) 280.08 284.78 1.03 4105.963
Distance to the closest road 9809.87 22040.91 0.29 217166.3
Distance to the closest railroad 19127.84 30395.37 4.64 279150.8
Distance to the closest industrial park 25898.73 30251.35 0.15 233252.3
Distance to the closest commercial center 36711.24 30087.6 203.46 143756.5
Pollution (SO2-equivalent) in ton 50.23 166.06 0 3164.177
Abatement technology 0.88 7.51 0 142
N 12220
All the distance variables are measured in meters.
Abatement technology is production capacity (tons) installed with denitrification technology for Chemical,
Manufacturing, and Medical Sectors, and with desulfurization technology for Power and Electronic Sectors.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Data Used in Air Pollution Analysis in Various Sectors (2011-2015)
122
Statistics Mean SD Mean SD
Sector Electronic Chemical
County-level governmental revenue (100 million CNY) 26.97 34.66 16.9 23.65
County-level governmental expenditure (100 million CNY) 37.14 33.57 28.24 22.91
County-level value added (100 million CNY) 232.35 279.31 152.2 185.55
County-level population (10k person) 71.53 33.27 67.93 34.03
County-level number of industrial enterprises 441.91 538.59 273.78 383.44
Prefectural-level number of employees (10k person) 101.16 124.27 78.24 110.53
Prefectural-level population density (person per sq. km) 644.8 552.6 564.08 518.07
Prefectural-level average wage 41361.3 13454.99 38753.87 14993.86
Provincial-level area of paved road (10k sq. m) 3120.95 2931.25 2415.57 2685.82
Precipitation (mm) 88.21 77.97 83.47 71.41
Terrain (average land slope) 5.22 6.79 6.21 8.06
In a designated historical industrial city (0/1) 0.2 0.4 0.29 0.45
N 78140 46052
Sector Manufacture Medical
County-level governmental revenue (100 million CNY) 20.5 27.67 13.91 18.7
County-level governmental expenditure (100 million CNY) 31.77 27.16 26.15 19.38
County-level value added (100 million CNY) 184.19 231.5 130.97 147.82
County-level population (10k person) 69.04 31.31 69.74 33.23
County-level number of industrial enterprises 340.97 439.4 238 306.43
Prefectural-level number of employees (10k person) 98.19 126.01 80.73 111.71
Prefectural-level population density (person per sq. km) 619.95 557.86 532.7 486.42
Prefectural-level average wage 39848.83 12909.09 37158.64 11573.01
Provincial-level area of paved road (10k sq. m) 2978.6 3080.02 2542.95 2529.58
Precipitation (mm) 97.49 82.61 79.47 69.25
Terrain (average land slope) 5.88 7.28 5.34 7.13
In a designated historical industrial city (0/1) 0.22 0.42 0.26 0.44
N 47288 11592
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Control Variables in Various Air-Polluting Sectors (2011-2015)
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Power Electronic Chemical Manufacture Medical
Pollution (SO2) Distance in km to -5.532
∗∗∗ -2.959∗∗∗ -1.399∗∗∗ -8.502∗∗∗ -1.943∗∗∗
(Mundlak) Downwind border (0.192) (0.106) (0.0740) (0.224) (0.115)
Wind spd 457.0∗∗∗ 356.6∗∗∗ 222.0∗∗∗ 128.4∗∗ 247.9∗∗∗
(1000mph) (5.058) (4.302) (2.113) (1.142) (2.306)
Abatement Tech. Distance in km to 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.00331∗∗∗ 0.00194∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.00183∗∗∗
(Mundlak) Downwind border (0.00121) (0.000283) (0.000298) (0.00137) (0.000170)
Wind spd -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.00263∗∗∗ -0.00256∗∗∗ -0.00131∗∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗
(1000mph) (0.00016) (0.000241) (0.000256) (0.000116) (0.00032)
Pollution (SO2) Distance in km to -5.159
∗∗∗ -2.923∗∗∗ -1.362∗∗∗ -7.217∗∗∗ -1.879∗∗∗
(Mundlak-IV) Downwind border (0.238) (0.117) (0.118) (0.491) (0.167)
Wind spd 427.8∗∗∗ 354.8∗∗∗ 203.9∗∗∗ 116.3∗∗∗ 227.4∗∗∗
(1000mph) (11.86) (16.18) (15.62) (41.31) (27.01)
Abatement tech. -3614.7∗∗ -6155.3∗∗∗ -4241.6∗∗∗ -5828.0∗∗∗ -7128.0∗∗
(in tons) (1222.6) (1379.7) (1272.2) (1385.4) (2428.4)
Abatement Tech. Distance in km to 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0315∗∗∗
(Mundlak-IV) Downwind border (0.00119) (0.00029) (0.0003) (0.00018) (0.00141)
Wind spd -0.0178∗∗∗ -0.0052∗∗∗ -0.0082∗∗∗ -0.0064∗∗∗ -0.0225∗∗∗
(1000mph) (0.000837) (0.00029) (0.00036) (0.00018) (0.000945)
Governmental -1.0081∗∗∗ -1.1082∗∗∗ -1.491∗∗∗ -1.3588∗∗∗ -1.1545∗∗∗
Expenditure (0.23759) (0.284) (0.27735) (0.27075) (0.28162)
Governmental 0.205∗∗∗ 0.0729∗∗∗ 0.0961∗∗∗ 0.0687∗∗∗ 0.2066∗∗∗
Revenue (0.04389) (0.01794) (0.01817) (0.01774) (0.04371)
† Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 27.007 36.754 23.268 32.655 22.85
Sargan-Hansen Stat 0.096 0.346 0.098 0.29 1.3
p-val 0.7573 0.5566 0.754 0.5901 0.2543
N 69236 74708 45328 46476 11412
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Abatement technology is production capacity (tons) installed with denitrification technology for Chemical,
Manufacturing, and Medical Sectors, and with desulfurization technology for Power and Electronic Sectors.
† Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values (maximal IV size): 10% 19.93, 15% 11.59, 20% 8.75, 25% 7.25.
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005)
Table 4.3: Firm’s Locational Impact on Air Pollution and Installed Abatement Technology (Mundlak Approach): 2011-2015
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Power Electronic Chemical Manufacture Medical
Distance in km to quarter 1 -2.044∗∗∗ -2.183∗∗∗ -5.218∗∗∗ -7.968∗∗∗ -1.860∗∗∗
Downwind border (0.452) (0.399) (0.867) (0.973) (0.430)
quarter 2 -2.178∗∗∗ -3.116∗∗∗ -6.628∗∗∗ -7.022∗∗∗ -2.458∗∗
(0.534) (0.569) (1.423) (1.549) (0.765)
quarter 3 -2.273∗∗∗ -1.275 -4.391∗∗∗ -5.551∗∗∗ -1.008
(0.581) (0.711) (1.246) (1.361) (0.780)
quarter 4 -2.974∗∗∗ -1.462∗∗∗ -2.904∗∗∗ -5.781∗∗∗ -1.336∗∗
(0.384) (0.436) (0.761) (0.959) (0.425)
quarter 5 -2.553∗∗∗ -3.393∗∗∗ -7.850∗∗∗ -8.555∗∗∗ -3.546∗∗∗
(0.484) (0.567) (0.971) (1.094) (0.612)
quarter 6 -2.051∗∗∗ -1.883∗∗∗ -5.394∗∗∗ -7.499∗∗∗ -1.809∗∗∗
(0.340) (0.465) (0.687) (0.891) (0.415)
quarter 7 -1.629∗∗∗ -1.336∗∗∗ -4.148∗∗∗ -6.082∗∗∗ -1.275∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.388) (0.526) (0.722) (0.335)
quarter 8 -3.772∗∗∗ -2.522∗∗∗ -4.422∗∗∗ -5.505∗∗∗ -2.384∗∗∗
(0.374) (0.495) (0.753) (0.975) (0.436)
quarter 9 -4.627∗∗∗ -2.509∗∗∗ -14.99∗∗∗ -15.45∗∗∗ -2.642∗∗∗
(0.451) (0.518) (0.985) (1.116) (0.550)
quarter 10 -3.609∗∗∗ -1.729∗∗∗ -8.724∗∗∗ -9.866∗∗∗ -1.815∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.423) (0.916) (1.055) (0.453)
quarter 11 -1.822∗∗∗ -1.098∗ -3.983∗∗∗ -4.984∗∗∗ -1.046∗∗
(0.287) (0.430) (0.584) (0.796) (0.373)
quarter 12 -3.516∗∗∗ -2.062∗∗∗ -7.316∗∗∗ -9.009∗∗∗ -2.356∗∗∗
(0.332) (0.377) (0.768) (0.973) (0.441)
quarter 13 -2.627∗∗∗ -3.986∗∗∗ -14.80∗∗∗ -16.57∗∗∗ -4.336∗∗∗
(0.383) (0.587) (1.327) (1.422) (0.681)
quarter 14 -2.191∗∗∗ -1.245∗∗∗ -4.812∗∗∗ -6.693∗∗∗ -1.590∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.368) (0.766) (1.001) (0.448)
quarter 15 -3.348∗∗∗ -2.043∗∗∗ -14.23∗∗∗ -17.90∗∗∗ -2.033∗∗
(0.512) (0.597) (1.633) (1.712) (0.628)
quarter 16 -3.594∗∗∗ -2.349∗∗∗ -12.43∗∗∗ -16.36∗∗∗ -2.229∗∗
(0.620) (0.652) (1.822) (1.941) (0.693)
quarter 17 -3.142∗∗∗ -1.102∗∗ -4.798∗∗∗ -7.044∗∗∗ -1.098∗∗
(0.392) (0.403) (0.925) (1.148) (0.414)
quarter 18 -4.234∗∗∗ -2.774∗∗∗ -4.914∗∗ -7.416∗∗∗ -2.839∗∗∗
(0.540) (0.543) (1.498) (1.704) (0.569)
quarter 19 -3.630∗∗∗ -1.830∗∗ 0.439 -1.763 -1.699∗∗
(0.703) (0.600) (1.346) (1.528) (0.631)
quarter 20 -3.451∗∗∗ -1.360∗∗ -1.935∗ -4.684∗∗∗ -1.201∗
(0.403) (0.461) (0.854) (1.074) (0.490)
Table 4.4: Firm’s Locational Impact on Air Pollution (Fixed Effects Model): 2011-
2015
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Power Electronic Chemical Manufacture Medical
Wind spd quarter 1 491.3∗∗∗ 375.7∗∗∗ 182.9∗∗∗ 166.5∗∗∗ 128.9∗∗∗
(1000mph) (18.77) (17.65) (11.19) (25.12) (11.04)
quarter 2 454.6∗∗∗ 318.9∗∗∗ 199.1∗∗∗ 186.4∗∗∗ 88.21∗∗∗
(16.78) (16.67) (9.659) (18.76) (12.91)
quarter 3 520.8∗∗∗ 356.3∗∗∗ 198.8∗∗∗ 192.2∗∗∗ 69.65∗∗∗
(24.38) (18.28) (11.70) (15.83) (12.83)
quarter 4 418.4∗∗∗ 310.9∗∗∗ 209.8∗∗∗ 205.6∗∗∗ 150.2∗∗∗
(26.67) (18.10) (10.90) (12.29) (10.51)
quarter 5 461.8∗∗∗ 419.7∗∗∗ 178.1∗∗∗ 174.9∗∗∗ 159.0∗∗∗
(13.12) (15.90) (10.76) (11.99) (11.65)
quarter 6 391.0∗∗∗ 326.8∗∗∗ 168.7∗∗∗ 165.9∗∗∗ 175.3∗∗∗
(10.64) (13.93) (8.289) (9.390) (7.689)
quarter 7 519.7∗∗∗ 375.6∗∗∗ 179.1∗∗∗ 172.6∗∗∗ 69.93∗∗∗
(15.13) (17.40) (10.60) (13.47) (12.97)
quarter 8 533.4∗∗∗ 408.9∗∗∗ 248.5∗∗∗ 245.5∗∗∗ 162.8∗∗∗
(15.56) (18.04) (11.29) (12.14) (10.29)
quarter 9 537.0∗∗∗ 354.3∗∗∗ 212.5∗∗∗ 169.8∗∗∗ 177.8∗∗∗
(12.00) (16.79) (25.64) (29.79) (10.95)
quarter 10 523.3∗∗∗ 320.7∗∗∗ 214.7∗∗∗ 170.3∗∗∗ 180.9∗∗∗
(10.87) (15.62) (26.61) (30.60) (8.192)
quarter 11 522.8∗∗∗ 318.3∗∗∗ 231.8∗∗∗ 192.9∗∗∗ 120.4∗∗∗
(12.88) (18.28) (23.13) (27.61) (10.85)
quarter 12 574.6∗∗∗ 343.6∗∗∗ 254.9∗∗∗ 217.1∗∗∗ 119.4∗∗∗
(13.35) (18.89) (22.18) (27.56) (8.784)
quarter 13 465.9∗∗∗ 414.2∗∗∗ 201.2∗∗∗ 161.9∗∗∗ 200.7∗∗∗
(11.99) (15.38) (22.32) (29.35) (9.006)
quarter 14 423.5∗∗∗ 285.0∗∗∗ 190.6∗∗∗ 165.8∗∗∗ 108.2∗∗∗
(10.58) (17.74) (12.86) (20.65) (6.964)
quarter 15 469.1∗∗∗ 326.7∗∗∗ 184.9∗∗∗ 182.6∗∗∗ 122.9∗∗∗
(21.09) (22.45) (19.88) (23.50) (8.368)
quarter 16 479.1∗∗∗ 357.1∗∗∗ 225.0∗∗∗ 248.0∗∗∗ 128.8∗∗∗
(31.86) (19.52) (48.77) (23.19) (9.098)
quarter 17 488.5∗∗∗ 331.2∗∗∗ 181.0∗∗∗ 209.2∗∗∗ 146.6∗∗∗
(30.88) (34.92) (54.49) (22.78) (8.982)
quarter 18 469.2∗∗∗ 332.0∗∗∗ 172.6∗∗∗ 195.7∗∗∗ 180.6∗∗∗
(29.71) (33.65) (45.56) (19.65) (7.817)
quarter 19 546.7∗∗∗ 342.0∗∗∗ 232.1∗∗∗ 229.1∗∗∗ 176.0∗∗∗
(35.53) (42.53) (9.234) (11.81) (9.327)
quarter 20 466.4∗∗∗ 299.5∗∗∗ 167.0∗∗∗ 187.7∗∗∗ 139.2∗∗∗
(33.46) (42.68) (44.81) (21.91) (8.197)
Technology -3743.4∗∗ -6596.2∗∗∗ -4149.0∗∗ -5467.0∗∗ -4957.9∗∗∗
Capacity (in ton) (1355.8) (1344.6) (1278.9) (1666.3) (756.1)
N 69236 74708 45328 46476 11412
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Abatement technology is production capacity (tons) installed with denitrification technology for Chemical,
Manufacturing, and Medical Sectors, and with desulfurization technology for Power and Electronic Sectors.
Table 4.4: Firm’s Locational Impact on Air Pollution (Fixed Effects Model): 2011-
2015 Continued
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Power Electronic Chemical Manufacture Medical
Governmental -0.08841∗∗∗ -0.19253∗∗∗ -1.92677∗∗∗ -0.20056∗∗∗ -1.81531∗∗∗
Expenditure (0.022159) (0.052353) (0.19027) (0.051839) (0.187142)
Governmental 0.07463∗∗ 0.18739∗∗∗ 0.47649∗∗∗ 0.21308∗∗∗ 0.3666∗∗
Revenue (0.025086) (0.042904) (0.139469) (0.042523) (0.137154)
Distance in km to quarter 1 0.00141∗∗∗ 0.00168∗∗∗ 0.00521∗∗∗ 0.00512∗∗∗ 0.00089∗∗∗
Downwind border (0.000138) (0.000174) (0.000834) (0.000314) (0.000167)
quarter 2 0.00272∗∗∗ 0.00347∗∗∗ 0.00727∗∗∗ 0.00267∗∗∗ 0.00066∗∗∗
(0.000199) (0.000235) (0.000973) (0.000311) (0.000165)
quarter 3 0.00192∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.00764∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.00108∗∗∗
(0.000219) (0.000241) (0.001134) (0.000381) (0.000202)
quarter 4 0.00097∗∗∗ 0.00112∗∗∗ 0.00594∗∗∗ 0.00007 0.00011
(0.000142) (0.000177) (0.001011) (0.000351) (0.000187)
quarter 5 0.00185∗∗∗ 0.00202∗∗∗ 0.00576∗∗∗ 0.00168∗∗∗ 0.00087∗∗∗
(0.000183) (0.000202) (0.000885) (0.000309) (0.000164)
quarter 6 0.00109∗∗∗ 0.00144∗∗∗ 0.00595∗∗∗ 0.00209∗∗∗ 0.00072∗∗∗
(0.000134) (0.000166) (0.000891) (0.000326) (0.000173)
quarter 7 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.00084∗∗∗ 0.00549∗∗∗ 0.00095∗∗ 0.00093∗∗∗
(0.000105) (0.000136) (0.001124) (0.000361) (0.000192)
quarter 8 0.00101∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.00593∗∗∗ 0.00097∗ 0.00023
(0.000151) (0.000183) (0.001049) (0.00045) (0.000239)
quarter 9 0.00162∗∗∗ 0.00159∗∗∗ 0.00578∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.00084∗∗∗
(0.000197) (0.000209) (0.000908) (0.000333) (0.000177)
quarter 10 0.00111∗∗∗ 0.00112∗∗∗ 0.00604∗∗∗ 0.00009 0.00101∗∗∗
(0.000181) (0.000196) (0.000928) (0.000321) (0.00017)
quarter 11 0.00036∗∗∗ 0.00053∗∗∗ 0.00579∗∗∗ 0.00178∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗
(0.000113) (0.000147) (0.001006) (0.000361) (0.000191)
quarter 12 0.00013 0.00017 0.00506∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.00158∗∗∗
(0.000146) (0.000179) (0.000942) (0.000396) (0.00021)
quarter 13 0.00049∗ 0.00054∗ 0.00017 0.00453∗∗∗ 0.00131∗∗∗
(0.000213) (0.000232) (0.000938) (0.000369) (0.000196)
quarter 14 0.00066∗∗∗ 0.00085∗∗∗ 0.00486∗∗∗ 0.00376∗∗∗ 0.00097∗∗∗
(0.000138) (0.000179) (0.000842) (0.000313) (0.000166)
quarter 15 0.00279∗∗∗ 0.00313∗∗∗ 0.00155 0.00389∗∗∗ 0.00097∗∗∗
(0.000224) (0.000259) (0.000947) (0.000335) (0.000178)
quarter 16 0.00476∗∗∗ 0.00553∗∗∗ 0.01948∗∗∗ 0.00534∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗
(0.000253) (0.000291) (0.001074) (0.00039) (0.000207)
quarter 17 0.00176∗∗∗ 0.00233∗∗∗ 0.02029∗∗∗ 0.00465∗∗∗ 0.00197∗∗∗
(0.000139) (0.000179) (0.000906) (0.00034) (0.000181)
quarter 18 0.00355∗∗∗ 0.00471∗∗∗ 0.01872∗∗∗ 0.00478∗∗∗ 0.00106∗∗∗
(0.000184) (0.000223) (0.000947) (0.000332) (0.000176)
quarter 19 0.00279∗∗∗ 0.00351∗∗∗ 0.02015∗∗∗ 0.00534∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.000186) (0.000217) (0.001091) (0.000382) (0.000203)
quarter 20 0.00149∗∗∗ 0.00196∗∗∗ 0.01879∗∗∗ 0.00469∗∗∗ 0.00214∗∗∗
(0.000135) (0.000171) (0.001024) (0.000375) (0.000199)
Table 4.5: Air-Polluting Firm’s Locational Impact on Installed Abatement Technol-
ogy (Fixed Effects Model): 2011-2015
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Power Electronic Chemical Manufacture Medical
Wind spd quarter 1 -0.05933∗∗∗ -0.07381∗∗∗ -0.02211∗∗∗ -0.00054∗∗∗ -0.00108∗∗∗
(1000mph) (0.003008) (0.003283) (0.002329) (0.000074) (0.000117)
quarter 2 -0.05892∗∗∗ -0.0725∗∗∗ -0.02237∗∗∗ -0.00038∗∗∗ -0.00127∗∗∗
(0.002993) (0.003274) (0.002322) (0.000078) (0.000124)
quarter 3 -0.07514∗∗∗ -0.09175∗∗∗ -0.02416∗∗∗ -0.00067∗∗∗ -0.00176∗∗∗
(0.003671) (0.003998) (0.002836) (0.00009) (0.000142)
quarter 4 -0.06086∗∗∗ -0.07405∗∗∗ -0.01483∗∗∗ -0.00001 -0.00088∗∗∗
(0.003596) (0.003913) (0.002775) (0.000104) (0.000164)
quarter 5 -0.05851∗∗∗ -0.06896∗∗∗ -0.00196 -0.00053∗∗∗ -0.00237∗∗∗
(0.002861) (0.003138) (0.002226) (0.000078) (0.000124)
quarter 6 -0.04753∗∗∗ -0.05491∗∗∗ -0.00212 -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.00112∗∗∗
(0.002601) (0.002836) (0.002012) (0.000069) (0.00011)
quarter 7 -0.06457∗∗∗ -0.07401∗∗∗ -0.00298 -0.00045∗∗∗ -0.00167∗∗∗
(0.003371) (0.003668) (0.002602) (0.000084) (0.000134)
quarter 8 -0.06049∗∗∗ -0.06856∗∗∗ -0.00834∗∗ -0.00047∗∗∗ -0.00023
(0.003461) (0.003747) (0.002658) (0.000088) (0.000139)
quarter 9 -0.03941∗∗∗ -0.04441∗∗∗ -0.01071∗∗∗ -0.00035∗∗∗ -0.00038∗∗∗
(0.002837) (0.003074) (0.002181) (0.000074) (0.000116)
quarter 10 -0.03556∗∗∗ -0.03961∗∗∗ -0.01198∗∗∗ -0.00037∗∗∗ -0.00076∗∗∗
(0.002758) (0.003) (0.002128) (0.000075) (0.000119)
quarter 11 -0.03653∗∗∗ -0.04141∗∗∗ -0.01648∗∗∗ -0.00044∗∗∗ -0.00092∗∗∗
(0.003169) (0.00342) (0.002426) (0.000081) (0.000129)
quarter 12 -0.00777∗ -0.00767∗ -0.02275∗∗∗ -0.00046∗∗∗ -0.00116∗∗∗
(0.003117) (0.003367) (0.002388) (0.000086) (0.000136)
quarter 13 -0.0059∗ -0.00948∗∗∗ -0.02472∗∗∗ -0.00046∗∗∗ -0.00042∗∗
(0.002631) (0.002876) (0.00204) (0.000088) (0.000139)
quarter 14 -0.02375∗∗∗ -0.03077∗∗∗ -0.02771∗∗∗ -0.00038∗∗∗ -0.00036∗∗
(0.002426) (0.002651) (0.00188) (0.000075) (0.000118)
quarter 15 -0.05313∗∗∗ -0.06553∗∗∗ -0.03579∗∗∗ -0.00005 -0.0005∗∗∗
(0.002745) (0.003006) (0.002132) (0.000063) (0.000099)
quarter 16 -0.08204∗∗∗ -0.10118∗∗∗ -0.04147∗∗∗ -0.00161∗∗∗ -0.00081∗∗∗
(0.002986) (0.003278) (0.002325) (0.000083) (0.000131)
quarter 17 -0.07166∗∗∗ -0.08432∗∗∗ -0.03841∗∗∗ -0.00195∗∗∗ -0.00056∗∗∗
(0.002625) (0.002868) (0.002034) (0.00008) (0.000127)
quarter 18 -0.07329∗∗∗ -0.0883∗∗∗ -0.04051∗∗∗ -0.00202∗∗∗ -0.00051∗∗∗
(0.002635) (0.002906) (0.002061) (0.000083) (0.000131)
quarter 19 -0.09595∗∗∗ -0.11592∗∗∗ -0.05023∗∗∗ -0.00201∗∗∗ -0.00038∗∗
(0.003201) (0.003544) (0.002514) (0.000088) (0.000139)
quarter 20 -0.0816∗∗∗ -0.09554∗∗∗ -0.04191∗∗∗ -0.00178∗∗∗ -0.00079∗∗∗
(0.002871) (0.003139) (0.002227) (0.000084) (0.000133)
† Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 38.236 68.612 21.688 24.886 39.533
Sargan-Hansen Stat 0.437 0.274 0.666 1.600 1.419
p-val 0.5088 0.6005 0.4143 0.2058 0.2335
N 69236 74708 45328 46476 11412
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Abatement technology is production capacity (tons) installed with denitrification technology for Chemical,
Manufacturing, and Medical Sectors, and with desulfurization technology for Power and Electronic Sectors.
† Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values (maximal IV size): 10% 19.93, 15% 11.59, 20% 8.75, 25% 7.25.
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005)
Table 4.5: Air-Polluting Firm’s Locational Impact on Installed Abatement Technol-
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dep. var. Power Electronic Chemical Manufacture Medical
Pollution (SO2) Distance in km to -27.16
∗∗∗ -21.80∗∗∗ -63.34∗∗∗ -30.07∗∗∗ -22.83∗∗∗
Downwind border (2.240) (2.285) (4.627) (7.720) (2.032)
Wind spd 263.2∗∗∗ 486.1∗∗∗ 473.7∗∗∗ 219.5∗∗∗ 272.8∗∗∗
(1000mph) (5.056) (36.48) (9.154) (3.931) (9.311)
Abatement Tech. Distance in km to 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.00466∗∗∗ 0.00252∗∗∗ 0.00112∗∗∗ 0.0191∗∗∗
Downwind border (0.00163) (0.000427) (0.000729) (0.000167) (0.00185)
Wind spd -0.00260∗∗∗ -0.00202∗∗∗ -0.00166∗∗∗ -0.000281∗∗∗ -0.00310∗∗∗
(1000mph) (0.000193) (0.000215) (0.000193) (0.0000283) (0.000139)
N 69236 74708 45328 46476 11412
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Abatement technology is production capacity (tons) installed with denitrification technology for Cement, Paper, and Food Sectors,
and with desulfurization technology for Power, Cement, and Clothing/Dyeing Sectors.
Table 4.6: Firm’s Locational Impact on Air Pollution and Installed Abatement Technology: 2011-2015 Mundlak-RE Approach
with IV for Location129
Dis. in km to Power Electronic Chemical Manufacture Medical
First Stage of the Instrumented Variable: Distance in km to the Downwind Border
Closest 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.0526∗∗∗ 0.0671∗∗∗ 0.1664∗∗∗
Railroad (0.0074) (0.0096) (0.0109) (0.019) (0.0236)
Closest 0.0317∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗ 0.0131∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.0741∗∗∗
Main road (0.003) (0.0064) (0.0059) (0.014) (0.0086)
Closest 0.0871∗∗∗ 0.0101 0.1406∗∗∗ 0.5161∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗
Industr. park (0.0113) (0.0174) (0.0209) (0.0311) (0.0187)
Commercial -0.0281∗∗∗ 0.0079 0.0215∗ 0.0704∗∗∗ 0.1852∗∗∗
Center (0.006) (0.008) (0.0104) (0.015) (0.0196)
First Stage of the Instrumented Variable: Average Wind Speed
Closest -0.0484∗∗∗ -0.0306∗∗∗ -0.0544∗∗∗ -0.0902∗∗∗ -0.0991∗∗∗
Railroad (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.002) (0.0034) (0.0051)
Closest -0.0466∗∗∗ -0.0174∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.0288∗∗∗ -0.0428∗∗∗
Main road (0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0034) (0.002)
Closest 0.0525∗∗∗ 0.0269∗∗∗ 0.0191∗∗∗ -0.1655∗∗∗ -0.3709∗∗∗
Industr. park (0.0021) (0.0046) (0.004) (0.0057) (0.0036)
Commercial 0.0004 -0.0591∗∗∗ -0.0015 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.1182∗∗∗
Center (0.0011) (0.002) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0037)
Underidentification & Overidentification Test
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 68.64∗∗∗ 64.52∗∗∗ 70.01∗∗∗ 129.74∗∗∗ 275.92∗∗∗
Sargan-Hansen Stat 4.169 2.039 0.219 1.339 2.025
p-val 0.1244 0.3608 0.8964 0.5118 0.3632
Weak Identification Test
† Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 18.08 17.7 20.96 28.12 81.43
‡ AP F-val downwind 23.99 24.68 24.29 41.68 52.29
AP F-val avg. speed 123.3 34.01 72.19 44.48 134.23
N 69236 74708 45328 46476 11412
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values (maximal IV relative bias): 5% 11.04, 10% 7.56, 20% 5.57, 30% 4.73.
critical values (maximal IV size): 10% 16.87, 15% 9.93, 20% 7.54, 25% 6.28. Source: Stock-Yogo (2005)
‡ Critical values for single endog. regressor (maximal IV relative bias): 5% 16.85, 10% 9.08, 20% 6.46, 30% 5.39.
critical values (maximal IV size): 10% 22.30, 15% 12.83, 20% 9.54, 25% 7.80. Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).
Table 4.7: First Stage Regression (Firm’s Locational Impact on Air Pollution)
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Dis. in km to Power Electronic Chemical Manufacture Medical
First Stage of the Instrumented Variable: Distance in km to the Downwind Border
Closest 0.2976∗∗∗ 0.1798∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.2953∗∗∗ 0.0262∗∗∗
Railroad (0.0203) (0.0207) (0.0155) (0.0188) (0.0034)
Closest 0.1556∗∗∗ 0.1708∗∗∗ 0.0583∗∗∗ 0.1457∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗
Main road (0.0206) (0.0308) (0.0165) (0.0171) (0.0036)
Closest -0.9807∗∗∗ -1.1068∗∗∗ -0.4059∗∗∗ -1.0053∗∗∗ 0.0387∗∗∗
Industr. park (0.0185) (0.0319) (0.0299) (0.0178) (0.009)
Commercial -0.0821∗∗∗ -0.0768∗∗∗ -0.0309 -0.0884∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗
Center (0.0143) (0.0164) (0.0124) (0.0138) (0.0029)
First Stage of the Instrumented Variable: Average Wind Speed
Closest -0.0286∗∗∗ -0.0144∗∗∗ -0.0052∗∗∗ -0.0296∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
Railroad (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Closest -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.0045∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0001
Main road (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Closest 0.123∗∗∗ 0.1294∗∗∗ 0.0514∗∗∗ 0.1225∗∗∗ 0.0058∗∗∗
Industr. park (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0002)
Commercial 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗
Center (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Underidentification & Overidentification Test
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 450.333∗∗∗ 240.777∗∗∗ 125.264∗∗∗ 95.36∗∗∗ 106.367∗∗∗
Sargan-Hansen Stat 0.981 1.072 1.876 4.394 2.534
p-val 0.6122 0.585 0.3914 0.1111 0.2816
Weak Identification Test
† Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 113.341 60.262 31.296 23.857 26.645
‡ AP F-val downwind 301.34 80.25 134.89 171.28 36.08
AP F-val avg. speed 150.77 351.01 44.1 33.57 370.72
N 69236 74708 45328 46476 11412
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values (maximal IV relative bias): 5% 11.04, 10% 7.56, 20% 5.57, 30% 4.73.
critical values (maximal IV size): 10% 16.87, 15% 9.93, 20% 7.54, 25% 6.28. Source: Stock-Yogo (2005)
‡ Critical values for single endog. regressor (maximal IV relative bias): 5% 16.85, 10% 9.08, 20% 6.46, 30% 5.39.
critical values (maximal IV size): 10% 22.30, 15% 12.83, 20% 9.54, 25% 7.80. Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).
Table 4.8: First Stage Regression (Firm’s Locational Impact on Air Pollution)
131
dep var Pollution (SO2) Power Electronic Chemical Manufacture Medical
Distance in km to -14.19∗∗∗ -9.037∗∗∗ -13.32∗∗∗ -8.236∗∗∗ -5.337∗∗∗
Downwind border (1.300) (1.623) (1.162) (1.043) (0.826)
Avg. wind spd 524.8∗∗∗ 481.6∗∗∗ 685.3∗∗∗ 529.0∗∗∗ 630.9∗∗∗
(1000mph) (49.74) (71.02) (38.81) (27.34) (48.18)
Abatement tech. -4082.7∗∗∗ -1101.0∗∗∗ -7167.9∗∗∗ -3411.8∗∗∗ -4409.4∗∗∗
Capacity (tons) (278.8) (276.0) (438.3) (241.5) (212.6)
Residual from -0.448∗∗∗ 0.0383 -0.0121 -0.134∗∗∗ -53.82∗∗∗
Downwind equation (0.0961) (0.0442) (0.00821) (0.0317) (3.945)
Residual from 5.585∗ -10.32∗∗∗ -3.576∗∗∗ -2.994∗∗∗ -25.73∗∗∗
Speed equation (2.170) (1.179) (0.239) (0.554) (3.959)
Residual from 32740.8∗∗∗ 22273.5∗∗∗ 24294.9∗∗∗ 61661.9∗∗∗ 46958.3∗∗∗
Technology equation (3433.0) (1022.2) (2149.5) (6685.3) (7722.6)
N 69236 74708 45328 46476 11412
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Abatement technology is production capacity (tons) installed with denitrification technology for Chemical,
Manufacturing, and Medical Sectors, and with desulfurization technology for Power and Electronic Sectors.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.3: Interpolated Winter Wind Direction at All Heavily Monitored Firms in
Anhui Province
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Appendix A: AJAE Appendix for Chapter 2
Note: The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in
the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics (AJAE).
A.1 Conceptual Framework
To better understand how different driving forces across local areas influ-
ence land-use decisions, a shifter is added to each function, which accounts for
demographically-caused shocks that change the value of production or costs. With
initial values of shifters to be 1 as in the maximization problem in the theory section,
let α ≥ 1, β ≥ 1, γ ≥ 1, and ω ≥ 1 represent shifters for the value of forestry pro-
duction, level farmland production, erodible farmland production, and the relative
cost of erodible farmland conversion to level farmland conversion. The shifter in
front of the function Cl(al) is normalized to 1.
The benefit maximization problem under the afforestation process with interior
solutions when 0 < a∗l < Al and 0 < a
∗
e < Ae becomes:
maxW (al, ae) = αB(F+al+εae)+βπl(Al−al)+γπe(Ae−ae)−Cl(al)−ωCe(ae)+S·(al+ae)
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Applying Cramer’s Rule yields the following comparative statics of a∗l and a
∗
e with
respect to the model parameters. Let g =
(
αB′ − βπ′l − C ′l + S








variables x = (al, ae) with parameters θ = (F,Al, Ae, α, β, γ, ω, S). The determinant
of Dgx(θ) = αB
′′(γπ′′e − ωC ′′e ) + ε2αB′′(βπ′′l − C ′′l ) + (γπ′′e − ωC ′′e )(βπ′l − C ′′l ) > 0,
which is guaranteed by the second-order sufficient conditions for a maximum, i.e.,
g11 = αB
′′ + βπ′′l − C ′′l < 0, and g22 = ε2αB′′ + γπ′′e − ωC ′′e < 0.




= αB′′(ωC ′′e − γπ′′e )/det < 0,
∂ae
∂F





2αB′′ + γπ′′e − ωC ′′e )/det > 0,
∂ae
∂Al












= B′(ωC ′′e − γπ′′e )/det > 0,
∂ae
∂α





2αB′′ + γπ′′e − ωC ′′e )/det < 0,
∂ae
∂β




















= [ε(1− ε)αB′′ + (ωC ′′e − γπ′′e )]/det,
∂ae
∂S
= [−αB′′(1− ε) + C ′′l − βπ′′l ]/det > 0
All the signs are following the expectation, except the direction of the subsidy’s
impact on the conversion of level farmland could be ambiguous and depend on the
size of the relative forestry productivity of converted farmland, ε. When ε is close
to 1, i.e. when forest land converted from both types of farmland have similar
forestry productivity, a higher unit subsidy increases the converted amount of level
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farmland. When ε converges to 0, it is less likely to happen. It would hint that highly
erodible farmland converting to forestland with almost no forestry productivity, as
if it was completely abandoned, would backfire the design of the GfG program.
The tradeoff could arise in middle cases: namely, when ε is close to 1/2. Whether
a high subsidy will induce more conversion of level farmland is ambiguous. It is
thus possible that an increased unit subsidy could discourage the conversion of level
farmland. The intuition is that a higher unit subsidy will increase erodible farmland
conversion. At the same time, the low survival rate of the newly afforested land,
along with the assumption that a marginal forestry benefit is decreasing when the
forest is expanding, reduces the general incentive of afforestation on farmland. If
the erodible farmland is relatively easy to convert or the marginal benefit to keep
the erodible farmland in use is very low, the incentive to convert level farmland is
further reduced.
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A.2 Robustness Check with GIS Data
In China, there are three types of land use data sources: the official statistical
data by the State Statistical Bureau; the national land resources inventory data
sponsored by the Ministry of Land and Resources (the MLR dataset); and the
satellite remote-sensing data maintained by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (the
GIS dataset) (Liu et al., 2005). The first source potentially underestimates the actual
cultivated land area, while the latter two are mapping based on aerial photos and
Landsat images and are validated against field surveys (Deng et al., 2006; Liu et al.,
2005, 2002). The MLR dataset (1996 to 2004) includes the yearly land transition
data with 47 classes of land cover (8 major categories) in every county, and the GIS
dataset documents the 1:100,000-scale national land use database with 31 classes of
land cover (6 major categories) that was applied to the Landsat TM/ETM in the
late 1980s, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 (Liu et al., 2014). Because the MLR dataset
remains confidential, it is crucial to show its data quality and data reliability against
the broadly accepted remote-sensing data. To compare the land use data from the
two data sources, I convert the 1km × 1km raster data from 1995 to 2010 into
geospatial vector data, spatially join these layers of land use databases with the
administrative map at the county-level, and calculate the aggregated area of each
class of land in each county (figure A.1 provides an example of the mapping process).
As mentioned in the data section, the MLR dataset has three advantages.
The GIS dataset shares the same advantages, except that there is a time gap in the
corresponding panel of five years. I use the GIS data as a major descriptive statistical
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reference in this paper, but conduct the empirical analysis using the MLR dataset.
A comparison of county-level averages for the amounts of major types of land
is shown in table A.1. Because of the inconsistency between the two datasets,
I compare the 1996, 2000, and 2004 land stock data in the MLR dataset with
the 1995, 2000, and 2005 land stock data in the GIS dataset. Because there was
no land use program during 1995-1996 and the GfG program was slowed down
after 2004, I expect a relatively low level of land conversion across the compared
types. None of the differences in county-average land stocks are statistically different
from zero. Two possible sources of measurement errors are (1) the GIS dataset is
measured to the nearest 100 hectares (1 km2) while the MLR dataset is to the
nearest 0.0067 hectares; and (2) the GIS dataset is developed by digitalization and
visual interpretation, which may involve certain measurement errors.
The comparison of land transition between the 5-year based GIS data and the
MLR data would be less suggestive and are not reported here. This is because the
MLR dataset documents the detailed yearly land conversion from land type A to
type B and from land type B to type A, which gives the net conversion of any two
types of land. The difference of two GIS maps, on the other hand, are the five-year
summation of the corresponding net conversion plus the net conversion from other
types to type B (such as pasture conversion, road construction, etc.). The latter
involves other economic incentives that beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure A.1: China Land Use (2000): 1km by 1km Raster Data Conversion to Vector Data at the County Level
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Data Source MLR GIS difference H0:mean(diff)=0
Comparison Land Type mean SD mean SD mean SD t-val p-val
MLR-1996 level farmland 21096.27 22277.12 20975.25 34178.08 121.0207 37202.88 0.1478 0.8825
vs. GIS-1995 erodible farmland 34455.31 46029.27 32457.14 53586.64 1998.165 57763.04 1.572 0.1161
all types of forests 84844.62 191137.2 83806.61 92699.76 1038.009 188735.6 0.2494 0.8031
pasture 24300.54 192723.4 24418.81 43567.53 -118.2705 196892.6 -0.0273 0.9782
unused land 22721.76 191569.8 21254.13 64513.62 1467.631 195645.9 0.3409 0.7332
MLR-2000 level farmland 21174.22 22488.76 22313.55 37214.58 -1139.33 39312.34 -1.3179 0.1877
vs. GIS-2000 erodible farmland 33730.65 45382.79 33743.05 54145.93 -12.39979 58092.84 -0.0097 0.9923
all types of forests 84350.67 190327.3 81966.61 90187.13 2384.06 187988.3 0.5755 0.5650
pasture 24845.89 192660.7 22904.35 42340.65 1941.536 196663.8 0.4489 0.6535
unused land 23129.04 191840.2 20978.83 65460.56 2150.21 196776.4 0.4969 0.6193
MLR-2004 level farmland 20772.72 22175.34 21885.53 36448.83 -1112.807 38343.02 -1.3198 0.1870
vs. GIS-2005 erodible farmland 31832.47 43644.39 33416.65 53817.1 -1584.178 58125.58 -1.2394 0.2153
all types of forests 80375.54 189830.7 81594.19 89902.52 -1218.653 186057.3 -0.2972 0.7663
pasture 24933.87 192635.5 22833.75 42181 2100.124 196569.8 0.4859 0.6271
unused land 22874.61 191783.7 20870.05 64490.64 2004.564 196479.7 0.464 0.6427
GIS-2010 level farmland 21861.75 36332.57 (Compare to -0.1252 0.9004
erodible farmland 32927.4 52816.76 GIS-2005) -1.6039 0.1089
all types of forests 82140.72 90284.59 1.5031 0.1330
pasture 22604.45 41845.07 -5.1592 0.0000
unused land 20935.65 64839.38 0.4573 0.6475
County Level Land Use Data Source: The Ministry of Land and Resources of China (1996-2004)
GIS Data Source: Chinese Academy of Sciences. (Based on Landsat TM scenes with a spatial resolution of 1km × 1km.
The main analysis in the paper focuses on the newly afforested timber-producing forest. The GIS data does not parse out this category.
I compare the total area of all types of forests in this table instead.
Table A.1: Land Use Data in China: Data Comparison (Area in Hectare)
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A.3 Robustness Check Regressions
This section includes a series of robustness checks and the main estimated co-
efficients of the robustness-check regressions. After that, tables providing additional
information about the land stock effect in the GfG program are included.
A. Time-Variant Unobservables at Provincial and Prefectural Level
The above empirical specification controls for county-level fixed effects and yearly
fixed effects, but time-variant unobservables at provincial and prefectural level can
also be controlled by including interactions between the regional and year indicators.
The tables reporting the coefficients of the program effect (along with the interaction
with farmland values) are reported in tables A.2 and A.3. The derived maximum
county-average productivity levels under this model specification are reported in
table A.4. Because the county-level land values, land stock, and average worker
characteristics that have been controlled in the model have absorbed and can reflect
many regional shocks, the coefficients have the same magnitudes as those reported
in the main text.
B. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model
Because the error terms in each land transition estimation equation are potentially
correlated across the equations, I estimate the group of equations simultaneously
to increase the estimation efficiency. The coefficients of the GfG program’s land
use impacts are expected to remain the same magnitudes. The seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) model consists of six equations of land transition. And I estimate
the pooled, regional, and sub-regional land transition separately. The coefficients are
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reported in tables A.5 and A.6. The derived maximum yields at which conversion
is desirable are reported in table A.7.
A major difference between the SUR model estimation and the FE model is
that the former improve the estimation efficiency. In the FE model, the main table
suggests that the GfG program has almost no impact on unused land conversion
or orchard afforestation, while in table A.5, a significant amount of erodible farm-
land and unused land has been converted to orchards. In northern China, unused
land conversion to orchards amounts to one-sixth of its total afforestation level,
which is very close to the regulation that orchards can account for at most 20% of
afforestation.
C. Propensity Score Matching and Difference-in-Difference Matching
As a conservation program to reduce soil erosion and prevent floods, the GfG pro-
gram was phased in based on major river flow directions. Although the region-based
enrollment selection made by the central government has been well controlled by
the fixed-effects model, the enrolled counties may be systematically different from
non-enrolled counties. To mitigate this concern, I use a propensity score match-
ing (PSM) method to account for observable differences in characteristics between
enrolled and un-enrolled counties.
I group the counties based on the years that they have been treated. Denote
the treatment status of each county as GfGi(m) where GfGi = 0 if a county is
never treated and GfGi = m if a county receives the GfG subsidy starting in year
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m. The probability of being enrolled in year m can be estimated as:
pm(Xi) = Pr(GfGi = m|Xi) = f(Xi) + ei (A.1)
where the potential set of observables Xi includes all the characteristics that have
been used in the fixed effects model above before treatment. It also includes some
time invariant characteristics that might influence local land-use policy decisions,
including: regional indicators; local terrain types (average percentage of mountain-
ous area, desert, and water area); local weather (precipitation, average temperatures
in winter and summer, and humidity); and average worker wage at the prefectural
and provincial level (to control for farmers’ outside options).1
With an estimate of p̂m(Xi), I estimate the average treatment effects (ATE)






















for land transition type j at year t. The expected treatment effects are not significant
to zero if t < m. The average of the treatment effects with t ≥ m is the overall ATE
of the GfG program for each land transition type j. The corresponding coefficients
are reported in tables A.8 and A.9.
1The last three groups of variables are averaging from 1990 to 1995. The data sources are from
the National Geomatics Center of China, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), and China’s provincial yearbooks, respectively.
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The PSM model can be used both as a robustness check and as a placebo test.
This model is able to examine the yearly conversion effects across different treated
cohorts. It compares the same land transition type in a certain year between one
treated group and the control group that have similar pre-treatment characteristics.2
Presumably, land transition should be similar for years before the treatment. At
the same time, the treatment effects over the treated years for a certain treatment
cohort have the same pattern as the placebo test in the FE model (see figures A.4
and A.5 and tables A.13 and A.14), and the average of the treatment effects have
the same magnitude with the effects estimated in the main text.
To further reduce the bias from unobserved systematic county characteristics,
I combine matching with the difference-in-difference (DID) estimator to control for
time-invariant characteristics. More specifically, I re-estimate the fixed effects model
on the trimmed or matched sample that has been derived from the PSM method.
I compare the treatment effects separately across different treated cohorts, because
even the pool of the control group is the same, and the matched control group to
different treated cohorts could be different. The ATEs for each treated cohort have
been reported in the last columns of tables A.8 and A.9. The ATEs are almost
identical to the coefficients in the FE model.
D. Variable and Data Variation
Changing the identification of farmland value from output grain/ha to GDP of
agricultural industry/ha, value added of agricultural industry/ha, output value of
farm/ha, and output of grain/ha from another source of data also provides virtually
2This is done by converting the long panel to wide panel.
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identical results. Dropping the top or bottom 5% and 10% of the transitional ob-
servations also yields estimated coefficients of the same magnitude, suggesting the
estimated coefficients are not influenced by outliers.
Tables A.10 and A.11 show the estimated coefficients in the absolute value
model and share model, respectively. Panel 1 to 4 report the results of changing
the identification of farmland value from output grain/ha to GDP of agricultural
industry/ha, value added of primary industry/ha, output value of farm/ha, and
output of grain/ha from another source of data, respectively. Panel 5 to 8 report the
results of dropping the top 5% and 10%, and bottom 5% and 10% of the transitional
observations, respectively.
Tables A.15 and A.16 provide additional information about land stock effect
in the GfG program: a type of land is likely to be enrolled in the program when its
stock is high, or the other type of land’s stock is low. This finding suggests that the
GfG program worked as intended from this aspect, because more erodible farmland
conversion would occur in a relatively erosion-prone region. On the other hand,
similar to the conversion of erodible farmland, local land stock effects are sizable in
the conversion of level farmland. Regions with a limited area of highly productive
flat farmland may choose to enroll more erodible farmland to the program, while
regions with a high stock of productive flat farmland have incentives to violate the
program’s regulations. Although the land stock effects on level farmlands are similar
in both northern and southern China, unintended land use conversion is more likely
to be observed in south-central China, because this region has a relatively abundant
stock of level farmland.
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E. Validity of the parallel trend assumption
To examine the validity of the parallel trend assumption, I conduct two tests. I first
check the differences in the pre-treatment trends of the treatment and comparison
groups separately for each cohort of provinces that implemented the GfG program
in a given year. As figures A.2 and A.3 show, there are no discernible differences in
pre-treatment trends in average conversion to timber-producing forests from level
farmland and erodible farmland, respectively. I also perform a set of placebo tests for
each implementation-year cohort. I estimate the farmland transition model under
the assumption that the program was implemented in 1997, 1998, and so on up to
a year before the end of the sample period. The estimated coefficients of the GfG
indicator for the level farmland and erodible farmland conversion showed in figures
A.4 and A.5 are not significantly different from zero. Tables A.12 to A.14 following
these figures report the corresponding coefficients in the figures. Comparisons and
placebo tests of other types of conversion are very similar and not reported.
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Land Transition
level erodible unused level erodible unused
farmland farmland land farmland farmland land
Model Variable to timber-producing forest to orchards
Pooled GfG 52.14∗∗∗ 238.9∗∗∗ -1.468 6.400 34.17∗∗ -0.977
(7.839) (45.02) (32.21) (15.02) (12.84) (5.703)
Regional GfG·N 86.12∗∗∗ 293.0∗∗∗ 59.68∗∗ -16.27 -0.386 -3.258
(11.24) (70.57) (18.46) (48.46) (23.35) (8.519)
GfG·S 20.18∗ 201.8∗∗∗ 10.25 -10.25 11.19 0.875
(8.91) (58.46) (43.11) (17.87) (19.62) (7.677)
Subregional GfG·NW 173.0∗∗∗ 440.3∗∗∗ 69.89 115.8∗∗∗ 14.27 -10.82
(17.98) (104.8) (68.22) (26.21) (34.69) (11.99)
GfG·NC 24.85∗ 67.98∗ 117.3 -13.98 -12.42 2.522
(12.56) (33.9) (80.42) (30.66) (37.37) (14.16)
GfG·NE 44.61∗ 428.9∗ -67.00 19.12 70.03 9.704
(22.32) (178.5) (132.9) (48.88) (59.09) (23.31)
GfG·SW 9.285 196.9∗∗ 12.52 -12.79 4.045∗ 0.0159
(13.99) (70.97) (52.86) (20.78) (2.05) (9.424)
GfG·SC 56.26∗ 191.3∗ -21.41 -3.112 -0.756 23.56∗
(23.32) (75.9) (75.22) (34.96) (34.83) (11.97)
N 8566 9003 10012 8564 8949 9838
Clustered standard errors in parentheses at the provincial level, with county, year fixed effects included.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Pooled, regional, and subregional models are separate regressions.
The model also includes the program indicator and provincial, prefectural indicators interactions.




Level Farmland Erodible Farmland
Pooled GfG 132.7∗∗∗ 736.7∗∗∗
(34.44) (128.1)
GfG·farmland value -12.45∗ -111.5∗∗∗
(5.309) (25.95)
Regional GfG·N 67.46∗∗∗ 606.9∗∗∗
(8.546) (63.88)




GfG·S·farmland value -0.105 -59.18∗∗∗
(1.522) (8.229)
Subregional GfG·NW 509.1∗∗∗ 97.26∗∗∗
(54.29) (11.45)
















GfG·SC·farmland value -284.5∗∗∗ -135.0∗∗∗
(20.42) (16.34)
N 8363 8685
Clustered standard errors in parentheses at the provincial level,
with county, year fixed effects included. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Pooled, regional, and subregional models are separate regressions. The model also
includes the program indicator and provincial, prefectural indicators interactions.
This is the table that used to derive the estimated breakeven farmland values.




Level Farmland Erodible Farmland
Pooled 10.656*** 6.609***
[6.64,14.68] [5.38,7.84]














Note: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
The Delta Method is used to calculate the 95% Confidence Intervals.
Pooled, regional, and subregional models are separate regressions.
Table A.4: Estimated Maximum Farmland Values (ton/ha) for Unintended Conver-
sion to Timber-producing Forest (with Prefecture-Year Indicators)
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Land Transition
level erodible unused level erodible unused
farmland farmland land farmland farmland land
Model Variable to timber-producing forest to orchards
Pooled GfG 74.93∗∗∗ 276.4∗∗∗ 6.033 -1.353 19.52∗∗ 8.943∗∗
(12.10) (33.24) (17.67) (13.18) (7.314) (2.950)
Regional GfG·N 42.38∗∗∗ 376.8∗∗∗ 54.65∗∗∗ -17.89∗∗∗ 10.66∗ 10.04∗∗∗
(2.309) (13.78) (8.595) (3.696) (4.416) (1.553)
GfG·S 13.41∗∗∗ 181.9∗∗∗ -6.024 0.124 47.71∗∗∗ 7.428∗∗∗
(2.369) (13.08) (8.550) (3.788) (4.219) (1.543)
Subregional GfG·NW 84.47∗∗∗ 375.6∗∗∗ 34.74∗∗ -22.47∗∗∗ 17.90∗∗ 10.06∗∗∗
(3.729) (17.38) (11.47) (4.645) (5.572) (2.077)
GfG·NC 20.89∗∗∗ 135.1∗∗∗ 138.2∗∗∗ -10.94 -26.97∗∗∗ 12.52∗∗∗
(5.503) (23.60) (13.34) (6.211) (7.537) (2.432)
GfG·NE 35.19∗∗∗ 727.0∗∗∗ -1.888 -19.04∗∗ 45.66∗∗∗ 7.660∗∗
(4.959) (27.73) (13.83) (7.279) (8.931) (2.628)
GfG·SW -2.165 190.9∗∗∗ -24.88∗ 14.78∗∗∗ 74.94∗∗∗ 4.087∗
(3.606) (14.43) (9.771) (4.214) (4.671) (1.776)
GfG·SC 53.29∗∗∗ 218.5∗∗∗ -3.769 -41.97∗∗∗ -11.15 10.83∗∗∗
(4.385) (19.45) (12.59) (6.457) (6.318) (2.283)
N 49828
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Pooled, regional, and subregional models are separate regressions.




Level Farmland Erodible Farmland
Pooled GfG 79.57∗∗∗ 443.5∗∗∗
(12.73) (35.76)
GfG·farmland value -7.589∗∗ -59.18∗∗∗
(2.365) (8.229)
Regional GfG·N 103.7∗∗∗ 952.8∗∗∗
(11.09) (64.23)




GfG·S·farmland value 1.949 -40.05∗∗∗
(1.913) (11.75)
Subregional GfG·NW 131.0∗∗∗ 623.3∗∗∗
(13.81) (79.64)
















GfG·SC·farmland value 8.008 -109.8∗∗∗
(7.280) (27.32)
N 48745
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Pooled, regional, and subregional models are separate regressions.
This is the table that used to derive the estimated breakeven farmland values.




Level Farmland Erodible Farmland
Pooled 10.484*** 6.167***
[5.63,15.34] [5.10,7.24]














Note: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
The Delta Method is used to calculate the 95% Confidence Intervals.
Pooled, regional, and subregional models are separate regressions.
Table A.7: Estimated Maximum Farmland Values (ton/ha) for Unintended Conver-
sion to Timber-producing Forest: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
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Counties enrolled Sample 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Avg. ATT DID-Match
1999 Unmatched -7.329 0.886 -32.475 -2.572 -4.891 8.931 -6.397
Cohort 4.268 0.981 29.956 1.939 4.924 58.779 4.4
ATT -2.501 0.553 -1.445 -0.026 0.66 14.489∗∗∗ 0.243 2.784 3.989
60.03 13.259 2.047 28.36 72.247 4.343 64.567 (2.662)
2000 Unmatched -5.226 0.131 -3.366∗ 7.916 1.828 20.874∗∗∗ 193.518∗∗∗
Cohort 2.731 1.561 1.4 7.555 3.395 4.725 25.02
ATT -12.082 13.092∗ -1.095 10.967 11.631 23.463∗∗ 210.356∗∗∗ 64.104 47.00∗∗∗
12.778 5.725 6.361 11.758 15.002 7.88 38.63 (7.276)
2001 Unmatched -2.33 0.643 3.034 8.443 15.575 49.643∗∗∗ 114.23∗∗∗
Cohort 6.777 2.298 2.862 5.753 10.278 15.025 13.28
ATT 20.394 12.563 2.505 4.769 19.424 53.783∗∗ 132.047∗∗∗ 68.418 63.49∗∗∗
18.877 7.289 8.714 12.701 20.489 19.687 21.545 (10.06)
2002 Unmatched -1.079 -2.721 -34.696∗ 12.949 -2.694 51.09∗∗∗ 116.812∗∗∗
Cohort 9.053 4.251 16.978 7.246 26.638 8.03 18.9
ATT 23.29 27.951 -1.92 -28.017 7.942 72.62∗∗∗ 149.88∗∗∗ 111.25 106.8∗∗∗
35.701 14.897 4.427 24.078 103.791 21.577 36.987 (16.77)
Total Average: 61.639 55.320
Note: The average ATT is the average of each year’s land use effect on the treated group since its enrollment year (in bold).
The balance test has been satisfied.
Table A.8: Land Use Effects for Level Farmland Conversion between the Enrolled Counties and the Never-enrolled Counties
(Kernel-based Propensity Score Matching Method)
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Counties enrolled Sample 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Avg. ATT DID-Match
1999 Unmatched 10.176 5.086 -83.104 685.756∗∗∗ 315.111∗∗∗ 490.939∗∗∗ 198.371∗∗∗
Cohort 10.64 21.165 74.138 41.365 33.739 34.66 31.461
ATT 12.147 2.049 107.3∗∗∗ 464.139∗∗∗ 235.466∗ 435.254∗ 223.607 293.153 319.9∗∗∗
133.546 59.223 19.827 116.461 113.854 170.856 146.408 (20.51)
2000 Unmatched 7.154 12.167 7.949 145.876∗∗ 175.758∗∗∗ 414.207∗∗∗ 261.753∗∗∗
Cohort 6.898 8.622 6.544 51.917 38.324 40.088 26.471
ATT 23.707 18.648 -8.889 166.385∗ 165.11∗∗ 424.313∗∗∗ 302.428∗∗∗ 264.559 256.5∗∗∗
25.731 25.489 27.358 67.522 51.76 59.297 57.108 (12.19)
2001 Unmatched 7.949 1.204 15.023 17.813∗ 11.973 291.966∗∗∗ 210.186∗∗∗
Cohort 6.544 5.285 13.417 8.631 9.107 32.912 25.113
ATT -8.889 3.774 8.255 26.122 11.699 314.842∗∗∗ 245.578∗∗∗ 190.706 232.8∗∗∗
27.358 8.893 18.436 15.844 16.587 45.007 42.21 (12.31)
2002 Unmatched -7.712 -8.249 -10.394 -13.295∗ -76.584∗∗ 105.571∗∗∗ 228.71∗∗∗
Cohort 5.56 4.738 5.454 6.67 28.819 16.403 25.232
ATT -9.105 -6.433 -2.105 -4.003 -9.055 120.054∗ 254.57∗∗∗ 187.312 134.9∗∗∗
21.099 14.588 18.522 25.201 9.105 48.708 72.996 (11.62)
Total Average: 233.933 236.025
Note: The average ATT is the average of each year’s land use effect on the treated group since its enrollment year (in bold).
The balance test has been satisfied.
Table A.9: Land Use Effects for Sloped Farmland Conversion between the Enrolled Counties and the Never-enrolled Counties
(Kernel-based Propensity Score Matching Method)
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Land Transition
Model Variable level erodible unused level erodible unused
farmland farmland land farmland farmland land
Panel 1 Panel 5
Pooled GfG 74.50∗∗∗ 264.5∗∗∗ 29.49 80.74∗∗∗ 209.0∗∗∗ 23.86
(14.71) (31.23) (20.49) (16.21) (32.26) (21.58)
Regional GfG·N 40.96∗∗∗ 437.9∗∗∗ 41.94 43.78∗∗∗ 406.1∗∗∗ 46.20
(5.571) (39.96) (25.46) (6.009) (41.86) (26.96)
GfG·S 13.50∗ 118.7∗∗ 18.41 15.92∗ 51.29 3.413
(5.765) (37.59) (24.51) (6.286) (38.63) (26.17)
N 8653 7703 8474 8130 7110 7930
Panel 2 Panel 6
Pooled GfG 74.99∗∗∗ 263.5∗∗∗ 29.36 70.55∗∗∗ 234.9∗∗∗ 9.917
(14.67) (31.24) (20.51) (16.08) (33.39) (21.65)
Regional GfG·N 41.36∗∗∗ 438.4∗∗∗ 41.91 41.20∗∗∗ 429.3∗∗∗ 12.81
(5.571) (39.96) (25.47) (6.025) (42.11) (26.47)
GfG·S 13.28∗ 116.2∗∗ 18.14 12.41∗ 66.88 7.237
(5.763) (37.61) (24.55) (6.133) (40.06) (25.83)
N 8648 7701 8472 8046 7157 7834
Panel 3 Panel 7
Pooled GfG 78.12∗∗∗ 272.3∗∗∗ 25.92 93.59∗∗∗ 189.6∗∗∗ 28.15
(14.81) (31.33) (20.61) (16.82) (35.52) (23.20)
Regional GfG·N 41.40∗∗∗ 446.5∗∗∗ 38.51 46.51∗∗∗ 398.2∗∗∗ 50.49
(5.604) (40.10) (25.60) (6.181) (44.91) (28.82)
GfG·S 13.55∗ 125.7∗∗∗ 14.76 17.93∗∗ -5.206 6.093
(5.800) (37.72) (24.62) (6.506) (43.80) (28.69)
N 8644 7695 8466 7753 6550 7445
Panel 4 Panel 8
Pooled GfG 74.87∗∗∗ 270.6∗∗∗ 30.67 74.44∗∗∗ 220.8∗∗∗ 4.851
(14.82) (31.64) (20.84) (14.87) (36.18) (22.01)
Regional GfG·N 42.13∗∗∗ 460.1∗∗∗ 43.28 41.43∗∗∗ 427.6∗∗∗ 10.25
(5.653) (40.94) (26.08) (5.665) (45.09) (26.93)
GfG·S 13.53∗ 119.4∗∗ 19.98 12.78∗ 34.35 -0.0548
(5.805) (37.78) (24.71) (5.732) (43.53) (26.14)
N 8573 7628 8396 7753 6571 7428
Clustered standard errors (provincial level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Pooled and regional models are separate regressions. County and fixed effects are included.
Table A.10: Land Transition to Forests in Hectare in China (1996-2004)
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Land Transition
Model Variable level erodible unused level erodible unused
farmland farmland land farmland farmland land
Panel 1 Panel 5
Pooled GfG 0.00228∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0193 0.00251∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.0185
(0.000649) (0.00137) (0.0108) (0.000717) (0.000957) (0.0117)
Regional GfG·N 0.00278 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.0167 0.00287 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0168
(0.00147) (0.00183) (0.0137) (0.00157) (0.00130) (0.0148)
GfG·S -0.000907 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0214 -0.000888 0.00974∗∗∗ 0.0200
(0.00150) (0.00161) (0.0128) (0.00164) (0.00112) (0.0140)
N 8379 7353 8091 7927 6819 7575
Panel 2 Panel 6
Pooled GfG 0.00229∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0192 0.00219∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗ 0.00492∗∗∗
(0.000649) (0.00137) (0.0108) (0.000703) (0.00141) (0.00139)
Regional GfG·N 0.00278 0.0175∗∗∗ 0.0167 0.00261 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.00295
(0.00147) (0.00183) (0.0137) (0.00157) (0.00185) (0.00172)
GfG·S -0.000858 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0213 -0.00108 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.00661∗∗∗
(0.00150) (0.00161) (0.0128) (0.00159) (0.00166) (0.00164)
N 8374 7351 8089 7843 6866 7482
Panel 3 Panel 7
Pooled GfG 0.00231∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0195 0.00282∗∗∗ 0.00744∗∗∗ 0.0194
(0.000653) (0.00137) (0.0109) (0.000666) (0.000873) (0.0127)
Regional GfG·N 0.00271 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.0168 0.00281 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0182
(0.00147) (0.00183) (0.0137) (0.00168) (0.00115) (0.0160)
GfG·S -0.000958 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0216 -0.000832 0.00440∗∗∗ 0.0206
(0.00151) (0.00161) (0.0128) (0.00176) (0.00104) (0.0155)
N 8377 7351 8087 7550 6259 7090
Panel 4 Panel 8
Pooled GfG 0.00229∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0195 0.00227∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.00447∗∗
(0.000653) (0.00133) (0.0110) (0.000655) (0.00153) (0.00141)
Regional GfG·N 0.00279 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0169 0.00264 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.00273
(0.00147) (0.00179) (0.0139) (0.00147) (0.00198) (0.00175)
GfG·S -0.000870 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0215 -0.000959 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.00594∗∗∗
(0.00150) (0.00156) (0.0129) (0.00148) (0.00181) (0.00166)
N 8363 7333 8037 7563 6280 7077
Clustered standard errors (provincial level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Pooled and regional models are separate regressions. County and fixed effects are included.
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Figure A.5: Placebo Treatment Effects for Sloped Farmland Conversion from Timber-producing Forest
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Sample 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Level control 0.53 4.264 0.751 1.252 2.333 2.485 12.398 40.712
Farmland group (-52.539, 53.6) (-59.651, 68.178) (-26.257, 27.759) (-30.416, 32.919) (-28.227, 32.894) (-22.988, 27.958) (-41.458, 66.254) (-129.102, 210.527)
1999 0.45 -2.046 -1.524 -1.843 -0.232 0.482 15.007 0.959
cohort (-10.947, 11.847) (-40.64, 36.548) (-26.506, 23.458) (-22.865, 19.178) (-18.558, 18.093) (-3.766, 4.73) (-82.652, 112.666) (-26.806, 28.724)
2000 -10.824 -3.984 -2.879 -4.867 -5.012 3.684 21.937 149.865
cohort (-100.629, 78.98) (-95.99, 88.021) (-49.321, 43.563) (-42.824, 33.09) (-208.991, 198.967) (-49.208, 56.576) (-474.962, 518.836) (-137.087, 436.816)
2001 -17.629 0.708 0.041 -2.734 -2.485 -0.908 30.489 136.09
cohort (-434.109, 398.85) (-20.2, 21.616) (-23.288, 23.37) (-20.544, 15.077) (-24.053, 19.082) (-9.55, 7.733) (-73.978, 134.956) (-256.439, 528.618)
2002 3.547 0.705 -0.641 0.852 9.815 36.81 135.131 351.157
cohort (-17.58, 24.674) (-5.579, 6.988) (-14.006, 12.724) (-6.695, 8.399) (-57.459, 77.09) (-183.429, 257.05) (-642.002, 912.263) (-139.989, 842.302)
Sloped control 2.908 10.323 -2.867 10.614 13.59 18.524 97.171 177.805
Farmland group (-186.63, 192.447) (-72.632, 93.278) (-62.302, 56.568) (-58.694, 79.923) (-84.929, 112.108) (-100.267, 137.315) (-190.562, 384.904) (-408.895, 764.504)
1999 64.206 41.519 2.26 117.785 752.123 317.949 626.65 1037.379
cohort (-217.576, 345.989) (-314.953, 397.99) (-550.164, 554.685) (-411.783, 647.354) (-1440.188, 2944.435) (-557.163, 1193.061) (-343.572, 1596.872) (-184.759, 2259.516)
2000 110.892 66.431 29.912 118.963 139.99 154.279 890.907 1318.128
cohort (-635.263, 857.047) (-440.272, 573.134) (-273.279, 333.104) (-736.851, 974.776) (-1372.614, 1652.594) (-966.17, 1274.728) (-729.167, 2510.981) (-124.997, 2761.253)
2001 -71.107 50.952 -1.609 15.881 31.442 35.125 466.364 456.01
cohort (-1127.716, 985.502) (-536.986, 638.89) (-171.794, 168.576) (-150.195, 181.958) (-217.553, 280.438) (-258.263, 328.514) (-826.263, 1758.991) (-19.306, 931.326)
2002 12.403 2.324 0.868 -7.236 -1.957 29.931 213.561 1391.62
cohort (-132.98, 157.787) (-14.447, 19.096) (-18.298, 20.035) (-46.878, 32.405) (-33.822, 29.908) (-148.066, 207.928) (-201.664, 628.786) (276.949, 2506.292)
Values are in hectares. ±1 Standard deviations in parentheses
Table A.12: Comparison of Average Farmland Conversion to Timber-producing Forest
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Treatment Cohorts Placebo Treatment at Year
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1999 cohort -2.518 -1.99 -2.31 -0.698 0.0162 13.84∗ -3.134
(2.170) (1.398) (1.244) (1.151) (0.707) (6.040) (14.77)
2000 cohort 6.842 7.989 5.962 5.818 14.51∗ 35.29∗∗∗ 176.1∗∗∗
(7.067) (7.087) (7.064) (7.064) (7.064) (9.615) (17.37)
2001 cohort 18.38 17.73 14.95 15.2 16.78 49.97∗ 148.3∗
(17.79) (17.73) (17.81) (17.80) (17.79) (20.63) (58.00)
2002 cohort -2.842 -4.188 -2.702 6.261 33.26 131.1∗∗∗ 292.5∗∗∗
(16.63) (16.63) (16.66) (16.66) (16.97) (19.77) (31.24)
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Placebo treatment effects are compared between the non-participants and the participants
in different enrollment-year cohorts.
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Table A.13: Placebo Treatment Effects for Level Farmland Conversion from Timber-producing Forest
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Treatment Cohorts Placebo Treatment at Year
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1999 cohort -21.64 -58.48 57.04 693.0∗∗∗ 258.8∗∗∗ 569.9∗∗∗ 1016.7∗∗∗
(24.68) (32.82) (29.93) (114.8) (48.61) (59.53) (129.0)
2000 cohort 6.842 7.989 5.962 5.818 14.51∗ 35.29∗∗∗ 176.1∗∗∗
(7.067) (7.087) (7.064) (7.064) (7.064) (9.615) (17.37)
2001 cohort 122.3 70.05 87.54 103.1 107 550.4∗ 597.0∗∗
(109.6) (113.5) (115.6) (116.9) (109.2) (196.4) (170.8)
2002 cohort -10.08 -11.54 -19.67 -14.39 17.5 206.2∗∗∗ 1324.7∗∗∗
(18.10) (18.10) (18.13) (18.13) (18.13) (21.31) (33.56)
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Placebo treatment effects are compared between the non-participants and the participants
in different enrollment-year cohorts.
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Table A.14: Placebo Treatment Effects for Sloped Farmland Conversion from Timber-producing Forest
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Farmland transition to forest from level farmland from erodible farmland
Sample restriction Mean SD Mean SD
top 25% level farmland 2.437315 167.4992 43.62078 460.9976
bottom 25% stock .6742652 26.29976 241.9261 1031.033
top 25% erodible farmland -.6992145 108.8343 138.8657 978.6556
bottom 25% stock 7.767845 231.3312 14.28482 102.1118
Table A.15: Descriptive Statistics of Farmland Conversion (Different Farmland Stocks)
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level erodible (con’d) level erodible
Model Variable farmland farmland Model Variable farmland farmland
Pooled GfG 41.62∗∗ 310.2∗∗ Subregional GfG·NC 17.85∗∗ 430.6∗∗∗
(14.21) (115.1) (6.578) (79.65)
GfG·level stock 0.00237∗∗∗ -0.00116∗ GfG·NC 0.00887∗∗∗ -0.000242∗
(0.000151) (0.000543) ·level farmland stock (0.00106) (0.000114)
GfG·sloped stock -0.000238∗∗ 0.0177∗∗ GfG·NC -0.000240∗ 0.000535∗
(0.0000885) (0.00546) ·sloped farmland stock (0.000115) (0.000251)
Regional GfG·N 67.19∗ 429.5∗∗∗ GfG·NE 15.36∗ 522.1∗∗∗
(29.49) (79.86) (6.725) (73.74)
GfG·N 0.00230∗∗∗ -0.00139∗ GfG·NE 0.000512∗ -0.00709∗∗∗
·level stock (0.000154) (0.000548) ·level farmland stock (0.000255) (0.00131)
GfG·N -0.000282∗∗ 0.00723∗∗∗ GfG·NE -0.00499∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗
·sloped stock (0.0000904) (0.000509) ·sloped farmland stock (0.000306) (0.00544)
GfG·S 37.35∗ 160.7∗∗∗ GfG·SW 14.63∗ 311.8∗∗
(18.69) (38.66) (7.156) (114.9)
GfG·S 0.00220∗∗∗ -0.00171 GfG·SW 0.000122 -0.00403∗∗
·level stock (0.000156) (0.000896) ·level farmland stock (0.000261) (0.00140)
GfG·S -0.00267∗∗∗ 0.00977∗∗∗ GfG·SW -0.00109 0.00783∗∗∗
·sloped stock (0.000182) (0.000590) ·sloped farmland stock (0.000879) (0.00153)
Subregional GfG·NW 160.3∗∗∗ 309.6∗ GfG·SC 118.7∗ 102.5∗
(35.89) (154.1) (55.54) (47.80)
GfG·NW 0.00881∗∗∗ -0.00215∗ GfG·SC 0.00460∗∗∗ -0.00171
·level stock (0.00106) (0.000902) ·level farmland stock (0.000327) (0.000896)
GfG·NW -0.00262∗∗∗ 0.00909∗∗∗ GfG·SC -0.00014 0.00723∗∗∗
·sloped stock (0.000187) (0.000596) ·sloped farmland stock (0.000249) (0.000509)
N 7155 7602
Clustered standard errors in parentheses at the provincial level, with county, year fixed effects included.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Pooled, regional, and subregional models are separate regressions.
The model also includes the program indicator and other land stocks interactions, but most of the coefficients are small and insignificant.
Due to the space limit, the table reports only the farmland stock effects. Level (sloped) stock represents level (erodible) farmland stock.
Table A.16: Land Transition to Forests in China (1996-2004) with Land Stock Interaction
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A.4 Supplementary Figures
This section includes three supplementary figures. Figure A.6 shows the geo-
graphical regions and the GfG subsidizing regions in China. Figure A.7 shows how
the GfG program was expanded to a nation-wide program from 1999 to 2002. Figure
A.8 indicates that the areas of timber-producing forest and orchards were increasing
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year
Timber-producing Forest Orchards
Source: the Ministry of Land and Resources of China
Note: soild line: 1-year implementation after the pilot;
         dashed line: 1-year implementation after the expansion
Timber-producing Forest and Orchards in China (1996-2004)
Figure A.8: Timber-producing Forest and Orchards Uses in China (1996-2004)
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Appendix B: Additional Robustness Checks for Chapter 3
This section provides the details of the robustness checks of the firm’s loca-
tional impacts to its pollution and its scale of installed abatement technology. The
following robustness checks reduce concerns related to omitted variable bias, endo-
geneity, and heterogeneity.
Plant-Level Bias
I include detailed plant-level control variables for a subgroup of firms to reduce
the corresponding bias. The representative subgroup of firms accounts for 12.7% of
total observations. They have the detailed quarterly financial reports, including the
number of employees, revenue, cost, production level, etc., that are published by
Bloomberg.I use the WBRE model with and without these additional controls for
these plants in Table B.3. The coefficients are following my expectation and are
almost identical, suggesting that the WBRE model helps control the time-invariant
unobservables.
Regime/Policy Change
I use a 2SLS-FE model as a robustness check to examine possible regime or
policy changes during the study period. The WBRE model would not provide the
“downstream effect” derived from fixed locational information if the policy is chang-
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ing. To do so, I interact time-invariant locational variables with quarter indicators.
This method creates variation in time and allows me to examine the regulatory
stringency of local regimes over time. Techit is instrumented (by local governmen-
tal revenue and expenditure as in the WBRE model) to reduce possible bias from
unobserved firm or governmental characteristics that affect both abatement tech-
nology installation and a firm’s pollution. The 2SLS-FE model is the following:
pollutionit = α + β1downstreami · qt + β2residentiali · qt
+ δTechit + γXit + ei + et + eit
Techit = a+ b1downstreami · qt + b2residentiali · qt + gXit
+ z1Revenueit + z2Expenditureit + εi + εt + εit
(B.1)
The expected signs of the coefficients that I am interested in are as follows: β1 ≤ 0,
β2 ≥ 0, δ ≤ 0, b1 ≥ 0, b2 ≤ 0. The estimated locational impacts to firm’s pollution
level are reported in Table B.1. First stage coefficients including locational impacts
to the scale of installed abatement technology are reported in Table B.2.
To account for regional heterogeneity, I also plot the coefficients of distance
variables across the whole time period by region in Figures B.1 and B.2, which
provide comparisons of coefficients between eastern China and western China. The
dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients using the WBRE model
for the corresponding sector.
In general, there is no regime or policy change during the study period. Coeffi-
cients of firms’ locational impacts on firms’ pollution levels and abatement technol-
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ogy installation in the 2SLS-FE model are almost identical over the 20 quarter peri-
ods in Tables B.1-B.2. And they have similar magnitudes compared to the random
effects model using the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach in Table 3.3. The reason
that the coefficients in the 2SLS-FE model are larger in terms of the downstream
effects is possibly because that the FE model could not control for time-variant un-
observables like production. Although the FE model provides additional locational
impacts over time, the coefficients may be slightly overestimated comparing to the
WBRE model.
Locational Heterogeneity
The western-eastern comparison in the above FE model confirms that there
may be region-wide heterogeneity in generating negative pollution spillover effects.
Another local variable that may influence the negative externalities across the bound-
ary is the size or river length in each jurisdiction. I separate my dataset into two
groups, one has plants in the jurisdiction with total river length less than the aver-
age, and the other has the rest of the plants. Table B.4 reports the coefficients of
the corresponding downstream effects for both groups.
Slightly modifying equation 3.7 allows every jurisdiction react differently:
Pollutionit = α + {β1 · river lengthi}
downstreami
river lengthi
+ β2residentiali + γ1Xit + γ2Xi + ui + ei + eit
(B.2)
To see if the model is robust comparing to equation 3.7, I examine the ratio of the
coefficients {β1 · river lengthi} over the average river length. Table B.5 shows the
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corresponding ratios for each sector.
Both tables B.4 and B.5 have the same magnitudes of coefficients comparing
to the WBRE model. They also suggest that pollution increases more aggressively
towards the border of a jurisdiction if the river segment in it is shorter. It is possible
that, instead of reacting by real distance, local governments determine the health
risk impact based on relative location of plants in the jurisdiction. In terms of the
downstream effects, strategic allocation of pollution in the jurisdiction can be viewed
as a reaction of both real and relative geographic information across all the plants.
Allowing each jurisdiction to react differently can be more flexible for future policy
designs as shown in Section 3.6.2.
Endogenous Location
WBRE estimation provides an opportunity to examine a firm’s locational im-
pacts when downstreami and residentiali are endogenous without introducing too
many instruments. The difference between the results from this model and those in
Table 3.3 for water-polluting firms is by treating locational variables downstreami
and residentiali endogenous. Although the descriptive statistics have suggested
that heavily polluting firms may not be able to cluster at the least environmentally
sensitive areas like downstream borders, it is still legitimate to believe that water-
polluting firms’ relative locations on a river network are potentially endogenous to
their emission levels. Local firms with high expected pollution may strategically
locate closer to the downstream border or further away from the jurisdictional resi-
dential area. However, each jurisdictional general land use planning is less likely to
be related to any environmental regulations that impact the whole country simul-
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taneously.
I assume that functional land use planning, such as the construction of trans-
portation infrastructure and designation of economic development zones (includ-
ing major industrial parks and commercial centers), are generically determined. A
firm’s locational choice is more likely to be decided according to local land use plans,
which relate to a firm’s supply and procurement management, and is independent
of a firm’s emission level. The estimated system of equations for water-polluting
firms is given by:
pollutionit = α + β1downstreami + β2residentiali + δ1Techit + δ2Techi
+ γ1Xit + γ2Xi + uit + ei + eit + ε̂it + ŵit + v̂it
(B.3)
Techit = a+ b1downstreami + b2residentiali + g1Xit + g2Xi
+ z1Revenueit + z2Expenditureit + εi + εt + εit
(B.4)
downstreami = φ1Zi + ζ1Xit + wit
residentiali = φ2Zi + ζ2Xit + vit
(B.5)
where Zi includes the distances from firm i to the closest road, railroad, industrial
park, and commercial center.
I first estimate the reduced form equations by estimating equation B.3 (exclud-
ing the abatement technology variable and the residual estimation: ε̂it + ŵit + v̂it)
and B.4 separately using 2SLS-WBRE model. The estimated coefficients are re-
ported in Table B.6. First stage coefficients and the corresponding statistics are in
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Table B.7-B.8. Including the abatement technology variable in equation B.3 that
introduces an additional endogenous variable and complicates the model. I use the
control function approach to estimate the corresponding model. Table B.9 provides
the corresponding estimated coefficients.
Comparisons of the coefficients of the locational impacts to a firm’s pollution
level and the scale of installed abatement technology among the WBRE models that
are adopted in the paper suggest that the magnitudes of the coefficients are very
similar as well. First stage estimates suggest that the chosen instrumental variables:
firm distances to the closest road; railroad; industrial park; and commercial center,
are strongly correlated to a firm’s location along river networks and residential
areas.1 The estimated coefficients using a control function approach, which includes
another endogenous variable (abatement technology installation), are reported in
Table B.9.
1Sargan-Hensen statistics suggests that they are valid instruments. And the Kleibergen-Paap
Wald statistics for each regression have passed the Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical
values (Stock and Yogo, 2005). Angrist and Pischke first-stage F statistics are also reported to
guarantee each of the endogenous regressors is not weakly identified (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
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Power Steel Cement Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food/Bev
Distance in km to quarter 1 -109.8∗∗∗ -98.64∗∗∗ -86.77∗∗∗ -60.96∗∗∗ -55.69∗∗∗ -46.45∗∗∗
Downstream estuary (1.843) (6.456) (9.236) (0.604) (1.483) (0.610)
quarter 2 -107.4∗∗∗ -98.53∗∗∗ -86.95∗∗∗ -60.98∗∗∗ -55.75∗∗∗ -46.46∗∗∗
(1.883) (6.457) (9.272) (0.605) (1.506) (0.612)
quarter 3 -110.0∗∗∗ -97.87∗∗∗ -86.80∗∗∗ -61.03∗∗∗ -55.46∗∗∗ -46.46∗∗∗
(1.877) (6.916) (9.300) (0.605) (1.497) (0.610)
quarter 4 -107.7∗∗∗ -97.23∗∗∗ -86.70∗∗∗ -60.77∗∗∗ -55.17∗∗∗ -46.35∗∗∗
(1.870) (7.045) (9.486) (0.605) (1.549) (0.610)
quarter 5 -108.9∗∗∗ -98.99∗∗∗ -86.95∗∗∗ -60.84∗∗∗ -55.42∗∗∗ -46.19∗∗∗
(1.886) (6.940) (8.980) (0.603) (1.523) (0.612)
quarter 6 -108.4∗∗∗ -98.56∗∗∗ -87.20∗∗∗ -60.78∗∗∗ -55.36∗∗∗ -46.37∗∗∗
(1.861) (6.860) (8.813) (0.603) (1.521) (0.608)
quarter 7 -109.7∗∗∗ -98.26∗∗∗ -87.03∗∗∗ -60.81∗∗∗ -55.50∗∗∗ -46.37∗∗∗
(1.848) (6.876) (8.864) (0.604) (1.534) (0.612)
quarter 8 -106.0∗∗∗ -97.02∗∗∗ -86.71∗∗∗ -60.71∗∗∗ -55.32∗∗∗ -46.67∗∗∗
(1.860) (6.887) (9.013) (0.602) (1.536) (0.612)
quarter 9 -116.6∗∗∗ -98.42∗∗∗ -87.56∗∗∗ -61.18∗∗∗ -55.43∗∗∗ -45.71∗∗∗
(1.841) (6.876) (8.427) (0.602) (1.505) (0.613)
quarter 10 -111.5∗∗∗ -98.08∗∗∗ -87.72∗∗∗ -60.77∗∗∗ -55.53∗∗∗ -46.27∗∗∗
(1.841) (6.811) (8.360) (0.602) (1.503) (0.610)
quarter 11 -111.7∗∗∗ -97.48∗∗∗ -87.01∗∗∗ -60.82∗∗∗ -55.36∗∗∗ -45.70∗∗∗
(1.820) (6.805) (8.890) (0.601) (1.506) (0.609)
quarter 12 -111.0∗∗∗ -96.67∗∗∗ -86.56∗∗∗ -60.85∗∗∗ -55.38∗∗∗ -46.07∗∗∗
(1.825) (6.562) (9.336) (0.601) (1.516) (0.606)
quarter 13 -113.0∗∗∗ -99.51∗∗∗ -87.38∗∗∗ -60.91∗∗∗ -55.36∗∗∗ -46.24∗∗∗
(1.829) (5.672) (7.828) (0.603) (1.532) (0.608)
quarter 14 -112.1∗∗∗ -97.21∗∗∗ -87.23∗∗∗ -60.67∗∗∗ -55.24∗∗∗ -46.04∗∗∗
(1.858) (5.983) (8.088) (0.602) (1.530) (0.610)
quarter 15 -114.3∗∗∗ -97.35∗∗∗ -87.15∗∗∗ -60.71∗∗∗ -55.26∗∗∗ -46.13∗∗∗
(1.893) (6.181) (8.423) (0.602) (1.548) (0.610)
quarter 16 -111.9∗∗∗ -97.14∗∗∗ -86.93∗∗∗ -60.46∗∗∗ -55.45∗∗∗ -46.29∗∗∗
(1.965) (6.120) (8.973) (0.603) (1.655) (0.604)
quarter 17 -110.2∗∗∗ -97.13∗∗∗ -86.57∗∗∗ -61.29∗∗∗ -55.62∗∗∗ -45.89∗∗∗
(2.072) (6.431) (9.305) (0.603) (1.719) (0.610)
quarter 18 -106.9∗∗∗ -97.89∗∗∗ -86.97∗∗∗ -60.97∗∗∗ -55.38∗∗∗ -46.02∗∗∗
(2.064) (6.411) (9.218) (0.603) (1.716) (0.605)
quarter 19 -103.4∗∗∗ -97.22∗∗∗ -87.16∗∗∗ -60.98∗∗∗ -55.35∗∗∗ -46.12∗∗∗
(1.861) (6.437) (9.299) (0.602) (1.723) (0.606)
quarter 20 -103.6∗∗∗ -96.78∗∗∗ -87.11∗∗∗ -60.73∗∗∗ -55.22∗∗∗ -46.29∗∗∗
(2.054) (6.493) (9.357) (0.602) (1.721) (0.605)
Table B.1: Firm’s Locational Impact on Water Pollution: 2011-2015
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Power Steel Cement Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food/Bev
Distance in km to quarter 1 84.39∗∗∗ 78.58∗∗∗ 66.12∗ 54.62∗∗∗ 41.94∗∗∗ 39.92∗∗∗
Residential area (4.347) (0.456) (28.24) (0.556) (0.614) (1.505)
quarter 2 83.52∗∗∗ 78.59∗∗∗ 65.83∗ 54.90∗∗∗ 42.04∗∗∗ 40.10∗∗∗
(4.488) (0.456) (28.37) (0.560) (0.621) (1.491)
quarter 3 83.74∗∗∗ 78.60∗∗∗ 65.41∗ 54.98∗∗∗ 41.95∗∗∗ 39.99∗∗∗
(4.765) (0.456) (28.46) (0.559) (0.617) (1.494)
quarter 4 82.99∗∗∗ 78.68∗∗∗ 65.47∗ 54.83∗∗∗ 42.06∗∗∗ 40.61∗∗∗
(4.788) (0.457) (28.33) (0.560) (0.617) (1.458)
quarter 5 83.69∗∗∗ 78.44∗∗∗ 66.04∗ 54.90∗∗∗ 42.11∗∗∗ 39.17∗∗∗
(4.469) (0.456) (28.27) (0.555) (0.621) (1.507)
quarter 6 82.70∗∗∗ 78.35∗∗∗ 65.82∗ 55.12∗∗∗ 43.19∗∗∗ 38.99∗∗∗
(4.549) (0.455) (28.49) (0.558) (0.607) (1.490)
quarter 7 83.57∗∗∗ 78.47∗∗∗ 65.39∗ 55.29∗∗∗ 41.67∗∗∗ 38.99∗∗∗
(4.572) (0.456) (28.49) (0.558) (0.611) (1.502)
quarter 8 82.97∗∗∗ 78.62∗∗∗ 65.96∗ 54.60∗∗∗ 41.46∗∗∗ 39.17∗∗∗
(4.488) (0.457) (28.56) (0.554) (0.617) (1.482)
quarter 9 83.74∗∗∗ 78.49∗∗∗ 67.36∗ 56.06∗∗∗ 42.46∗∗∗ 39.29∗∗∗
(4.636) (0.454) (28.47) (0.553) (0.621) (1.261)
quarter 10 82.92∗∗∗ 78.62∗∗∗ 66.23∗ 54.84∗∗∗ 43.16∗∗∗ 39.29∗∗∗
(4.743) (0.457) (28.33) (0.554) (0.608) (1.253)
quarter 11 83.26∗∗∗ 78.57∗∗∗ 65.91∗ 54.82∗∗∗ 41.90∗∗∗ 39.18∗∗∗
(4.612) (0.457) (28.31) (0.554) (0.608) (1.253)
quarter 12 81.77∗∗∗ 78.63∗∗∗ 65.73∗ 54.80∗∗∗ 41.87∗∗∗ 40.67∗∗∗
(5.868) (0.458) (28.10) (0.551) (0.616) (1.255)
quarter 13 83.42∗∗∗ 78.47∗∗∗ 64.83∗ 55.15∗∗∗ 42.91∗∗∗ 39.82∗∗∗
(6.164) (0.456) (29.38) (0.550) (0.609) (1.376)
quarter 14 81.82∗∗∗ 78.67∗∗∗ 65.22∗ 54.99∗∗∗ 41.93∗∗∗ 40.26∗∗∗
(6.196) (0.457) (29.32) (0.553) (0.606) (1.361)
quarter 15 81.64∗∗∗ 78.64∗∗∗ 65.25∗ 54.93∗∗∗ 42.51∗∗∗ 39.62∗∗∗
(6.048) (0.457) (29.20) (0.553) (0.606) (1.984)
quarter 16 81.47∗∗∗ 78.63∗∗∗ 65.27∗ 54.80∗∗∗ 42.24∗∗∗ 41.76∗∗∗
(6.871) (0.457) (28.84) (0.553) (0.618) (2.648)
quarter 17 82.26∗∗∗ 78.65∗∗∗ 65.91∗ 55.17∗∗∗ 43.28∗∗∗ 39.68∗∗∗
(7.347) (0.457) (28.41) (0.549) (0.608) (2.722)
quarter 18 82.09∗∗∗ 78.54∗∗∗ 65.40∗ 55.11∗∗∗ 42.86∗∗∗ 39.79∗∗∗
(7.433) (0.457) (28.66) (0.552) (0.602) (2.667)
quarter 19 81.34∗∗∗ 78.50∗∗∗ 65.77∗ 54.89∗∗∗ 43.10∗∗∗ 40.03∗∗∗
(7.397) (0.457) (28.59) (0.553) (0.606) (2.115)
quarter 20 80.21∗∗∗ 78.51∗∗∗ 65.42∗ 55.04∗∗∗ 42.54∗∗∗ 39.01∗∗∗
(7.329) (0.457) (28.74) (0.554) (0.603) (2.709)
Technology -2130.9∗∗∗ -1960.9∗∗∗ -1490.0∗∗∗ -725.3∗∗∗ -1951.7∗∗ -2327.5∗∗
Capacity (in ton) (219.9) (205.6) (300.8) (192.7) (696.5) (729.0)
N 70572 75628 21552 39860 29444 32636
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Abatement technology is production capacity (tons) installed with denitrification technology for Cement, Paper, and Food Sectors,
and with desulfurization technology for Power, Steel, and Clothing/Dyeing Sectors.
Table B.1: Firm’s Locational Impact on Water Pollution: 2011-2015 Continued
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Power Steel Cement Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food/Bev
Governmental -1.69855∗∗∗ -0.99198∗∗∗ -1.31373∗∗∗ -1.85743∗∗∗ -1.51189∗∗∗ -1.81193∗∗∗
Expenditure (0.18542) (0.28513) (0.19465) (0.18584) (0.18529) (0.1858)
Governmental 0.56006∗∗∗ 0.21141∗∗∗ 0.21516∗∗∗ 0.58095∗∗∗ 0.46282∗∗∗ 0.54722∗∗∗
Revenue (0.13862) (0.0421) (0.0421) (0.13923) (0.13821) (0.13901)
Distance in km to quarter 1 0.00138∗∗∗ 0.00049∗∗∗ 0.00067∗∗ 0.00094∗∗∗ 0.00029∗∗∗ 0.00035∗∗∗
Downstream estuary (0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00024) (0.00027) (0.00005) (0.00008)
quarter 2 0.00138∗∗∗ 0.00048∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗ 0.00105∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.00035∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00024) (0.00027) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 3 0.00139∗∗∗ 0.00045∗∗∗ 0.00102∗∗∗ 0.00141∗∗∗ 0.00032∗∗∗ 0.00035∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00025) (0.00028) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 4 0.00138∗∗∗ 0.00047∗∗∗ 0.00168∗∗∗ 0.00226∗∗∗ 0.00032∗∗∗ 0.00041∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00009) (0.00025) (0.00028) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 5 0.00138∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.00265∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.00049∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00023) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 6 0.00139∗∗∗ 0.00052∗∗∗ 0.00201∗∗∗ 0.00273∗∗∗ 0.00031∗∗∗ 0.00048∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00023) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 7 0.00139∗∗∗ 0.00052∗∗∗ 0.00198∗∗∗ 0.00272∗∗∗ 0.00031∗∗∗ 0.00048∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00024) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 8 0.00139∗∗∗ 0.00054∗∗∗ 0.00206∗∗∗ 0.00281∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.00048∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00024) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 9 0.00139∗∗∗ 0.00053∗∗∗ 0.00212∗∗∗ 0.00277∗∗∗ 0.00031∗∗∗ 0.00051∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00023) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 10 0.00138∗∗∗ 0.00052∗∗∗ 0.00224∗∗∗ 0.00299∗∗∗ 0.00032∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00023) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 11 0.00138∗∗∗ 0.00057∗∗∗ 0.00253∗∗∗ 0.00325∗∗∗ 0.00031∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00023) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 12 0.00137∗∗∗ 0.00065∗∗∗ 0.00264∗∗∗ 0.00342∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00023) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 13 0.00143∗∗∗ 0.00065∗∗∗ 0.00308∗∗∗ 0.00375∗∗∗ 0.00042∗∗∗ 0.00052∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00023) (0.00025) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 14 0.00143∗∗∗ 0.00065∗∗∗ 0.00328∗∗∗ 0.00403∗∗∗ 0.00043∗∗∗ 0.00051∗∗∗
(1.858) (5.983) (8.088) (0.602) (1.530) (0.610)
quarter 15 0.00143∗∗∗ 0.00072∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.00426∗∗∗ 0.00042∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00023) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 16 0.00141∗∗∗ 0.00094∗∗∗ 0.00383∗∗∗ 0.00461∗∗∗ 0.00048∗∗∗ 0.00051∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00023) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 17 0.00139∗∗∗ 0.00096∗∗∗ 0.00375∗∗∗ 0.00445∗∗∗ 0.00051∗∗∗ 0.00052∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00023) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 18 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.00096∗∗∗ 0.00389∗∗∗ 0.00463∗∗∗ 0.00052∗∗∗ 0.00051∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00022) (0.00025) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 19 0.00139∗∗∗ 0.00095∗∗∗ 0.00396∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.00052∗∗∗ 0.00049∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00023) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 20 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.00096∗∗∗ 0.00387∗∗∗ 0.00457∗∗∗ 0.00051∗∗∗ 0.00052∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00023) (0.00026) (0.00005) (0.00007)
Table B.2: Water-Polluting Firm’s Locational Impact on Installed Abatement Tech-
nology: 2011-2015
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Power Steel Cement Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food/Bev
Distance in km to quarter 1 -0.00025∗∗∗ -0.00111∗∗∗ -0.00305∗∗∗ -0.00468∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
Residential area (0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00032) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 2 -0.00026∗∗∗ -0.00103∗∗∗ -0.00283∗∗∗ -0.00422∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00032) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 3 -0.00026∗∗∗ -0.00096∗∗∗ -0.0028∗∗∗ -0.00418∗∗∗ -0.00043∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00032) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 4 -0.00026∗∗∗ -0.00097∗∗∗ -0.00272∗∗∗ -0.00388∗∗∗ -0.00044∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 5 -0.00025∗∗∗ -0.00093∗∗∗ -0.00279∗∗∗ -0.00392∗∗∗ -0.00044∗∗∗ -0.00041∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 6 -0.00024∗∗∗ -0.00095∗∗∗ -0.00301∗∗∗ -0.00405∗∗∗ -0.00043∗∗∗ -0.00041∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 7 -0.00024∗∗∗ -0.00095∗∗∗ -0.00312∗∗∗ -0.00416∗∗∗ -0.00043∗∗∗ -0.00041∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 8 -0.00025∗∗∗ -0.00096∗∗∗ -0.00305∗∗∗ -0.00393∗∗∗ -0.00043∗∗∗ -0.00041∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 9 -0.00023∗∗∗ -0.00096∗∗∗ -0.00319∗∗∗ -0.00423∗∗∗ -0.00043∗∗∗ -0.00044∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 10 -0.00023∗∗∗ -0.00096∗∗∗ -0.00322∗∗∗ -0.00417∗∗∗ -0.00043∗∗∗ -0.00043∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 11 -0.00024∗∗∗ -0.00096∗∗∗ -0.00316∗∗∗ -0.00401∗∗∗ -0.00043∗∗∗ -0.00044∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 12 -0.00026∗∗∗ -0.00096∗∗∗ -0.00346∗∗∗ -0.00424∗∗∗ -0.00041∗∗∗ -0.00044∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 13 -0.00021∗∗∗ -0.00096∗∗∗ -0.00339∗∗∗ -0.00427∗∗∗ -0.00036∗∗∗ -0.00045∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00027) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 14 -0.00022∗∗∗ -0.00096∗∗∗ -0.0036∗∗∗ -0.00444∗∗∗ -0.00038∗∗∗ -0.00044∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 15 -0.00023∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.00367∗∗∗ -0.0045∗∗∗ -0.00039∗∗∗ -0.00045∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00027) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 16 -0.00025∗∗∗ -0.00104∗∗∗ -0.00361∗∗∗ -0.00436∗∗∗ -0.00039∗∗∗ -0.00044∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00027) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 17 -0.00026∗∗∗ -0.00106∗∗∗ -0.00428∗∗∗ -0.0051∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.00044∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00027) (0.00031) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 18 -0.00025∗∗∗ -0.00106∗∗∗ -0.00427∗∗∗ -0.00506∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.00043∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00027) (0.0003) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 19 -0.00026∗∗∗ -0.00106∗∗∗ -0.00425∗∗∗ -0.00505∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.00041∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00027) (0.0003) (0.00005) (0.00007)
quarter 20 -0.00026∗∗∗ -0.00106∗∗∗ -0.00423∗∗∗ -0.00502∗∗∗ -0.00041∗∗∗ -0.00043∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00027) (0.0003) (0.00005) (0.00007)
† Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 21.736 33.015 20.351 46.605 27.166 49.104
Sargan-Hansen Stat 0.005 0.044 0.456 0.29 0.428 0.449
p-val 0.9426 0.8341 0.4995 0.5903 0.5127 0.503
N 70572 75628 21552 39860 29444 32636
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Abatement technology is production capacity (tons) installed with denitrification technology for Cement, Paper, and Food Sectors,
and with desulfurization technology for Power, Steel, and Clothing/Dyeing Sectors.
† Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values (maximal IV size): 10% 19.93, 15% 11.59, 20% 8.75, 25% 7.25. Source: Stock-Yogo (2005)
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Figure B.2: Regional Comparisons: Coefficients of Distance to Residential Area
Variables by Sector
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dep. var. Without Plant-level Control Power Steel Cement Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food
Pollution (COD in kg) Distance in km to -91.31∗∗∗ -78.68∗∗∗ -70.53∗∗∗ -59.32∗∗∗ -53.95∗∗∗ -34.82∗∗∗
Downstream estuary (2.272) (2.778) (2.012) (2.203) (1.283) (0.936)
Distance in km to 75.03∗∗∗ 60.91∗∗∗ 52.94∗∗∗ 43.62∗∗∗ 31.65∗∗∗ 27.34∗∗∗
Residential area (1.819) (2.287) (1.277) (1.040) (1.010) (2.114)
dep. var. With Plant-level Control Power Steel Cement Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food
Pollution (COD in kg) Distance in km to -92.62∗∗∗ -72.12∗∗∗ -67.46∗∗∗ -51.96∗∗∗ -50.02∗∗∗ -29.53∗∗∗
Downstream estuary (7.807) (7.347) (4.500) (7.807) (2.771) (2.775)
Distance in km to 78.09∗∗∗ 63.18∗∗∗ 50.34∗∗∗ 39.67∗∗∗ 31.26∗∗∗ 27.71∗∗∗
Residential area (7.578) (5.059) (2.981) (3.413) (2.726) (2.057)
N 19008 13992 4464 5824 4996 2592
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.3: Firm’s Locational Impact 2011-2015 (Additional Plant Control)184
dep. var. River Length ≤ mean Power Steel Cement Paper Clothing Food
Pollution (COD) Distance in km to -102.1∗∗∗ -101.2∗∗∗ -97.04∗∗∗ -52.60∗∗∗ -46.58∗∗∗ -31.84∗∗∗
(in kg) Downstream estuary (1.185) (1.697) (1.540) (1.255) (0.837) (0.592)
Distance in km to 98.83∗∗∗ 79.92∗∗∗ 78.25∗∗∗ 58.55∗∗∗ 50.14∗∗∗ 33.13∗∗∗
Residential area (1.154) (1.463) (1.337) (1.328) (0.739) (0.740)
N 41384 41236 10684 17980 18696 15580
dep. var. River Length > mean Power Steel Cement Paper Clothing Food
Pollution (COD) Distance in km to -76.37∗∗∗ -58.20∗∗∗ -41.14∗∗∗ -38.05∗∗∗ -31.84∗∗∗ -22.66∗∗∗
(in kg) Downstream estuary (1.372) (1.018) (0.763) (0.761) (0.683) (0.608)
Distance in km to 70.57∗∗∗ 57.76∗∗∗ 51.86∗∗∗ 40.69∗∗∗ 23.26∗∗∗ 20.85∗∗∗
Residential area (1.111) (1.136) (1.042) (0.798) (0.629) (0.499)
N 29188 34392 10868 21880 10748 17056
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.4: Heterogeneity due to Jurisdictional River Length
Power Steel Cement Paper Clothing Food
β1·river lengthi
average river length
-92.95 -93.89 -97.80 -46.21 -31.81 -27.49
N 70572 75628 21552 39860 29444 32636
Table B.5: Heterogeneity due to Jurisdictional River Length (Percentage Model)
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dep. var. Power Steel Cement Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food/Bev
Pollution (COD) Distance in km to -138.9∗∗∗ -75.12∗∗∗ -69.83∗∗∗ -63.05∗∗∗ -63.51∗∗∗ -46.08∗∗∗
Downstream estuary (13.82) (11.88) (1.803) (2.591) (2.128) (3.504)
Distance in km to 121.2∗∗∗ 106.2∗∗∗ 52.23∗∗∗ 50.92∗∗∗ 52.47∗∗∗ 32.40∗∗∗
Residential area (15.27) (9.876) (2.668) (3.669) (2.072) (5.084)
Abatement Tech. Distance in km to 0.00532∗∗∗ 0.00031∗∗ 0.00062∗∗∗ 0.00102∗∗∗ 0.00663∗∗∗ 0.00014∗∗
Downstream estuary (0.00027) (0.00010) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00030) (0.00005)
Distance in km to -0.00577∗∗∗ -0.000278∗∗ -0.000542∗∗∗ -0.000972∗∗∗ -0.00730∗∗∗ -0.000135∗∗
Residential area (0.00029) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00032) (0.00005)
N 70572 75628 21552 39860 29444 32636
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Abatement technology is production capacity (tons) installed with denitrification technology for Cement, Paper, and Food Sectors,
and with desulfurization technology for Power, Cement, and Clothing/Dyeing Sectors.
Table B.6: Firm’s Locational Impact on Water Pollution and Installed Abatement Technology: 2011-2015 Mundlak-RE with
IV for Location
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Dis. in km to Power Cement Steel Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food/Bev
First Stage of the Instrumented Variable: Distance in km to the Downstream Estuary
Closest -0.1291∗∗∗ -0.0479∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0867∗∗∗ -0.0392∗∗∗
Railroad (0.0021) (0.0068) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0087) (0.0017)
Closest -0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0311∗∗∗ -0.0346∗∗∗ 0.0361∗∗∗ -0.0309∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗
Main road (0.001) (0.0082) (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0009)
Closest 0.0858∗∗∗ 0.1524∗∗∗ 0.0531∗∗∗ 0.0415∗∗∗ 0.0008 0.0408∗∗∗
Industr. park (0.0016) (0.0047) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0073) (0.0016)
Commercial -0.018∗∗∗ 0.2476∗∗∗ -0.0265∗∗∗ -0.0085∗∗∗ 0.1038∗∗∗ -0.0186∗∗∗
Center (0.0012) (0.0145) (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0099) (0.0042)
First Stage of the Instrumented Variable: Distance in km to the Closest Residential Area
Closest -0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0546∗∗∗ -0.0288∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ 0.02∗ -0.0347∗∗∗
Railroad (0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0101) (0.0071)
Closest -0.0279∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.0528∗∗∗ 0.0476∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0417∗∗∗
Main road (0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0014) (0.002)
Closest -0.0088∗∗∗ -0.1162∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗ -0.0015 -0.0541∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗
Industr. park (0.0027) (0.0042) (0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0068) (0.0042)
Commercial 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.1767∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ -0.1219∗∗∗ -0.1011∗∗∗ 0.2751∗∗∗
Center (0.0018) (0.0116) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.006) (0.0215)
Underidentification & Overidentification Test
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 106.44∗∗∗ 63.65∗∗∗ 170.45∗∗∗ 57.95∗∗∗ 38.38∗∗∗ 62.59∗∗∗
Sargan-Hansen Stat 1.372 1.491 3.876 1.856 0.301 2.584
p-val 0.5035 0.4745 0.144 0.3953 0.8603 0.2747
Weak Identification Test
† Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 22.18 29.47 26.08 19.88 19.18 20.11
‡ AP F-val downstream 271.79 69.06 124.2 26.5 33.64 27.2
AP F-val resi. area 31.84 37.82 33.1 52.26 27.31 40.24
N 70572 21552 75628 39860 29444 32636
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values (maximal IV relative bias): 5% 11.04, 10% 7.56, 20% 5.57, 30% 4.73.
critical values (maximal IV size): 10% 16.87, 15% 9.93, 20% 7.54, 25% 6.28. Source: Stock-Yogo (2005)
‡ Critical values for single endog. regressor (maximal IV relative bias): 5% 16.85, 10% 9.08, 20% 6.46, 30% 5.39.
critical values (maximal IV size): 10% 22.30, 15% 12.83, 20% 9.54, 25% 7.80. Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).
Table B.7: First Stage Regression (Firm’s Locational Impact on Water Pollution)
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Dis. in km to Power Cement Steel Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food/Bev
First Stage of the Instrumented Variable: Distance in km to the Downstream Estuary
Closest -0.3039∗∗∗ -0.0772∗∗∗ -0.1054∗∗∗ 0.0008 -0.0793∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
Railroad (0.0051) (0.0043) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0132) (0.0021)
Closest -0.0792∗∗∗ -0.0218∗∗∗ -0.1073∗∗∗ -0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0056 0.0256∗∗∗
Main road (0.0046) (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0035)
Closest -0.0552∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0328∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0042
Industr. park (0.0055) (0.004) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0046) (0.0024)
Commercial 0.2301∗∗∗ 0.0057 0.1488∗∗∗ -0.0807∗∗∗ 0.0281∗ -0.0656∗∗∗
Center (0.0042) (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0117) (0.0031)
First Stage of the Instrumented Variable: Distance in km to the Closest Residential Area
Closest 0.2353∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.0909∗∗∗ -0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0788∗∗∗ -0.0551∗∗∗
Railroad (0.004) (0.0052) (0.0033) (0.0043) (0.0114) (0.0018)
Closest 0.0909∗∗∗ 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.1595∗∗∗ 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.0397∗∗∗ 0.0579∗∗∗
Main road (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0054) (0.0036) (0.0047) (0.003)
Closest 0.1037∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0917∗∗∗ 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.0134∗ 0.0357∗∗∗
Industr. park (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0028) (0.0049) (0.0054) (0.0019)
Commercial -0.2606∗∗∗ -0.0663∗∗∗ -0.2131∗∗∗ -0.0643∗∗∗ -0.0382∗∗∗ -0.0354∗∗∗
Center (0.0035) (0.0053) (0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0101) (0.0025)
Underidentification & Overidentification Test
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 55.51∗∗∗ 63.09∗∗∗ 70.24∗∗∗ 77.83∗∗∗ 70.53∗∗∗ 63.28∗∗∗
Sargan-Hansen Stat 2.783 1.388 4.505 0.169 0.492 4.063
p-val 0.2487 0.4997 0.1051 0.9189 0.7821 0.1311
Weak Identification Test
† Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 21.93 19.26 17.87 25.45 18.05 19.25
‡ AP F-val downstream 29.49 78.81 31.12 35.27 31.05 25.09
AP F-val resi. area 45.47 22.29 22.84 35.08 23.11 79.05
N 70572 21552 75628 39860 29444 32636
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values (maximal IV relative bias): 5% 11.04, 10% 7.56, 20% 5.57, 30% 4.73.
critical values (maximal IV size): 10% 16.87, 15% 9.93, 20% 7.54, 25% 6.28. Source: Stock-Yogo (2005)
‡ Critical values for single endog. regressor (maximal IV relative bias): 5% 16.85, 10% 9.08, 20% 6.46, 30% 5.39.
critical values (maximal IV size): 10% 22.30, 15% 12.83, 20% 9.54, 25% 7.80. Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).
Table B.8: First Stage Regression (Water-Polluting Firm’s Locational Impact on
Abatement Tech. Installation)
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dep var Pollution (COD) Power Steel Cement Paper Clothing/Dyeing Food/Bev
Distance in km to -134.0∗∗∗ -114.0∗∗∗ -108.6∗∗∗ -56.92∗∗∗ -27.04∗∗∗ -27.85∗∗∗
Downstream boundary (7.463) (7.658) (8.592) (5.500) (6.162) (6.370)
Distance in km to 138.6∗∗∗ 168.9∗∗∗ 91.62∗∗∗ 97.64∗∗∗ 42.72∗∗∗ 19.41∗∗
Residential area (9.440) (12.23) (28.74) (4.908) (11.713) (6.667)
Abatement tech. -1753.4∗∗∗ -4473.7∗∗∗ -3166.8∗∗∗ -1224.4∗∗∗ -3874.9∗∗∗ -1654.8∗∗∗
Capacity (tons) (90.23) (203.56) (864.12) (75.71) (152.19) (76.89)
Residual from -133.8∗∗∗ 52.51∗∗∗ -123.5∗∗∗ -1.191 -78.18∗∗∗ -128.5∗∗∗
Downstream equation (14.57) (11.19) (4.370) (3.927) (14.27) (15.72)
Residual from 28.80∗∗∗ 56.31∗∗∗ 10.25∗∗∗ 13.90∗∗∗ 52.09∗∗∗ 30.15∗∗∗
Residential equation (1.711) (1.535) (0.688) (0.657) (0.785) (1.890)
Residual from 2184.79∗∗∗ 15372.17∗∗∗ -13221.06∗∗∗ 1490.21∗∗∗ -4099.55∗∗ -6829.00∗∗∗
Technology equation (127.95) (576.52) (1261.93) (92.03) (1310.18) (481.74)
N 70572 75628 21552 39860 29444 32636
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Abatement technology is production capacity (tons) installed with denitrification technology for Cement, Paper, and Food Sectors,
and with desulfurization technology for Power, Cement, and Clothing/Dyeing Sectors.
Table B.9: Firm’s Locational Impact on Water Pollution: Control Function Approach 2011-2015
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